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Abstract
We study unemployment and growth dynamics. A search theoretic approach, 
augmented by exogenous and endogenous growth considerations, is used. We 
apply a variety of macro-econometric tools, across OECD countries, namely: 
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) analysis; simulations; frequency do­
main analysis and panel data regression analysis, to test out a variety of 
hypotheses drawn from the theoretical literature.
First, we look at unemployment dynamics, using a search model and 
an SVAR methodology, and discover that the European Community and 
the US have faced similar shocks, mainly aggregate ones, but have reacted 
very differently. The exception is Spain, where most of the unemployment 
dynamics have been driven by reallocation. Overall, this implies that EEC 
economies might be ‘dynamically sclerotic’ when compared to the US, though 
simulations do not confirm this result.
Next, we re-examine the link between growth and unemployment. Using: 
frequency domain analysis, panel data regression analysis and looking at 
cross correlations, we find that the interactions are weak, with at best a 
marginally significant negative effect of growth on unemployment. This is 
consistent with theories that predict capitalization effects dominate creative 
destruction, in the effect of growth on unemployment. It is not consistent 
with theories that imply a strong effect of unemployment on growth, through: 
loss of skills; learning by doing; cleansing effects and savings effects. Even 
when the capitalization effect is significant, it is not very large. A 1% increase 
in steady state growth would only reduce equilibrium unemployment by 1%.
Finally, we look at the links between growth, R&D and job flows, as an 
alternative way to isolate creative destruction effects. We find that creative 
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There can be few questions of more importance, in economics, than how to 
increase growth and reduce unemployment, in a sustainable way. After the 
global boom in the 1950s and 60s, there was a period when the World Econ­
omy became less robust, in response to two major oil price shocks. There was 
a global productivity slowdown and particularly in Europe, unemployment 
took off. Low unemployment and high growth have never been taken for 
granted since. Some questions have been answered, but many puzzles still 
remain. As Blanchard and Katz (1996) noted, in reference to the huge cross 
country differences in unemployment dynamics,
‘man?/ suspects have been identified, none has been convicted.’
The aim of this thesis, is to help answer the questions of how to sustain 
growth and keep unemployment low. We do this against a backdrop of an 
OECD data set. This is not because developing countries are not equally 
important, just that the data available for the OECD is much more compre­
hensive and of a higher quality1.
This thesis will document and evaluate, how and why unemployment 
and growth evolve over time, and if there is any relationship between the 
two. Below, I discuss the theoretical considerations and empirical techniques 
which provide the foundations of this thesis, before going on to describe how 
the rest of the thesis is organized.
th o u g h  more recent data sets, for example Maddison (1994), Summers and Heston 
(1992) and Barro and Lee (1993) do provide rich data for developing countries aswell.
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1.1 Theoretical considerations
1.1.1 The Labour Market
Although we use a variety of models of the labour market, throughout this 
thesis, the most common one utilizes a search and matching framework. Mod­
ern search theory has its roots in the early 80s through a series of pioneering 
papers by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982a,b) and Pissarides (1984a,b) 
(see Mortensen and Pissarides 1999 for an evaluation of what phenomena in 
the labour market search models can and cannot explain). The basic formu­
lation that is utilized in this thesis, is based on Pissarides’ (1990) model of 
equilibrium unemployment, as extended by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
to allow for job destruction. The approach interprets unemployment as the 
consequence of the need to reallocate workers across activities and the fact 
that the process takes time. The model is founded on two constructs, a 
matching function that characterizes the search and recruitment process by 
which new job-worker matches are created and an idiosyncratic productivity 
shock that captures the reason for resource allocation across alternative ac­
tivities. Given these concepts, decisions about the creation of new jobs, about 
recruiting and search effort, and about the conditions that induce job-worker 
separations can be formalized.
Existing employment relationships command monopoly rents because of 
search and recruiting investments, hiring and firing costs, and other forms 
of match-specific human capital formation. The surplus that accrues is allo­
cated between the parties to the employment relationship by a wage con­
tract. Given a particular wage rule, employers provide jobs and recruit 
workers while workers search for employment. At the same time, an existing 
employer-worker match ends when sufficiently bad news arrives about their 
expected future. These job creation and job destruction decisions generate 
worker flows into and out of employment which depend on the current value 
of the employed stock. When the two flows differ, employment dynamics are 
set in motion which, under a reasonable set of conditions, lead to a unique 
steady-state employment level. These properties characterize the equilibrium 
model of job creation and job destruction.
This framework allows one to clearly discriminate between aggregate and 
reallocative shocks. An aggregate shock affects the average profitability of 
jobs: a positive shock will increase the profitability of jobs and thus increase
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the incentive to create new ones. At the same time, the shock reduces the 
incentive to destroy the old ones, so that job creation and job destruction 
tend to move in opposite directions. A reallocative shock on the other hand, 
affects the dispersion of productivities across jobs. For example, a positive 
reallocative shock will increase, for a given average productivity, productivity 
in some firms and will reduce it in others. More jobs will be created in 
high productivity sectors. At the same time, more jobs will be destroyed 
in low productivity ones, so that job creation and destruction tend to move 
in the same direction. We make use of this identification when we look at 
unemployment dynamics in chapter 2.
The framework also allows us to analyze the effect of growth on unem­
ployment. This is split up into two effects (see Aghion and Howitt 1994 and 
Mortensen and Pissarides 1998). The creative destruction effect is when pro­
ductivity growth occurs through the destruction of low productivity jobs and 
their replacement by new high productivity ones elsewhere in the economy, 
thus increasing the inflow rate into unemployment. The capitalization ef­
fect is where an increase in the growth rate increases the present discounted 
value of the profits from creating a new job slot, leading firms to open more 
vacancies increasing the rate of job creation and thus ultimately reduce un­
employment. We discuss and test the relevance of these effects in chapters 4 
and 5.
1.1.2 Growth
We consider both exogenous and endogenous growth models. To find ef­
fects of growth on unemployment, we only require a search theoretic frame­
work and exogenously given growth. To generate effects of unemployment 
on growth that are permanent though, we require a model of endogenous 
growth. Once we allow for endogenous growth, there are many ways in 
which unemployment can effect growth, such as: loss of skills, learning by 
doing, savings and cleansing effects. We evaluate such effects in chapters 4 
and 5 using a variety of endogenous growth models, some with optimizing 
Ramsey frameworks and some within an overlapping generations structure.
We focus on two main engines for growth: physical capital accumulation 
and R & D. Romer (1986) formalized the idea that physical capital accumula­
tion could affect the steady state growth rate via an externality. Most of the 
models of endogenous growth based on physical capital, that we review, use 
his formulation. Schumpeter (1942) was one of the first to write about the
12
importance of innovation in the growth process. This line of reasoning sug­
gests that R&D should be important, as increasing R&D should increase the 
probability of making an innovation. Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) have 
formalized this intuition in models of growth through creative destruction. 
We test some important hypotheses deriving from these models in chapters 
4 and 5.
This thesis is really about trying to discriminate between differing hy­
potheses concerning the evolution of unemployment and growth. This re­
quires an way of testing and it is to this that we now turn.
1.2 Econom etric considerations
This thesis is about studying macroeconomic evolutions and thus we tend 
to focus on macroeconometric modes of empirical analysis. The main tech­
niques used are: structural vector autoregression (SVAR) analysis, simula­
tions, spectral analysis and panel data analysis. I briefly motivate each one 
of these in turn.
1.2.1 SVAR analysis
Standard macroeconomic theory represents the equilibrium dynamics of an 
economic variable, as the joint outcome of exogenous structural shocks and a 
transmission mechanism that allows for these shocks to propagate in the eco­
nomic system. The structural VAR (SVAR) methodology, pioneered among 
others by Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard and Quah (1989), seems well suited 
to testing whether the evolution of macroeconomic variables in different coun­
tries are: due to exposure to different shocks, or reacting differently to the 
same shocks. In fact, if a structural VAR (SVAR) is estimated, the impulse 
response functions represent how shocks propagate in the economic system, 
while the variance decompositions weight the contribution of each shock in 
the forecasting error of the relevant variables. This seems particularly suited 
to analyzing unemployment dynamics, which have differed markedly in the 
EEC and the US. We carry out such an exercise in chapter 2.
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1.2.2 Simulations
Often models lead to predictions which are ambiguous if one keeps working at 
a very general level of abstraction. To get some testable hypotheses one often 
calibrates a model with certain parameter values obtained by inference using 
other techniques. For example, when calibrating search models, a matching 
elasticity of 0.4 is often chosen, as estimated by Blanchard and Diamond 
(1990). Once a model has been calibrated we can simulate it to generate 
variables which mimic the data the model is trying to explain. We use this 
technique in chapter 2 to see if the predictions of search based labour market 
models are born out in the results of the SVAR approach.
1.2.3 Spectral analysis
Frequency domain analysis allows one to look at the relationship between 
macroeconomic variables at all frequencies. A very arbitrary split, for macroe­
conomic variables, might be that: low frequency movements are equivalent 
to movements in the equilibrium of the process; medium frequency move­
ments equivalent to business cycle induced fluctuations and high frequency 
movements highlight seasonal trends. By looking at phase and coherence dia­
grams, we can get an understanding of the correlation and lead/lag structure 
between two variables, at all frequencies. This could be particularly useful 
in studying the relationship between growth and unemployment, as we may 
expect the relationship to be different at different frequencies. At business 
cycle frequencies, we may expect Okun’s Law to dominate the relationship 
between output and unemployment. At lower frequencies, we may expect: 
capitalization effects, creative destruction effects, loss of skills, learning by 
doing, savings effects and cleansing effects to play a part in the relationship 
between growth and unemployment. Thus the relationship at business cycle 
frequencies could be very different to that at lower frequencies. In chapter 
3, we look at this issue by applying a variety of time and frequency domain 
methods to growth and unemployment evolutions.
1.2.4 Panel D ata Regression analysis
A common finding in OECD studies of growth and unemployment, is the 
prevalence of country specific effects. This is not surprising, as institutional 
structures such as: employment protection, union coverage, benefit durations
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and labour taxes can vary a lot, even amongst a seemingly homogenous group 
like the OECD. As Nickell (1997) has noted though, these institutions have 
evolved very slowly since the 1960s. Thus we can maybe consider them as 
country-specific effects that have not varied much over time. Panel data anal­
ysis is ideally set up for this problem, as it allows one to explicitly control for 
country specific effects. In chapter 5, we utilize data from: the CEP-OECD 
data set, the Barro-Lee data set, the NSF(1996) and the OECD database 
on unemployment benefit entitlements and replacement rates, to estimate 
a system of growth and unemployment equations and test the interactions 
between growth and unemployment, controlling for institutional effects.
1.3 Structure o f the Thesis
Below, I briefly summarize the structure and results of the remaining chap­
ters.
1.3.1 Chapter 2 - Unem ploym ent D ynam ics
The European Community and the US have experienced vastly different un­
employment dynamics over the last two decades. This chapter investigates 
whether these differences are due to exposure to different shocks, or react­
ing differently to the same shocks. With the premise of a search theoretic 
framework and a structural VAR methodology, the chapter robustly identifies 
aggregate versus reallocative shocks. With the exception of Spain where most 
of the dynamics seem to be driven by reallocation, it is found that most dif­
ferences in unemployment dynamics arise because of differences in responses 
to shocks. In particular, the US Labour market is quicker to adjust than the 
European Community. This implies that EEC economies might be dynami­
cally ‘sclerotic’, even if the size of the steady state labour market flows give 
the impression that European Labour markets are quite active. This speed 
of adjustment ranking though seemingly intuitive, are not reflected in simu­
lations of a simple search model. Calibrated ‘US’ and ‘European’ economies 
appear to have very similar speeds of adjustment in the simulations. This 
difference in what the data suggests and what the simulations imply will 
hopefully be solved in future work.
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1.3.2 Chapter 3 - Growth and Unem ploym ent: the  
facts re-examined
This chapter re-examines the facts about the bivariate link between growth 
and unemployment. This is achieved using both time domain methods, i.e. 
granger causality tests and cross correlations; and frequency domain methods. 
Amongst other things, we find a high degree of correlation between unem­
ployment and growth at equilibrium and low business cycle frequencies, with 
no noticeable shift in the relationship as one progresses from equilibrium 
frequencies to business cycle frequencies. Further, granger causality tests 
suggest that we cannot rule out unemployment and growth feeding back into 
each other.
1.3.3 Chapter 4 - M odels of the G row th/U nem ploym ent 
Dynam ic
In this chapter, we review various classes of models which can result in inter­
actions between growth and unemployment, namely: search models, overlap­
ping generations models, optimizing Ramsey models, efficiency wage models 
and educational models. We then evaluate the models in fight of the bivariate 
evidence documented in the previous chapter. This suggests that at longer 
horizons, the relationship between growth and unemployment is dominated 
by growth affecting unemployment rather than vice versa. This is because 
growth is highly stationary with low levels of persistence, whereas unemploy­
ment is a highly persistent process. Further, cross correlations suggest that 
capitalization effects are more important than creative destruction effects. 
At medium run horizons, a cleansing type effect seems to be very pervasive.
1.3.4 Chapter 5 - A  M ulti-Variate Evaluation o f the  
G row th/U nem ploym ent Dynam ic
In the final chapter, we take account of institutions explicitly and estimate 
unemployment and growth equations using panel data. Considerations in 
previous chapters suggested growth and unemployment feedback into each 
other. This could lead to the problem of simultaneity bias in the regression es­
timates. We solve this problem by estimating the unemployment and growth 
equations as a system. We also look at the relationship between growth and
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R&D and growth and job flows. We discover that the interactions between 
growth and unemployment are weak. Further analysis of R&D and job flows 
evidence suggests that R&D models of growth and creative destruction mech­
anisms may be important in countries on the technological frontier, such as 
the US, but not so prevalent in other OECD countries. Also, results from 
estimating the growth and unemployment system, suggest that changes in 
the investment share do not have significant effects on growth. This is con­
sistent with Jones’s (1995a) criticism of endogenous models of growth based 
on physical capital accumulation.
1.4 Overall Conclusions
Overall, the evidence from this thesis is suggestive of the following:
• Most differences in unemployment dynamics arise because of differences 
in responses to shocks not exposure to different shocks. Further, EEC 
economies might be dynamically ‘sclerotic’ when compared to the US, 
though simulations do not confirm this latter result.
• The interactions between growth and unemployment are weak. Only 
the effect of growth on unemployment is ever significant and then only 
in one specification. If this specification is the true one, the effect 
is negative, suggesting capitalization dominates creative destruction, 
but not very high, a 1% increase in steady state growth only reduce 
equilibrium unemployment by 1%.
• The links between growth and R&D and growth and job flows, suggest 
that only for the US, the technological leader, are R&D and creative 
destruction important factors in economic growth.
• The finding that investment is not significant in determining steady 
state growth, is consistent with Jones’s (1995a) criticism of endogenous 
models of growth based on physical capital accumulation. In fact, this 
thesis suggests that neither physical capital accumulation nor R&D 
have been the main factors in determining steady state growth, for 






Over the last two decades unemployment has increased dramatically within 
the European Community (EC). It started at less than 3% of the workforce 
before the first oil price shock, peaked at 11% in 1985 and is now around 
10%. This phenomenon has not been replicated in the US. The US has also 
experienced a rise in unemployment over some of this period, but nowhere 
near as marked as that for the EC. Many theories have been produced to 
explain the differences, in the time path of unemployment, between the two 
sides of the Atlantic. These huge differences in the dynamics of unemploy­
ment, however, remain a major puzzle for macroeconomists (see Bean 1994). 
“Many suspects have been identified, none has been convicted” (Blanchard 
and Katz 1996).
Standard macroeconomic theory represents the equilibrium dynamics, of 
an economic variable, as the joint outcome of exogenous structural shocks 
and a transmission mechanism that allows for these shocks to propagate in 
the economic system. Equilibrium unemployment has taken a very different 
time path in the European Community as compared to the US. This paper 
tests whether these differences are due to exposure to different shocks, or
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reacting differently to the same shocks or a combination of the two.
The structural VAR (SVAR) methodology, pioneered, among others, by 
Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard and Quah (1989), seems well suited to the 
above question. In fact, if a structural VAR (SVAR) is estimated, the impulse 
response functions represent how shocks propagate in the economic system, 
while the variance decompositions weight the contribution of each shock in 
the forecast error of the relevant variables. For the exercise to be meaningful, 
however, the shocks must have a robust economic interpretation: that is the 
call for a strong theoretical framework. We choose a search theoretic one 
(see Pissarides 1990) and we use flow data, from and into unemployment (see 
Burda and Wyplosz 1994), to identify aggregate versus reallocative shocks. 
An aggregate shock affects the average profitability of jobs: a positive shock 
will increase the profitability of jobs and thus increase the incentive to create 
new ones. At the same time, the shock reduces the incentive to destroy the 
old ones, so that inflows into and outflows from the unemployment pool, 
tend to move in opposite directions. A reallocative shock on the other hand, 
affects the dispersion of productivities across jobs. For example, a positive 
reallocative shock will increase, for a given average productivity, productivity 
in some firms and will reduce it in others. More jobs will be created in high 
productivity sectors. At the same time, more jobs will be destroyed in low 
productivity ones, so that the unemployment flows tend to move in the same 
direction. We start from a two variable SVAR specification and then augment 
it by introducing additional labour force shocks, identified as skill unbiased 
and skill biased shocks. We think of the former as a shock that, in the long 
run, is neutral on the level of the unemployment rate and of the latter as a 
shock that, for given size of the labour force, affects unemployment flows in 
the same way as a reallocative shock.
A related exercise was carried out by Blanchard and Diamond (1989, 
1990). They estimated a three variable SVAR with unemployment, vacan­
cies and the labour force. Their experiment was carried out for the US only. 
They found that, except at long durations, reallocative and labour force
19
shocks contributed little to the fluctuations in the unemployment or vacancy 
rate. This paper differs in three respects. Firstly we make use of flow as well 
as stock data. In fact, Hosios (1991), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and 
Caballero and Hammour (1994) argue for the need to look at labour market 
flows, to properly identify reallocative versus aggregate shocks. Once the 
job destruction rate is endogenized, it is no longer possible to properly iden­
tify these shocks by looking at movements in unemployment and vacancies 
alone (see Hosios 1991). Secondly, the analysis is cross-country. We estimate 
SVARS for: the US, the UK, Germany, France and Spain for the period 1972- 
1990, so that the main purpose of the paper is to compare across countries. 
We also extensively check for robustness using different structural restric­
tions, and different variables in our VAR specification. Finally, we perform 
simulations of a simple search model as a final check of the interpretation of 
the results.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• European economies seem to respond slower to shocks than the US. 
This implies that EEC economies might be dynamically “sclerotic”, 
even if the size of the steady state labour market flows might give 
the impression of the European labour market being quite active (see 
Burda and Wyplosz 1994, OECD, 1994a, 1994b, Garibaldi et al., 1996, 
Alogoskoufis et al. 1995 and Bertola and Rogerson 1996). This result 
is not confirmed in the simulations of calibrated ‘US’ and ‘European’ 
economies which is very surprising and we hope to investigate further 
in future work.
• Different economies seem to be subject to the same structural shocks, 
mainly aggregate ones. Spain is the only exception, where reallocative 
shocks predominate. This difference may be due to the reallocation 
of workers, from the agriculture to the manufacturing sector, after the 
Franco’s reign, in Spain (see Marimon and Zilibotti (1996) and Dolado 
and Jimeno (1997)). The simulations suggest that the results from the
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VAR based on a normalization in rates, are more reliable than results 
based on data normalized by the labour force. The results though hold 
for both specifications.
• Shocks that are identified to affect all skill levels equally and not to 
have a long run impact on unemployment, do not appear to have had 
much influence for any of the countries considered.
• For all countries in the sample, the reallocative component can be split 
into a labour side skill biased component and a firm side reallocative 
component. This implies that skill biased technological progress (see 
Katz and Murphy 1992 and Juhn et al. 1993) might explain some of 
the unemployment problems of OECD economies.
Section II introduces aggregate and reallocative shocks in a search theo­
retic framework, and section III summarizes the SVAR methodology. Section 
IV documents the data. Section V reports the results for the two variable 
SVAR under different specifications. Section VI extends the analysis, by in­
troducing labour force shocks into the model and considering both a three 
and four variable SVAR . Section VII simulates a search model and compares 
the results to those from the SVAR. Section VIII summarizes the results and 
considers the implications.
2.2 A  Search Theoretic Framework
In this section we sketch a model of the labour market with search frictions. 
We use the model to derive the implications of aggregate and reallocative 
shocks for the dynamics of labour market flows. The analysis draws on 
Pissarides (1990) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
2.2.1 The theoretical Set-up
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The labor market consists of firms and workers. We assume they are both 
risk-neutral and maximize expected returns in output units, discounted at 
rate r > 0. Each firm has one job that can be in one of two states: filled 
and producing or vacant and searching. Jobs that are not actively producing 
or searching for a match, are destroyed. Similarly, workers can be either 
unemployed and searching, or employed and producing. As in Jovanovic 
(1979, 1984), we keep the simplifying assumption of equating wages to the 
reservation utility of workers, or that firms can extract all the surplus from 
a match. This implies, as in Jovanovic, that if h is the common alternative 
value of a worker’s time, that his wage w once employed will also be equal 
to h1.
Each job is characterized by a fixed irreversible technology and produces 
a quantity of goods equal to P  +  at. P  and a are common to all jobs, l is 
job specific and represents an idiosyncratic component of productivity. P  is 
the aggregate component of productivity that does not affect the dispersion 
of productivity. A change in P  affects, in a similar way, the profitability of 
all jobs and it is thus called an aggregate shock. The parameter cr reflects 
dispersion, with an increase in cr representing a symmetric mean preserving 
spread in the job-specific shock distribution, or equivalently an increase in 
the cross sectional variance of the productivity of jobs. A change in cr is a 
reallocative shock. For example, an increase in cr corresponds to a positive 
reallocative shock: productivity in some firms rises while it falls in others.
The process that changes the idiosyncratic component of productivity is 
assumed to be a Poisson process, with rate of arrival fi. When there is a 
change, the new value of t is a drawing from the fixed distribution G (-), 
which has finite upper support Z, no mass points, zero mean and unit vari­
ance. a is therefore the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component
1In the search literature wages are usually chosen so as to share at all times the surplus 
from a job match in fixed proportion, usually via a Nash bargain, see for example Pissarides 
(1990). We do not pursue this line of research here to save on notation and space. The 




As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), firms create jobs that have pro­
ductivity equal to the upper support of the distribution of productivities 
P  +  &l. Once a job is created, however, the firm has no choice over its pro­
ductivity. Thus job productivity is a stochastic process, with the initial 
condition being the upper support of the distribution and the terminal state 
being the reservation productivity R  that leads to job destruction. In fact, 
existing filled jobs are destroyed only if idiosyncratic component of their pro­
ductivity falls below some critical number R < T. Therefore, the rate at which 
existing jobs are destroyed is /xG (R ) .
As workers are heterogeneous and firms post vacancies to operate specific 
jobs, matching a worker with a vacancy is costly and requires time. Because 
of this, the model is usually closed through a useful tool: the matching func­
tion2, that is a stable, concave, homogenous-of-degree-one aggregate relation, 
H  =  m(U, V), linking the unemployment pool U and the stock of vacancies, 
V, with the number of new hirings H. The matching function allows one to 
represent two key characteristics of the labour market: the fact that work­
ers and firms are heterogeneous so that search is costly and time consum­
ing; and the fact that different firms might compete for the same workers. 
The transition rate for vacancies is q(0) = =  m (|, 1),
where 9 =  while the rate at which unemployed seekers meet vacancies is
2.2.2 The Formal M odel
The assumption that vacancies cost x  Per unit of time and that jobs are cre­
ated at the upper support of the distribution of the productivity distribution,
2See Jackman, Layard and Pissarides (1986), Pissarides (1986), Blanchard and Dia­
mond (1989,1990) and Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for empirical evidence on the existence 
of stable aggregate matching functions. Caballero and Hammour (1990, 1996) show how 
a matching function is not required to close the model, as a search theoretic framework 
just asks for some mechanism that makes it progressively less profitable to post vacancies 
at a given level of unemployment. In their set up, creation costs provide this.
23
imply that
rV  =  -X  +  q(0) [J(Z) -  V]
where V  and J(l) are respectively the asset values of a vacancy and of a filled 
job with idiosyncratic component i. As in Pissarides (1990) and Burda and 
Wyplosz (1994), jobs are created until all rents are exhausted. This implies 
the value of posting a vacancy must reach zero, so that the following free 
entry condition holds:
—  =  J(1) (FE)
Since firms have the option of closing jobs at no cost, a filled job continues 
in operation for as long as it is profitable. Hence, filled jobs axe destroyed 
when a productivity shock y arrives that makes J(y) negative. Given the 
Jovanovic assumption that workers are paid their marginal product h, for
any realization i, J( l) solves the Belman equation
(r +  fi) J(l) = P  +  at — h +  p f  max [J(y), 0] dG (y) . (2.1)
J—oo
Since J (l) is monotonically increasing in l, there is a unique reservation 
productivity R  that solves J(R) = 0 such that jobs that get a shock i < R, 
are destroyed. The condition J(R)  =  0 and the fact that J'{y) =  
implies, after integration by parts, that R  solves
P  + *R  = h - - ^ ~  r [ l - G ( y ) ] d y  (DE)
T  T  fJL J  Ft
so that Vt > R
J(t) = J l ~ R ) (2.2)
fi +  r  v '
while J(t) = 0 if i < R. Equation (FE)  together with (DE)  given the 
constraint imposed by either (2.1) or (2.2) completely solves the model in the 
two endogenous variables, 6 and R. Given equation (FE), 6 reflects market 
profitability: the higher the profitability of a job, the bigger the incentive to 
enter the market and the higher is 6. R  is a reservation productivity and
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reflects the option of firms to keep operating: the bigger the value of the 
option, the lower the value of R.
Let us indicate, respectively, with Et and Ut, the number of employed and 
unemployed workers. We then obtain that the inflow into unemployment, in, 
and the outflow from unemployment, out, are equal to
in  =  pG (R ) Et (2.3)
out = p(6)Ut. (2.4)
pG (R) is the inflow rate into unemployment. It is increasing in R: the
higher the reservation productivity R, the bigger the fraction of firms that
are destroyed. P  (0) is the outflow rate from unemployment. It is increasing 
in 6: the bigger the value of 6, the higher the probability of exiting from the 
unemployment pool.
In this framework, it is possible to think of shocks affecting either firms 
or the labour force. In this section we focus on shocks of the first kind, while 
we analyze shocks of the second kind in section 2.6.
An aggregate shock affects in a similar way the profitability of all jobs, 
both the operating and non operating ones. This is equivalent to a change
in P.  Differentiating (F E ) and (DE)  with respect to P, it can be seen that
d R  <7_1
d P  ~  1 -  ^  [1 -  G (i?)] <
= b(g)]2 dR
dP q'(&)x (^ + r) dP
as it follows from the fact that q'(6) < 0. As a result, a positive aggregate 
shock that increases the profitability of jobs, increases the incentive to create 
new ones and thus p(6) rises. At the same time, the shock reduces the 
incentive to destroy the old ones , thus pG (R) falls. This implies that, 
for given dynamics of the labour force, inflows into the unemployment pool 
would fall, while outflows would rise.
A positive reallocative shock will increase, for a given average produc­
tivity, productivity in some firms and will reduce it in others. Intuitively, a
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positive reallocative shock increases the cross sectional variance of the pro­
ductivity of jobs and it is equivalent to an increase in a. Differentiating (2.1) 
with respect to a, we obtain
m  = _ i _ + „ f ? m dG {y)
da r -f p Jr da
+ (r + fi) [r f  txG(R)] L ydG ^
that is positive for any l greater than zero as y dG (y) =  0 by assumption. 
Therefore, equations (FE) and (DE) imply that
dR _  (P -  h) a~2
1 “  7+J111 “  ^
±  =  m ?  dj(i)  Q
da q'(Q)x da
In other words, an increase in a leads to an increase in 0 which will have a 
positive affect on p(9). More jobs will be created in the high productivity 
sectors. At the same time more jobs will be destroyed in the low productivity 
ones, as R  increases and thus fiG (R) rises. Inflows into and outflows from the 
unemployment pool will simultaneously rise so that, ceteris paribus, worker 
flows should move in the same direction3. We use this result to identify 
an aggregate versus a reallocative shock in the context of structural VAR 
methodology.
One final point worth mentioning, is the distinction between worker, job 
and unemployment flows. In the model analyzed above, they coincide ex­
actly. This is not the case in the real world and we talk more about the 
empirical implications of this in section 2.4. Theoretically though, it is also 
important to draw a distinction between the various flows. Mortensen (1994)
3It should also be noted that the result does not depend on the assumption that jobs 
are created at the upper support of the distribution of productivities. In fact the value of 
a job J (l) at any idiosyncratic productivity i > 0  increases: a firm always has the option 
to stop losses when things go wrong. That is why an an increase in idiosyncratic volatility 
a  generally raises the value of a job and increases 9.
26
and Pissarides (1994) model on-the-job search with this in mind. More ex­
plicitly, Burda and Wyplosz (1994) model the distinction between a job and 
a worker-firm match. It seems that our identifying restrictions would extend 
to their set-up as well, once the destruction margin is modelled in the same 
way as in this section: on impact an aggregate (reallocative) shock will tend 
to move unemployment flows in opposite (same) directions4.
2.3 The Structured VAR M ethodology
Let Yt, et be two vectors containing, respectively, the observed values of our 
variables, assumed to be covariance stationary, and the structural distur­
bances.
From the assumption that Yt is a stationary process, it follows that there 
exists a Wold Decomposition with white noise disturbances rjt such that Yt = 
C{L)rjt , where E(r)tr)'t) = Q If, moreover, we assume that the relationship 
between the structural disturbances et and the observed outcomes Yt has a 
linear moving average (MA) representation, it follows that
Yt = C(L)r,t =  B(L)et, B{0) =  B0, (2.5)
where B(L)  is a (potentially) infinite order matrix polynomial in the lag op­
erator L, describing the dynamic effects, on Ytl of the structural disturbances 
et . From equation (2.5), it follows that rjt =  Boet and Bi = CiBo, where Bi , 
Ci are, respectively, the matrix coefficients associated with the terms of order 
i in the polynomials B(L), C(L).
In the analysis, we assume that the structural disturbances are uncorre­
lated white noise errors of unit variance. Though this is standard in the VAR
4This is not the same thing as saying that in response to an aggregate shock, unem­
ployment flows must move in opposite directions over the adjustment path. In fact, Burda 
and Wyplosz (1994) show that a sufficiently big adverse aggregate shock raises the unem­
ployment stock and makes unemployment flows move together over the adjustment path. 
Still, on impact, an adverse aggregate shock raises unemployment (the destruction margin 
rises), while the outflow rate falls.
27
literature, it is not a trivial assumption and requires some justification. A 
simple justification often invoked in the SVAR literature (see Blanchard and 
Quah 1989), is that the structural shocks, by their very nature, are funda­
mental shocks without a common cause and should therefore be treated as 
orthogonal. It certainly seems possible though, that many shocks that have 
impacted on the world economy in the post war period, have both aggregate 
and reallocative components. For example, the oil price shocks of 1972 and 
1979. If this is the case, the assumption of orthogonality is still tenable with 
shocks having both aggregate and reallocative components, provided the re­
allocative component depends on the magnitude of the aggregate shock and 
not its direction, i.e. not whether it is a positive or negative aggregate shock5. 
Over a long enough time period, the fundamental shocks should include a 
random mix of positive and negative aggregate shocks. Thus the correlation 
between aggregate and reallocative shocks should be zero, or close enough to 
zero.
This is equivalent to noting that even if the aggregate Pt and reallocative 
E* shocks are not stochastically independent, they might still be uncorrelated. 
For example, suppose that the aggregate shock Pt is symmetric and that the 
absolute size of Et and Pt are related as follows:
E ( £ t \P t) = b ( P ? - a )
where b > 0 and a =  E (&} ■ In other words the reallocative component is 
related to size of the aggregate component and not its direction. Then:
E ( £ t P t) =  0
so that Et and Pt are uncorrelated even if not stochastically independent. 
If so, the orthogonality assumption is still a reasonable one. We still have
5It should be noted that Caballero and Hammour (1994) argue that the direction could 
matter, to the extent that there is usually more reallocation in a recession than in a boom, 
due to cleansing type effects. One could argue though that this not a reflection of the 
asymmetry of reallocative shocks, but more of an asymmetry in the reaction to the shock. 
In other words, that the perceived costs of adjusting to the shock could be lower in a 
recession.
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to be careful about this interpretation of aggregate and reallocative shocks 
and its relation to those described in the search framework earlier. In the 
search framework, the reallocative shock was purely a shock to the dispersion 
of the idiosyncratic component of productivity and did not depend on the 
aggregate shock at all. Above we are arguing for a reallocative shock made 
up of two components:
ere =  </>( m o d ( e ag) + Ei
In other words, a component which depends on the size of the aggregate 
shock and one which does not. Now provided Er e  and Ea g  are uncorrelated, 
then the identification restrictions discussed below will allow us to derive 
impulse responses and variance decompositions for reactions to Er e  and Ea g . 
But in terms of the reallocative shock, we may be more interested in ei, as 
the other part of the reallocative shock is caused by the aggregate shock and 
thus in some way is less of a fundamental shock. Thus it may be the case that 
the variance decompositions put too much weight on fundamental realloca­
tive shocks, by including the component which depends on the magnitude 
of the aggregate shock. We could still argue that looking at the impact of 
the total reallocative component is interesting. As though part of it may 
be fundamentally caused by an aggregate shock, it is the transmission of 
this shock via reallocation which is causing the effect on unemployment. So 
provided we are aware that under this interpretation, the variance decompo­
sitions are assigning which shocks explain unemployment rather than which 
shocks are the initial impulse to unemployment, the variance decompositions 
are meaningful.
Again, we can provide a different decomposition of aggregate and real­
locative shocks that gets over this problem. In the real world we can think of 
shocks as always being a combination of aggregate and reallocative shocks, 
oil price shocks in the 70s being examples with a big component of both 
types of shock. But just because these shocks happen at the same time does 
not mean that they are correlated. Different shocks will have a different mix 
of aggregate and reallocative components. In fact we can think of a shock as
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a random drawing from the distribution of aggregate shocks and a random 
drawing from the distribution of reallocative shocks, with both shocks being 
independent of each other. This is a meaningful decomposition as though the 
shocks may happen at the same time, they have very different dynamics on 
job flows and very different policy implications. Under this decomposition 
the shocks are independent and there will be a direct correspondence from 
the shocks discussed under a search framework, to the shocks identified in an 
SVAR. Though if we believe that reallocation is caused by aggregate shocks, 
it is quite difficult to sustain that the shocks axe independent of each other 
and therefore accept this decomposition.
The point of the above discussion, is just to highlight the fact that the 
orthogonality of shocks is not an innocuous assumption and depending how 
we decompose shocks to be consistent with this, will affect how we interpret 
the resulting variance decompositions from the SVAR analysis.
From this, it follows that:
B 0B'0 = E{r}tr}'t) =  Q. (2.6)
The dynamics of the coefficient Bi represent the speed of adjustment to a 
given a shock. The greater the speed, the faster they decay. The contribution 
of a shock to the underlying dynamics of a variable, is given by the contri­
bution of the shock to the variance of the forecasting error of the variable at 
different leads (forecasting variance decomposition). In what follows we draw 
on the theoretical structure, introduced in the previous section, to estimate 
an SVAR as in equation (2.5). We consider different restrictions and different 
vectors of variables Yt, to identify the matrix Bo through equation (2.6) and 
check for robustness of the results.
2.4 D ata D escription
The French data came from the Ministere du Travail, the German data from 
the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, the Spanish data from the Bank of Spain, the
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UK data from the Employment Gazette and the US data from the Employ­
ment and Earnings survey.
The UK, German and French unemployment flow data are registry or 
claimant count based, whereas the Spanish and US data axe labour force 
survey based. All data has been seasonally adjusted. One caution should 
be mentioned. The vacancy data also is often not as comprehensive as one 
would like. For example, the US series is based on the help-want index of 
advertised vacancies and the UK series is of job centre reported vacancies. 
Both series may only capture up to a third of the total vacancy stock.
The data is on: inflows to, I t , and outflows from, Ot, unemployment; 
vacancies Vt; and the labour force, Lt, and is quarterly for the period 1972:3 
-1989:4 for France, Germany and Spain, but extended to 1997:4 for the US 
and the UK. A balanced sample was chosen as far as possible as some of 
the tests, for example comparing the impulse responses of the European 
countries relative to the US, can only be meaningful if performed over a 
balanced sample. Considering the data for the US and UK could be updated 
much further, we decided it was worth doing so for these two countries.
Various integration and cointegration tests were performed. All variables 
were found to be / ( l) ,  with inflows and outflows, standardized by the labour 
force, cointegrated with a cointegrating vector of approximately (1, —l)6. 
This is unsurprising, given that flows into and out of unemployment are 
large relative to the stock of unemployment. Thus any sharp movements in 
netflows should cause a sharp movement in the stock of unemployment. A 
perfunctory look at unemployment data for most countries, quickly shows 
that this rarely occurs. Also intuitively, an increase in inflows causes a rise 
in unemployment. Given the matching function, and ceteris paribus, this 
should lead to an increase in matchings or outflows. See figure 2.5 for graphs 
of inflows and outflows normalized by Lt.
6The flows to and from unemployment are likely to be measured with significant error. 
The strong cointegrating relationship between them could be partly due to this, though it 
is likely that the fact that unemployment is slow moving is far more important in explaining 
it.
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One final point on the data should be made. In the model we analyzed 
in section 2.2, unemployment, job and worker flows coincided exactly. This 
is not the case in reality. The flows we have are inflows to and outflows from 
unemployment. These are not the same as job destruction and job creation 
rates. Inflows are made up of job destruction, quits into unemployment and 
new entrants to the labour force. Outflows are made up of job creation and 
exits from unemployment to out of the labour force. It is then a reasonable 
question to ask if the identification of aggregate and reallocative shocks in our 
model, extend to a theoretical set-up where these distinctions are explicitly 
taken into account. There axe good reasons to believe that it does. Burda 
and Wyplosz (1994) detail how, for Europe at least, job separations axe 
much laxger than the flow of new entrants to the labour force: the majority 
of workers who leave unemployment do so because they have found a job. 
Moreover, they highlight that quits into unemployment represent a minor 
component of total unemployment inflow. Further, they show that exits from 
unemployment to employment, in European data, axe numerically larger than 
exits from the labour force. For example in Germany, 60-70% of outflows axe 
attributable to new employment. For the US the picture is not so rosy. 
Clark and Summers (1979) attribute up to half the unemployment flows in 
the US to entry and exit from the labour force. However, for given dynamics 
of the labour force, on impact a reallocative (aggregate) shock will tend to 
move unemployment flows in the same (opposite) directions. Moreover, we 
also introduce additional labour force shocks, in section 2.6, to correct for 
possible discrepancies in the dynamics of jobs versus worker flows. As it will 
be seen later, the robustness of the main broad results suggest that the main 
conclusions would have been no different if we had explicitly considered the 
distinction between unemployment, job and worker flows.
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2.5 Estim ating A ggregate and R eallocative Shocks
The considerations in section 2.2 suggest a very strong theoretical restriction. 
In response to an aggregate shock, flows into and out of the unemployment 
pool should move in the opposite direction; while in response to a reallocative 
shock, they should move in the same direction. If we write the contempora­
neous effects matrix as:
B 0 = 0-2 bi2 
O l  &21 0 2
equation (2.6) imposes that the coefficient £>12 and 621 must satisfy the fol­
lowing relation
_ f i i 2—f i l i a l  /0
12 n22-n 12V
while the two coefficient 0 1, cr2 are also defined as function of 612 and &21 
only.
In what follows, we consider different restrictions on the parameters bn 
and &21 such that (2.7) holds and the two coefficients axe of opposite signs. 
612 and &21 having opposite sign is a direct implication of our identification 
scheme for aggregate and reallocative shocks. We look at different combi­
nations of &12 and &21 as a check of the robustness of our results to slight 
perturbations.
As the objective of the paper is to compare across countries, we would 
like the variable to be scale free. (2.3) and (2.4) suggest two possible stan­
dardizations to analyze the flows: one in terms of the labour force, the other 
in terms of rates. Therefore, and as an additional check of robustness, we 
consider two different two variable SVAR specifications:
• In order to keep track of the dynamics of the unemployment rate, we 
consider a specification with outflows over labour force, and inflows 
over labour force, jfc. The variables seem to be integrated of order one 
and cointegrated with cointegrating parameter equal to (1,-1) (see the
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consideration of the previous section and figure 2.5 to illustrate the 




i t  Lt I
where A indicates the first difference operator and measures
net flows, n f t. Moreover we recover as a proxy of the impact on the 
unemployment rate at time t, the sum of the impact on — j i .
Our second specification uses the outflow rate,^-, and the inflow rate, 
■A (inflows over employment,^). The two variables seem to be inte­
grated of order one and not cointegrated. Therefore, we also consider 
as an alternative
A-7t
Yt = A 0tut j
As the dynamics of the unemployment rate, ut, are approximately given 
by Aut =  ^(1  — ut) — we also consider a measure of the forecast­
ing variance decomposition for the changes of the unemployment rate, 
given by the average between the ones of inflow and outflow rate with 
weight equal to (1 — ut) and ut respectively7.
2.5.1 Identification
In the 2 variable SVAR, only one identification restriction is required to 
exactly identify the matrix Bo in equation (2.5). In the first specification 
outlined above, we consider
Yt = A l-Q l  J l L  
I Lt Lt J
7In tables 2.4-2.11 the results are obtained posing a standardizing value of ut =  0.07. 
This value represents the approximate average of the unemployment rate of the countries 
considered for the sample chosen. We tried different values, choosing the average unem­
ployment rate for each country, not across the whole sample, but found the results were 
virtually identical, as the weights Ut and 1  — ut do not vary much.
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where — measures net flows n f t. An aggregate shock will cause A  A and 
n f t to move in the opposite direction, whereas a reallocative shock will cause 
them to move in the same direction. The logic is the one outlined in section 
2.2. Consider a positive reallocative shock that increases the productivities 
in some sectors and reduces it in others (an increase in the variance of the 
productivities of jobs a). This will cause the inflow into unemployment 
to rise (AA is positive) because of the contribution of declining sectors. 
Outflows will also rise, both because of the underlying trend linking the 
unemployment flows (cointegration) and because of the contribution of the 
expanding sectors. This causes outflows to increase more than what it would 
have done in the absence of the shock, i.e. n f t is positive. Thus AA and 
n f t move in the same direction. An analogous argument can be applied to 
aggregate shocks.
We identify the SVAR by choosing combinations of b12 and b2i such that 
(2.7) holds and the coefficients have opposite sign. Thus we impose impact 
restrictions on the SVAR. We report the results for 621 =  1,30 and 60 to 
cover the range of values for which the coefficients have opposite sign ( see 
figure 2.6 for the 612, b2\ locii, for all the countries, with the normalization 
by the labour force).
For the second normalization, a similar procedure is carried out, we simply 
identify an aggregate shock as one which causes A-A. and A ^  to move in 
opposite direction on impact and a reallocative shock to move them in the 
same direction on impact. We follow the same procedure for choosing b\2 
and b2\ as above.
2.5.2 R esults
The appendix gives the recursive chow tests, variance covariance decomposi­
tions, the impulse response functions and the speed of adjustment rankings 
for the two different two variables VAR specifications8. The results are re­
8 All the VARs in the paper were estimated with two lags. Standard Durbin Watson 
tests performed well. We also carried out some maximum likelihood tests against specifi­
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ported during the sample period 1972:3-1989:4 for Prance, Germany and 
Spain and updated until 1997:4 for the UK and US. In an earlier version of 
this chapter, all results were reported for the sample period 1972:3-1989:4. 
Only the updated results are reported here for the US and UK, though I will 
discuss the few differences there were between the initial sample results and 
the updated results, in the main text below, for these two countries.
The updated sample size allows us to test for structural change in the 
UK economy. It has been often argued that the UK labour market has 
evolved over the 1980s and 1990s due to the reforms implemented under 
Mrs. Thatcher. Many believe that the UK switched onto a more dynamic 
adjustment path, due to these reforms, during the 1990s and that the shock 
which was the impulse, was the UK leaving the ERM in the final quarter 
of 1992. We test this hypothesis by performing structural stability tests 
around this time. We perform recursive Chow tests for a structural break 
from 1990:1 to 1993:2 (a couple of quarters after the ERM exit). We do the 
same test for the US, to make sure that any structural break is unique to the 
UK during this period and could not be explained by some common factor 
affecting many countries.
The results for both specifications are reported in F igures 2.1-2.8. The 
graphs plot the value of the F statistic of the chow test, for a particular 
point in time, normalized by the value of 1% significance. Thus any point 
value below one can be interpreted as not rejecting the null hypothesis of 
no structural break. A 1% significance level is chosen as opposed to a 5% 
level, due to considerations discussed in Hendry (1996) of multiple testing 
when the tests overlap. By performing Chow tests recursively, we are in­
creasing the chance of finding some structural break and thus we must alter
cations with longer lags. Our specification beat the one with three lags, while the results 
were mixed for lags longer than four. In these cases, however, the VARs seemed to be 
overparametrized as the impulse responses looked unstable. We therefore relied on the 
principle of parsimony by choosing the specification with the smaller number of lags. We 
also looked at subsample stability tests, within a country, looking at the AR estimates 
of each equation separately. In general, the null hypothesis that no structural break had 
taken place before and after the 80 's was not rejected.
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the significance levels for the individual chow tests to adjust for this. We are 
performing chow tests recursively over 10 quarters, for which the Bonferroni 
bound for Type 1 errors with an individual significance level of 5% would 
be 40%. Thus to keep the overall possibility of Type 1 errors down, Hendry 
suggests using an individual significance level of 1% or lower. Referring to 
figures 2.1-2.8, it is very clear that there is no evidence of any structural 
change for the US economy, from either specification. At face value, the 
same result seems to hold for the UK. But looking a bit closer, the inflow 
equation for both specifications is close to the rejection level during the early 
90s for the UK, but nowhere near the rejection level for the US. This may be 
consistent with the hypothesis that the UK has evolved, but has not changed 
fundamentally enough to put itself onto a new adjustment path. Certainly, 
there does not seem to be strong case for a new adjustment path after the 
UK left the ERM. Overall it is difficult to reject the null of no structural 
change in the UK economy. This is consistent with the fact that the results 
below have not changed much once we updated the sample for the US and 
UK.
Table 2.3 documents the impact effects, standard deviations and the 
long run impacts of the shocks, using the standardization by the labour 
force. With the exception of Spain, it can be seen that in general the long 
rim impact of a shock, of unit standard deviation, is higher for aggregate 
shocks than for reallocative shocks9. This is consistent with the Variance 
Decomposition evidence (discussed later), that shows that aggregate shocks 
dominate, at least at long lags, with the exception being Spain. Also the 
impact effects, of a unit standard deviation shock, are very similar for France 
and Germany. Spain shows higher impact effects for both shocks. Finally, it 
is worth noting that the size of the reallocative shocks (ai) are much larger 
in Spain than in other countries.
Table 2.4 documents the dynamic speed of adjustment to the shocks.
9Though for the UK, with 6 2 1  =  60 the opposite is true, but only just. This is different 
from results for the initial sample where aggregate shocks were larger for all values of 6 2 1  > 
for the UK.
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The entries show the values of the norm of the ranked eigenvalues of the 
VAR(l) representation of the VAR, for different specifications. In the long 
rim, the dynamics of the system are dominated by the eigenvalue with the 
greatest norm. Thus, we consider this the appropriate measure to capture the 
long run speed of adjustment of the system10. As clearly illustrated, the US 
is quickest. The ranking over France, Germany, the UK and Spain, though, 
depends on which normalization we use. If standardized by the labour force, 
Germany is next, followed by France, Spain with the UK last. If we use the 
specification in terms of rates, the UK, Germany and Spain are quicker than 
France.
The US showing the quickest adjustment will not surprise many. It is 
often argued that the US has a more flexible labour market than the EC: 
with low welfare payments of a short duration, small firing costs and little 
trade union influence. Several authors have noted that steady state job 
flows are remarkably similar across the two sides of the Atlantic (OECD, 
1994a, 1994b, Garibaldi et al., 1996, Alogoskoufis et al. 1995 and Bertola 
and Rogerson 1996). Burda and Wyplosz (1994) also note how worker flows 
are large in Europe and because of this they argue that European Labour 
markets are quite active. The results of this section suggest, however, that 
European labour markets are dynamically “sclerotic”, even if steady state 
flows might give the impression of the European labour market being quite 
active.
Germany being so high in the rankings may surprise a few. This may be 
due to: its comprehensive apprentice system (see Lynch 1994); its alleged cor- 
poratist structure and nominal wage flexibility (see Bruno and Sachs (1985)). 
In comparison to France, Germany also does not have an explicit minimum 
wage and apprentices often work at considerably lower than market wages11. 
All theses factors, may allow a faster adjustment to shocks than is often
10This implies that the long run speed of adjustment of the system is independent of 
the the values of & 12 and 6 2 1  chosen.
11 In France, an explicit minimum wage (SMIC) binds at a high proportion of the average 
wage.
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perceived, for Germany, given its other institutional facets like strong trade 
unions.
The UK may have been expected to have been second after the US in the 
rankings. This is certainly not the case in the normalization by the labour 
force and is again repeated in the three and four variable case (see next 
section). Our initial thoughts were that this ambiguity maybe because of the 
Thatcher labour market reforms in the UK causing a structural change. But 
the above structural stability tests suggest that this is not the case. Further 
the fact that the ranking has not changed for the UK in either specification 
once we have updated the data, suggests the specification differences are 
driving the ambiguity rather than any structural change.
Tables 2.5-2.9 show the variance decompositions of the (approximated) 
unemployment rate, for the two different specifications for each country. 
With the exception of Spain, it is found that aggregate shocks tend to dom­
inate, with reallocative shocks being important on impact, but with dimin­
ishing influence over time.
For Spain, reallocative shocks dominate but more so using the labour force 
normalization. For France, we find that aggregate shocks dominate, but with 
reallocative shocks having a significant effect on impact. Even at long lags, 
reallocative shocks explain about 40% of the movement in unemployment for 
France12. Germany produces similar results to France, only that aggregate 
shocks dominate even more so. Again on impact, reallocative shocks have a 
significant influence on unemployment, but this drops to about 20% at long 
lags. For the US and UK, aggregate shocks dominate, but less so in the 
updated results reported here than in estimations based on earlier samples. 
Reallocative shocks have stronger impact effect in the results reported here. 
Also, for the UK under the normalization by labour force for &21 =  30,60, 
aggregate and reallocative shocks have more or less equal effect, even at long
12It must be noted that in the normalisation in terms of rates, with 6 2 1  =  60, we get 
the rather spurious result that reallocative shocks dominate. We do not think this is 
contradicting the previous results, as the impulse responses oscillate a lot and seem very 
unstable for this case.
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lags.
In Tables 2.9-2.11 we formally test the underlying hypothesis that the 
structures of the economies, as revealed by the impulse responses, are fun­
damentally different in the US and Europe. We do this by looking at the 
impulse responses of a country relative to those of the US and the accompany­
ing confidence intervals13. The tables are for the specification over the labour 
force, with results given for the different values of 62114 • The first number in 
each box represents the difference in the impulse response of the unemploy­
ment rate of the country minus that of the US, calculated at different leads. 
The second number is equal to (one half) the size of the corresponding 95% 
confidence interval, calculated using a bootstrapping technique with 1000 
replications15.
Referring to Tables 2.9-2.11, it is easy to notice a well known problem 
with this class of tests: the standard errors are very large. Thus, the con­
fidence intervals are correspondingly wide and it is very difficult to get sta­
tistically significant results. Nevertheless, some interesting findings do come 
out. The only country for which a reallocative shock is significantly different 
from the US, at any lead, is Spain. Further, Spain is the only country for 
which aggregate shocks show a significant difference at long leads. This is 
consistent with the view that the power of this test is very low. Thus only
13A11 results are reported on the balanced sample 1972:3-1989:4 except for the UK/US  
comparison, where we use the updated sample.
14Similar results holds for the specification in terms of rates.
15 The standard errors in table 6 are calculated using a bootstrapping technique with 
1000 replications. The underlying assumption is that the Wold innovations are not only 
uncorrelated over time, but also identically and independently normally distributed with 
variance equal to the sample variance. From this distribution, we resample a number of 
Wold innovations equal to the one in the original sample. For each replication, we then 
estimate the MA representation of the VAR and obtain the implied structural impulse 
responses for unemployment. The first number is equal to, the average over all replications 
of, the difference between the impulse response of the unemployment rate of the country 
minus that of the US. The second number, band (*) ,  in table 6 is equal to (one half) the 
size of the interval. This represents the range over which we are 95% confident that the 
difference between the impulse response, of the unemployment rate of the country, minus 
that of the US lies.
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large differences will show up as being significantly so. We noted earlier that 
Spain was an exception, in that reallocative shocks dominate. The evidence 
presented here is consistent with this finding, in that it is the only country 
which shows significant differences in its responses relative to the US. On the 
whole, aggregate shocks show more significant differences, with all countries 
showing significant differences up to two quarters after a shock. France ranks 
after Spain, in showing the most significantly different aggregate shocks. The 
differences are significant up to five quarters, but thereafter remain close to 
significance. For both reallocative and aggregate shocks, the UK and Spain 
have bigger absolute differences relative to the US.
Summary
The above analysis of the tables suggests the following. Aggregate shocks 
dominate across countries, the important exception being Spain. There is 
some variation in the importance of reallocative shocks (excluding the obvious 
example of Spain) across countries, with France showing them to have more 
influence when compared to Germany. The explanation for the predominance 
of reallocative shocks in Spain, could be the reallocation of workers from the 
agriculture to the manufacturing sector, after Franco’s reign (see Maximon 
and Zilibotti (1996)).
Independent of the specifications, the US labour market is quicker to 
adjust than European economies. There is also a ranking inside European 
economies with Germany quicker than other continental European countries 
even if still slower than the US. Finally, structural stability tests find it 
difficult to reject the hypothesis of no structural change for the UK.
2.6 Labour Force Shocks
The two variable VAR specifications, have given us some interesting results. 
In order to investigate if the results are driven by the particular specifications 
chosen, we augment them by considering, in more detail, the labour force.
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First, we show how the theoretical set-up can account for labour force 
shocks. These can be of two types, either affecting the size or the composition 
of the labour force. We then draw on these theoretical considerations to 
identify a skill unbiased labour force shock, which represents changes in the 
size of the labour force alone; and a skill biased shock that deals with the 
compositional change alone.
2.6.1 Theoretical Labour Force considerations
In practice, workers can be in one of three states: working in a firm, unem­
ployed or out of the labour force. Unemployed workers can either be actively 
searching or stop searching and go out of the labour force. There are, in fact, 
vast movements in and out of the labour force which we hope to capture 
better by explicitly using the labour force as a variable.
The reallocative and aggregate shocks, considered previously, axe shocks 
directly affecting the firm. To complete the model, we must consider shocks 
that directly affect the labour force. These can be of two types, either af­
fecting the size or the composition of the labour force. Thus we consider 
two further shocks which characterize these two effects separately. The skill 
unbiased labour force shock represents changes in the size of the labour force 
alone, and the skill biased shock deals with the compositional change alone.
In the model outlined in section two, no shock had a permanent effect on 
the unemployment rate. This is, however, the result of the particular model 
specification chosen there. For example, Acemoglu (1996) shows that once 
the choice of technology is made endogenous and firms freely choose their 
optimal levels of capital, multiple equilibria can arise in the basic model. If so, 
change in the aggregate conditions (change in P  or cr) can shift the economy 
from one equilibrium to the other. However, if the matching function has 
constant returns to scale, changes in the size of the labour force L*, alone, 
represent just a change in the scale of the economy. Given the assumption 
that no job can exploit economies of scale, Lt can never have long run effects 
on the level of unemployment. In fact, there is a large body of evidence, across
42
countries, that suggests that the unemployment rate is untrended in the long 
run despite huge increases in the size of the labour force. Moreover, economies 
with very different labour force sizes have very similar unemployment rates 
(see i.e. Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991).
We therefore identify the skill unbiased labour force shock by imposing 
that it has no long run effect on the unemployment rate. This shock is in­
troduced for two reasons: firstly because it allows us to evaluate if labour 
force influences affect unemployment dynamics in the short run; and sec­
ondly because it might correct for possible discrepancies in the dynamics of 
jobs versus worker flows. It gauges what is the short run contribution of 
struct rural shocks that do not exhibit permanent effects, on the level of the 
unemployment rate.
Even if changes in the size of the labour force do not a have long run 
impact on the unemployment rate, changes in the composition of the labour 
force might. Acemoglu (1997, 1998) shows that firms can react to changes 
in the composition of the labour force, by ‘directing’ technological change 
towards specific skills. More specifically, when the composition of the labour 
force changes, the nature of the equilibrium might change, with firms starting 
to create separate jobs for the skilled and unskilled.
To consider the effects of a skill biased technological shock, we modify the 
model in section 2.2 as follows. We assume that each worker is endowed with 
a given amount of skill x.  The skill x is worker specific and can be transferred 
from one job to the other. We indicate, with F(-), the distribution function 
of skills x  in the labour force. The productivity of a job, once it is operated 
by a worker with skill x,  is given by the sum of three components P + c t l + X l x .  
P , a and A are common to all jobs, while i is an idiosyncratic component 
of productivity that, as before, evolves according to a Poisson process with 
rate of arrival fi. The third component is new. It captures mismatch. In 
a Walrasian economy, with no frictions, high productivity workers (high x) 
should be matched with high productivity firms, (high t). In a market with 
search frictions this is not always the case and high productivity workers can
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be operating jobs hit by a negative idiosyncratic shock. A captures this effect, 
measuring the size of the skill mismatch. When A is equal to zero, there is 
no skill mismatch and the allocation of worker-skills to jobs has no effect on 
productivity. When A is high, the social cost of allocating ‘good’ workers to 
‘bad’ jobs is high. A change in A is a skill biased labour force shock. For 
example, an increase in A corresponds to an increase in skill mismatch or the 
social cost of misallocating skills.
Given these additional assumptions, equations (DE) and (2.2) become 
equal to
P  + aR  + \ R x  = h -  ^  ^  +  [1 -  G (y)l dy (DE’)
r  +  f i  J r
so that W > R
J(i, x) = (a +  Ax) [L (2.8)
while J( l , x )  = 0 if i < R, where now both the asset value of a job and the 
reservation productivity depend on x. Differentiating (D E ’) and (2.8) with 
respect to A and cr, we then obtain that
and
dR x ( P  — h) dR
dX (cr +  Aa;) { l  — [1 — G (-R)]} ^
dj( i ,x )  x ( t  — R) — (a + X x ) ~  
dX n + r
dJ(i,x) (l -  R) — (cr +  Xx) 4E
da fi +  r
Therefore, the three equations together imply that
dJ(i,x) dR (l — R) (cr +  Ax) dJ(L,x) dR . .
dX dX (/i +  r) ^  (/x +  r) da da
That is the relative impact of a skill biased labour force shock (change in 
A) on the destruction margin R  and on the overall profitability of the job 
J( l , x ) ,  is equal to that of a reallocative shock (change in a).
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(2.9) suggests a possible way of identifying a skill biased labour force 
shock: for given size of the labour force, a skill biased labour force shock has 
similar effects on unemployment flows as a reallocative shock. This symmetry 
is appealing as skill mismatch and reallocative shocks are really compositional 
effects, the former being on the labour force side, the latter being on the firm 
side.
2.6.2 Augm ented VARs
Given the labour force considerations documented above, we consider ex­
tending our empirical evaluation by augmenting our previous VAR analysis. 
We do this by adding variables to the VARs, to capture labour force size and 
skill effects. We include the total labour force and the stock of vacancies to 
achieve this. Vacancies are an important addition, as they captures firm-side 
demand. In particular, if the work force has a lower average level of skill, then 
firms may put out less vacancies, as the potential profit stream from a job 
will have fallen (Pissarides 1992). This illustrates how introducing vacancies 
as an additional variable, may capture skill compositional changes better. 
We first consider a three variable SVAR, with
Y,=
A iQ ± _ K
L t A r L t  A  Lt
Lt
Each of the variables in Yt is found to be stationary, according to preliminary 
statistical investigation.
This specification allows one to recover, perfectly, the unemployment rate 
ut as
It Ot A Lt , *A ut = -   ----- —  uu (2.10)
L t L t L t
once a standardizing value for ut is chosen 16.
16In the table 1.12, the results are obtained posing a value of ut = 0.07. Changing this 
standardized value does not change the results, as the size of is small with respect to 
that of unemployment flows.
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We have argued in section 2.6.1, that there are two elements to labour 
force changes: a size effect and a compositional effect reflecting the skill 
make up of the labour force. To capture both these effects, we estimate a 
four variable SVAR with
A t
Q ± _ K
L t A r L tA Lt
4
Vt represents vacancies at time t. Vacancies standardized by the labour force, 
|J-, were found to be 1(1) and so were entered in differences in the SVAR. 
The effects on the unemployment rate are recovered as in the three variable 
case above.
2.6.3 Identification
For the three variable SVAR, three independent identification restrictions are 
required to exactly identify the matrix Bq, in equation (2.5). We identify the 
reallocative and aggregate shocks, by imposing that the relative impact of 
both a reallocative and an aggregate shock, on inflows A  A and on net flows 
n f t — — A-, m. the three variable case, is equal to that of the two variable
case. We believe this to be a reasonable procedure, because we are using 
the 3 and 4 variable SVARS first to check the robustness of the 2 variable 
SVAR results and second to isolate labour force influences in the dynamics 
of the unemployment rate. We draw on the considerations in section 1.6.1 
to identify the third shock and we impose that it has no long run effect on 
the level of the unemployment rate. We call this a skill unbiased labour force 
shock, its role being to correct for the behavior of inflow and outflows that 
can be driven by changes in the labour force, rather than changes in the 
creation and destruction of jobs.
For the four variable SVAR, six independent identification restrictions are 
required. We use the three given above and hence require three more. We 
identify the fourth shock, the skill biased labour force shock, by imposing that
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its relative impact on inflows Ajfr and on net flows, n f t = — is equal to
that of a reallocative shock. The justification draws on equation (2.9): real­
locative shocks and skill biased shocks are really both compositional effects, 
the former being on the firm side and the latter being on labour force side. 
Both shocks are really about mismatch and therefore we would expect sim­
ilar effects on inflows and outflows. Moreover we impose that a skill biased 
shock has no effect on the size of the labour force on impact. This is simply 
an orthogonalization, to separate out the size and compositional effects of a 
labour force change. The third required identifying restriction is delivered 
directly by the assumption that a skill unbiased labour force shock has no 
long run impact on the unemployment rate. This implies that it can not 
have a long run effect on the level of vacancies, standardized by the labour 
force, as well.
2.6.4 Results
Tables 2.12 and  2.13 show how the results, from the two variable VARs, ex­
tend to this case as well17. The relative weight of aggregate versus reallocative 
shocks is changes little in the variance decomposition of the unemployment 
rate, as does the speed of adjustment ranking18. In particular, we do not find
17Recursive chow tests were also performed for the the 3 and 4 variable VARs, though 
they are not reported here, but are available on request. Again it was very difficult to find 
evidence of structural breaks in the flows equations or the vacancy equation for either the 
UK or US. There was some evidence of instability in the labour force growth equation, 
but this was evidenced both for the US and UK, which suggests that it is a problem of 
modelling labour force growth, rather than of structural change specific to the UK. Given 
also that the identification of reallocative versus aggregate shocks does not depend on any 
reaction of the labour force, its seems hard to believe that this could cause any loss of 
confidence in the SVAR derived results of the importance of the two shocks relative to 
each other.
1 8 There are slight exceptions here. The three variable results for Spain suggest that 
aggregate shocks dominate. This goes against the results for the two and four variable 
cases. We believe the result does not contradict the previous ones, for the same reasons 
that were suggested for France, in the two variable case with 6 2 1  =  60, namely that the 
impulse response functions oscillate a lot and seem very unstable for this case. Also, in 
the four variable VAR, France has a higher speed of adjustment than Germany and the 
UK a slightly higher figure than for Spain
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that the speed of adjustment ranking is affected. Moreover, the role of the 
skill unbiased labour force shock, on the variance covariance decomposition of 
the unemployment rate, is very small, so that most of its dynamics are driven 
by shocks that have permanent effects. One interesting result to notice, is 
the difference in the importance of the skill biased shock between Prance and 
Germany. In France it has more influence on the variance decomposition of 
unemployment than for Germany (approx 25% in Prance as opposed to 5% in 
Germany at long lags). This is consistent with the two variable SVAR results 
where reallocative shocks were more important in Prance than in Germany. 
The importance of the skill biased shock in Prance suggests that skill biased 
technical progress might explain more unemployment in France than other 
OECD countries, particularly when compared to Germany. The contrast 
with Germany may be due to the factors mentioned in section 2.5.2.
2.7 Sim ulations
In this section, we simulate a simple version of the search theoretic framework 
to see if the results suggested by the VAR analysis, above, are consistent with 
simulations of the underlying theoretical model that we used to justify the 
identification restrictions.
Search models are non linear models of the labour market. The VAR 
methodology imposes a linear structure onto the dynamics of the variables 
considered. We noted in section 2.3 that there always exists a linear Wold 
Decomposition of any stationary process. This is the fundamental decom­
position used in most VAR analysis. There also exists many non linear de­
compositions of a stationary process. The question is are we losing much by 
imposing a Wold Decomposition onto a labour market which may be better 
forecasted by a non linear process? We analyze this question by simulating a 
version of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model of the labour market 
which is exposed to purely aggregate shocks. We recover the inflows and 
outflows from the unemployment pool, predicted by the simulations, and use
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them as inputs into an SVAR as modelled in section 2.5. To test how well 
a linear VAR is representing the market, we compare the impulse responses 
from the VAR to those from the simulations for an aggregate shock. We 
also check the variance decompositions derived from the SVAR. The extent 
to which reallocative shocks play a role is evidence of how misleading the 
procedure is, as the simulated results are purely driven by aggregate shocks. 
Many recent papers ( Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Mortensen 1994 and 
Cole and Rogerson 1998) have argued that a variant of the search model ex­
posed to aggregate shocks can perform well in matching business cycle facts 
for the US. Thus we perform this test for a calibrated baseline economy, 
based on the US economy.
One of the most important findings of the previous sections was that the 
US economy had a higher speed of adjustment than the European economies 
and this was robust to the identification restrictions, as it only depended on 
the unrestricted VAR representation. We can use a simulated search model 
to try explain this, by calibrating the search model differently to correspond 
to differences in the US and Europe. In particular, following Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1999b) and Mortensen and Millard (1997) we can vary the firing 
tax and unemployment benefits. To this end, we can simulate search models 
for ‘US’ and ‘European’ economies exposed to aggregate productivity shocks, 
recover the inflows and outflows and use them to form a VAR representation, 
from which we can estimate speeds of adjustment.
In this section we firstly extend the model of section 2.5 to allow us to 
perform the simulations. We then perform the simulation exercises proposed 
above.
2.7.1 The M odel
We extend the previous model by introducing some institutional variables 
and introducing an aggregate shock. We propose that after the initial wage 
wq has been agreed by the matched worker and employer, the firm must pay 
a set up cost k , which includes the cost of hiring, training and other forms of
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match specific investment. As before, when t < R, then the job is destroyed, 
but now the firm has to pay a firing cost T. We introduce unemployment 
benefit, by the symbol b. Also, let 8 represent the exogenous turnover rate, 
or the rate of voluntary quits into unemployment. To introduce aggregate 
shocks, we model P  as a jump process characterized by rj, a Poisson arrival 
rate, and H  : 1Z —> [0,1], a conditional distribution function. Although 
simple, this approach captures the main features of cyclical shocks, i.e. that 
there is a positive probability less than one that a boom or a recession will 
end within any finite period of time. Since we are not varying the reallocative 
component cr, we set it equal to 1 to save on notation.
The free entry condition becomes:
where Jo is the value of a job just filled. In other words, the introduction 
of creation costs just reduces the value of forming a vacancy by k. Notice 
how all variables to be determined are now indexed by the state of aggregate 
productivity, as it now can vary. The job destruction condition will now 
become:
So jobs are only destroyed when there value no longer exceeds the cost of 
paying the firing cost.
In section 2.5, we made a simplifying assumption about wages to save on 
notation and space. We are afforded no such luxury here. Thus following 
the search literature, for example Pissarides (1990), we assume wages are
chosen via a nash bargain19, which shares the surplus from a job match in a 
fixed proportion between the worker and employer. Let W(i, P) denote the 
asset value of a job match, with idiosyncratic productivity l, to a worker 
and Wo(P) denote the initial value before an idiosyncratic shock has hit the 
job. Further, let U(P) be the asset value of being unemployed.
19 So threat points are equal to the option of looking for an alternative match partner.
Xd(P) = a(9(P)){J0(P) -  k} (2 .11)
J(R (P ) ,P )  = - T (2.12)
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The initial and continuing match surplus in equilibrium are:
S0{P) =  J0( P ) - k  + W0( P ) - U ( P )  (2.13)
S(i) = J  (l, P) + T  + W  (i, P) — U(P)
The difference between the initial wage bargain and subsequent renego- , 
tiation arises for two reasons. First creation costs are ‘sunk’ in the latter 
case but ‘on-the-table’ in the former. Second, termination costs are not in­
curred if no match is formed initially but must be paid if an existing match 
is destroyed. The standard Nash solution to the bargaining problem is the 
following:
/9(Jo(P) -  *) =  (1 - 0 ) ( W o(P) -  U(P)) (2.14)
B (J  (l, P) + T) =  (1 -  /3)(W(P) -  U ( P ) )  (2.15)
where /?, the worker’s bargaining power is the resulting worker’s share of 
match surplus.
It can be shown, by writing down conditions for ( J  (t, P), W (P ), U(P)) 
and summing them up, that the equilibrium surplus value of a match is given 
by:
{ r  + S + fi + r])S{L,P) = P + L + { r  + 6 ) T - b  + a{P)(3S0{P) (2.16)
+fi f  S(z, P)dG(z) + rj [  S ( t , z )dH (z /P ) 
J r ( p ) J r ( z )
S0(P) =  S(l, P) -  T  -  k (2.17)
where H ( z /P ) is the conditional distribution of the next arrival of the 
aggregate productivity parameter given its current value P.
Making use of the free entry condition, equation (2.11), and the solutions 
to the wage bargaining problem, equation (2.14), we can show that the job 
meeting rate, ct(P), solves the following:
^ { ( 1  -  0)So(P) - k } = X (2.18)
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Also the job destruction condition can be rewritten as:
S(R{P),P) = 0 (2.19)
An equilibrium is a solution to equations (2.16), (2.17), (2.18) &; (2.19). 
Mortensen (1994) develops a method for solving the above system, once the 
model has been calibrated. Then it is straight forward to simulate the model 
and to recover the dynamics for employment, unemployment and the inflows 
to and from unemployment.
2.7.2 Calibrating the model
To model the evolution of aggregate productivity, we follow previous stud­
ies in this area (Mortensen (1994), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and 
Millard, Mortensen and Rosenblat (1996)) and suppose that the aggregate 
productivity follows the following first order autoregressive process:
Pt = pPt„i +  (1 -  p)fi +  v t with E(vt) = a\  (2.20)
We follow Millard, Mortensen and Rosenblat (1996) in setting p and av to 
equal 0.95 and 0.047 respectively20. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) show 
how a continuous Markov process can be modelled as a finite state Markov 
chain. Mortensen (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) use a three 
state approximation. We follow Millard, Mortensen and Rosenblat (1996) 
and use a 17 state approximation. The reason for this is the approximation of 
equation (2.20) gets better as we increase the number of possible states. Also 
Millard, Mortensen and Rosenblat (1996) show that the simulated results for 
unemployment tend to be very jerky, when compared to the data, if the 
number of possible states is small. 17 states is chosen as a balance between 
getting a good fit of the data and saving on CPU time.
A matching function of the Cobb-Douglas form is assumed with elasticity 
with respect to unemployment equal to f, i.e. q(6) = #_<\  The distribution
20 These values are chosen to set the autocorrelation and variance of aggregate consump­
tion in a baseline model for the US, equal to that in detrended data, as reported by Merz 
(1994).
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of idiosyncratic shocks is assumed to be uniform on the support [7 , 1 ], i.e. 
F(x) = V x e [7 , 1 ]. The parameters for a ‘US’ baseline economy, cali­
brated on quarterly data, are reported below21. The value of income while 
unemployed and the minimum match product 7 , are chosen so that the av­
erage unemployment rate and average duration of an unemployment, for the 
simulated model, are 6.5% and 3 months respectively. These are post war av­
erages for the US. The other parameter values are the same as those justified 
in Mortensen and Millard (1997).
Baseline parameter values
discount rate: r =  0.01 per quarter 
matching elasticity: f  =  0.4 
recruiting cost: c — 0.33 per worker 
creation cost: k = 0.275 per worker 
productivity shock frequency: A =  0.66 
minimum match product: 7  =  0.66 per quarter 
value of income while unemployed: b =  0.53 
worker’s share: (3 =  0.3 
firing cost: T  =  0
To obtain parameters that reflect a ‘European’ economy, we follow Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1999a) and maintain the same values for all parameters ex­
cept for unemployment income b and the firing cost T  which we chose to 
yield an average unemployment rate of 7.8%, but an average duration of 9 
months. 7.8% is the unemployment average for the big five European coun­
tries over the last 30 years, namely: the UK, France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain. The results, b =  0.61 and T  =  1.45 are consistent with the fact that 
unemployment compensation and the implicit cost of employment protection 
are both higher in Europe than in the US and the fact that unemployment 
spells are much longer in Europe.
21 The software used to perform the calibrations and simulations below, is called ‘Flows’ 




We perform the simulations to create a sample size similar to that used in 
this paper, i.e. for a baseline sample of 70 observations. The simulations are 
performed 500 times.
First experiment
For the first experiment, on the baseline ‘US’ economy, the impulse responses 
for the simulated economy are shown in figures 2.11-2.14 ( let us refer to 
them as unfiltered responses). We show the responses of unemployment, the 
inflow rate, the outflow rate and the level of outflows The responses for the 
level of inflows are very similar to that for the rate of inflow and are thus 
not shown22. The shock is a negative one and interesting features to notice 
is the speed at which inflows react compared to outflows. The inflow rate is 
back to the level before the shock hit after approximately 2 quarters, whereas 
the outflow rate has not reached its initial level after 20 quarters. This is 
consistent with the job destruction spikes we see at the start of a recession 
in the data. As Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) note, the job destruction 
rate leads the job creation rate as a cause of the rise in unemployment and 
the speed of change at the start of a recession. Also worth noting is that the 
level of outflows (also outflows normalized by the labour force in this model) 
fall for 1 period, then quickly rise and overshoot their final equilibrium. The 
fall is due to the fall in the outflow rate and the subsequent rise is due to 
the vast increase in unemployment caused by the job destruction spike. This 
phenomenon has also been noted by Burda and Wyplosz (1994) Mortensen 
(1994) and Cole and Rogerson (1998). It suggests that using flows in levels 
terms, or normalized by the labour force, to identify aggregate shocks by 
the opposing effects it has on the flows is only robust if imposed on the 
impact effect as suggested in the discussion in section 2.2.2. The dynamics 
of unemployment destroy this negative correlation at some point after the
22In the search model used, the labour force is normalised to unity, and thus the level 
of inflow is the same as the inflow normalized by the labour force.
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impact of the shock. The simulations suggest the negative correlation is 
destroyed as soon as the second period after the shock.
Figures 2.15-2.16 and Table 2.15 show the impulse responses (let us 
refer to them as the filtered responses) and variance decompositions once 
the simulated data has been put into the VARs, as specified in section 2.5. 
For the rates specification, the responses are for a negative aggregate shock. 
They show the same features as the unfiltered responses in that the outflow 
rate takes a lot longer to converge to its initial level than the inflow rate. The 
inflow rate has a sharp spike, gets back close to its initial level before the 
shock after 2 periods, before slowly moving back to the initial equilibrium. 
Thus the inflow rate filtered response is similar but not quite as quick as the 
unfiltered response. The variance decompositions also suggest that aggregate 
shocks contribute over 90% to the variance of unemployment at all leads. 
Thus there does not seem to be a large error in the assignment of which 
shocks are more important in the specification in terms of rates.
The filtered responses for the normalization by the labour force show 
the response to a positive aggregate shock. Since the VAR representation 
implies equal but opposite effects for positive or negative shocks, we can 
impute the effects of a negative shock. Thus again it can be seen that inflows 
have a spike, before coming back to near its initial value after 2 periods and 
then slowly adjusting to its pre-shock value. Outflows show the property 
of having an initial negative impact, before quickly shifting to a positive 
effect, and in fact overshooting the final equilibrium, due to the increase in 
unemployment, i.e. a very similar reaction to the unfiltered response. The 
variance decompositions suggest that aggregate shocks dominate on impact, 
explaining around 90% of unemployment, but over time reallocative shocks 
become more important, in the end explaining up to 57% of the variance of 
unemployment. Clearly this is a surprising result given the data are purely 
generated by an aggregate shock. I believe it can be explained by looking at 
the filtered response for a reallocative shock. The responses of inflows and 
unemployment are very strange and volatile. Take the reaction of inflows to
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a positive reallocative shock. It is positive on impact, as expected, and then 
switches between being positive and negative for four periods. I believe the 
filtered responses for a reallocative shock are spurious after impact because 
the SVAR is trying to identify a shock that is not there. In this situation 
the variance decompositions after impact are also misleading. The results 
from this specification suggest one has to be careful when interpreting the 
variance decompositions when the variables are normalized by the labour 
force. Though, the fact that the results earlier in the paper also hold for the 
specification in terms of rates, gives us confidence that they are still valid.
One important property of the VAR based responses I alluded to before 
is the symmetry of the response to positive and negative shocks. This is a 
property not shared by search models. As noted in Davis and Halitwanger 
(1992, 1998) Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Mortensen (1994) job 
destruction is certainly not symmetric. It increases more rapidly and by 
more at the start of a recession than it decreases at the start of a boom. Also 
because of this, unemployment will rise quicker in a recession in response to a 
negative aggregate shock, than it will fall in a boom in response to a positive 
shock. This is because job destruction can happen immediately in a recession, 
but job creation takes time in a boom, due to matching frictions. Further, as 
noted by Mortensen (1994) the overshooting in the level of outflows is likely to 
be less in the case of a positive shock, as unemployment falls less at the start 
of a boom than it rises at the start of a recession, due to the job destruction 
spikes. What the VAR responses are doing is averaging asymmetric positive 
and negative responses to form a symmetric one. Since job destruction spikes 
tend to be large relative to job destruction troughs, this suggests that the 
filtered impulse responses more closely characterize negative aggregate shocks 
than positive ones, at least for a short time period after the shock23.
23This asymmetry is likely to be less prevalent in continental European countries. As 
Garibaldi (1998) argues on one side we find the North American and British experience, 
where job destruction is more volatile than job creation and job reallocation moves coun- 
tercyclically. On the other side we find the Continental Europe experience, where job 
reallocation tends to be acyclical and the fluctuations in job creation and destruction are 
less pronounced.
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C ountry Specification 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
U.S. T  V  " "  "
! ’<£
Ek ’ Ut
.6702 .4011 .4011 .0984
.9139 .2959 .1475 .1230
EU i  0
! ’ & .
Ei ’ U<
.685 .685 .3169 .3169
.9128 .2975 .2261 .0754
Table 2.1: Speed of ad justm en t ranking for th e  unem ploym ent ra te  
(ranked eigenvalues): two variables (sim ulated  da ta ) VAR. The
entries show the values of the norm of the ranked eigenvalues of the VAR 
representation, of the VAR for different specifications for the simulated data.
Second experim ent
In this experiment we estimate speeds of adjustment from the VAR represen­
tation of the simulated data for the baseline ‘US’ economy and the calibrated 
‘European’ economy. The results are given in table 2.1 above.
The results are very surprising at first sight. The highest eigenvalue is 
virtually identical in both specifications for the US and European economies. 
This suggests there speed of adjustment rankings are very similar. This is 
very much at odds with the evidence provided earlier which suggested that 
one of the most robust results of the paper was that the speed of adjustment 
was higher in the US as it did not depend on the identification assumptions 
and was a common finding across all specifications. In fact in other ways 
the model performs well in simulating the differences between the US and 
Europe. In table 2.2 we show the means for inflows and outflows normalized 
by the labour force for the simulated economies and the US and Germany. 
It can be seen that the model simulations replicate the large differences in 
absolute levels of the flows between the US and a typical European country, 
for example Germany.
Possible explanations are:
• The model is in some way not capturing the processes generating the 
data, for example the fact that there is no labour force growth in the 
model. This rules out movements in and out of the labour force (which
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Table 2.2: Flows in th e  sim ulated d a ta  and  real d a ta
do not net out), which are large in the US (see Clark and Summers 
(1979)) and may be part of its quick adjustment process. Perhaps more 
important is the way firing costs have been modelled. We have modelled 
them as a fixed certain cost that varies across countries. Garibaldi 
(1998) argues that we should model firing and job destruction as costly 
and lengthy, at least in Continental Europe. He argues that this can 
explain some of the differences we see in job flow dynamics between 
Anglo-Saxon economies and Continental European economies, which 
will not show up in models simulated with fixed certain firing costs. In 
particular, he shows that increased firing costs, due to the lower chance 
of getting firing permissions, reduces the volatility of job destruction 
relative to job creation.
• In our calibrations, the US and European economies only differed in 
their unemployment benefits and firing costs. Maybe there are other 
more important differences, like in creation costs or the worker share 
which could explain differences in speeds of adjustment. I feel though 
that this explanation is unlikely as benefits and firing costs were cho­
sen as they have often been argued to the most important differences 
between Europe and the US. For example Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1999b) argue that the US would have experienced a similar rise in 
unemployment to Europe had unemployment compensation and em­
ployment protection policies been at European levels. Also in simu­
lations not reported here, I changed other policy variables, but found 
few differences when the European economy was calibrated on the same
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average duration and unemployment.
• We have only looked at a simulated economy exposed to aggregate 
shocks. Maybe introducing reallocative shocks could make a difference.
• Maybe our measure of speed of adjustment is not capturing adjustment 
properly.
We hope to able to discriminate between these various hypotheses in 
future work,
Summary
The simulations suggest the VAR procedure performs well, in representing 
a non linear search model, on some dimensions but not on others. It seems 
to perform well in illustrating the job destruction spikes we see in the data, 
at least for the US, and the switching prevalent in the response of the level 
of outflows. The symmetry assumption is not held up in simulations of the 
search model though and this suggests that, if job destruction spikes are large 
and pronounced, VAR based impulse responses are more accurate for negative 
rather than positive aggregate shocks. The variance decompositions suggest 
one needs to be careful in interpreting results based on a specification based 
on a normalization by the labour force, though the fact that the results earlier 
in the chapter were also based on a rates specification, gives us confidence 
that they are still valid. The speed of adjustment experiment provides a 
surprising result in that there is no difference for the US and European 
economy. Finally, we have only considered aggregate shocks. It could be 
argued that reactions to reallocative shocks could be even more non linear 
than to those of aggregate shocks. We hope to introduce reallocative shocks 
and solve the speed of adjustment paradox in future work.
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2.8 Conclusions
The European Community and the US have experienced vastly different un­
employment dynamics over the last two decades. This paper has investigated 
whether these differences are due to exposure to different shocks, or reacting 
differently to the same shocks. With the premise of a search theoretic frame­
work and a structural VAR methodology, the paper has robustly identified 
aggregate versus reallocative shocks. With the exception of Spain where most 
of the dynamics seems to be driven by reallocation, it is found that most dif­
ferences in unemployment dynamics arise because of differences in responses 
to shocks. In particular, European economies seem to respond slower to the 
same shock, when compared with the US. This implies that EEC economies 
might be dynamically “sclerotic” even if the size of the steady state job flows 
might give the impression of the European labour market being quite active. 
Simulations of a search model though cannot replicate the speed of adjust­
ment rankings. For calibrated US and European economies we do not find 
a difference in the speed of adjustment ranking. In future work, we hope to 
resolve this paradox.
In order to check for robustness we have introduced additional labour 
force shocks identified, respectively, as a skill unbiased and a skill biased 
component. We have shown that skill unbiased labour force shocks do not 
appear to have much influence in any of the countries considered, so that most 
structural shocks exhibit permanent effects on the level of the unemployment 
rate. The skill biased component seems to be relevant in accounting for un­
employment dynamics. This implies that skill biased technological progress 
might explain some of the unemployment problems of OECD economies.
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Country 621 612 <72 &21 <7 l b i2 CT2 —-^ 2l ( l ) < 7 l — i ? 22( l )<72
U.S. 60 -1.32 0.003 0.245 0.21 -0.32 0.401 0.605
U.S. 30 -1.31 0.007 0.247 0.21 -0.32 0.395 0.601
U.S. 1 -1.00 0.114 0.302 0.11 -0.30 0.175 0.700
U.K. 60 -1.34 0.002 0.112 0.15 -0.16 0.964 0.946
U.K. 30 -1.31 0.005 0.114 0.14 -0.15 0.949 0.961
U.K. 1 -0.77 0.074 0.169 0.07 -0.130 0.387 1.294
Spain 60 -4.96 0.007 0.123 0.42 -0.61 0.547 0.086
Spain 30 -4.76 0.014 0.128 0.42 -0.61 0.545 0.092
Spain 1 -1.640 0.310 0.320 0.310 -0.525 0.432 0.347
France 60 -1.21 0.003 0.169 0.18 -0.20 0.288 0.329
France 30 -1.20 0.006 0.171 0.18 -0.21 0.283 0.649
Ftance 1 -0.801 0.090 0.229 0.090 -0.184 0.119 0.421
Germany 60 -1.11 0.003 0.178 0.18 -0.20 0.243 0.517
Germany 30 -1.09 0.006 0.180 0.18 -0.20 0.236 0.520
Germany 1 -0.762 0.084 0.233 0.084 -0.178 0.008 0.571
Table 2.3: S tandard iza tion  over Lt. The first four columns summarise 
the impact effects and standard deviations of the shocks, that is the coef­
ficient &!2, 621 ? a ii <*2 in the main text once a V A R  with two lags is run. 
The last two columns document the long run impacts on the unemployment 
measure. The term Bij( 1) indicates the element in rows i and column j  of 
the structural matrix polynomial B(L), in equation (5), evaluated at L = 1. 
N ote: The elements in the first column of the matrix Bo and B(L) refer to 
the reallocative shock, the ones in the second to the aggregate shock.
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Table 2.4: Speed of ad justm en t ranking  for th e  unem ploym ent ra te  
(ranked eigenvalues): two variables VAR. The entries show the values 
of the norm of the ranked eigenvalues of the VAR representation, of the VAR 






&21 VD of &21 V D o f£ VD of jj effect on Aut
RE AG RE AG RE AG RE AG
1 1 12 88 -25 46 54 12 88 43 57
15 6 94 23 77 2 98 22 78
30 6 94 23 77 2 98 22 78
1 30 41 59 -30 60 40 5 95 66 44
15 30 70 36 64 0 100 33 67
30 30 70 35 65 0 100 33 67
1 60 42 58 -35 69 31 1 99 64 46
15 31 69 45 55 2 98 42 58
30 31 69 45 55 2 98 42 58
Table 2.5: C ountry: U.S. VD  stands for forecasting variance decomposition 
of the (approximated) unemployment rate, RE for reallocative shock, AG for 
aggregate shock. For the specification with outflow and inflow rates, we 
also consider, as a measure of the forecasting variance decomposition for the 
unemployment rate, the average between the ones of inflow and outflow rate 
with weight equal to ( l —ut) and ut, respectively, where a standardizing value 
of 0.07 is chosen for w*. All VARs are run with two lags.
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621 V D o f E ^ r ^ &21 VD Of VD of ^ effect on Aut
RE AG RE AG RE AG RE AG
1 1 16 84 -10 3 97 91 9 9 991
15 9 91 4 96 80 20 19 91
30 8 92 5 95 79 21 10 90
1 30 61 38 -30 39 61 48 52 40 60
15 50 50 9 91 34 66 11 89
30 50 50 8 92 32 68 10 90
1 60 63 37 -60 75 25 25 85 71 29
15 52 48 39 61 6 94 37 63
30 51 49 37 63 5 95 35 65
Table 2.6: Country: U .K . VD  stands for forecasting variance decomposi­
tion of the (approximated) unemployment rate. For the specification with 
outflow and inflow rates, we also consider, as a measure of the forecasting 
variance decomposition for the unemployment rate, the average between the 
ones of inflow and outflow rate with weight equal to (1 — ut) and ut, respec­
tively, where a standardizing value of 0.07 is chosen for ut. All VARs are run 
with two lags.
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VD leads 1 0 L ’ L
1 0
TV’ U
&21 VD of &21 VD of jj VD of ^ effect on Aut
RE AG RE AG RE AG RE AG
1 1 48 52 -10 51 49 84 16 53 47
15 58 42 71 29 83 17 72 28
30 59 41 74 26 83 17 74 26
1 30 92 8 -30 83 17 51 49 81 19
15 95 5 94 6 50 50 90 10
30 96 4 96 4 50 50 93 7
1 60 92 8 -60 94 6 34 66 90 10
15 96 4 98 2 33 67 93 7
30 97 3 99 1 33 67 94 6
Table 2.7: Country: Spain. VD  stands for forecasting variance decompo­
sition of the (approximated) unemployment rate. For the specification with 
outflow and inflow rates, we also conside,r as a measure of the forecasting 
variance decomposition for the unemployment, rate the average between the 
ones of inflow and outflow rate with weight equal to (1 — ut) and ut} respec­
tively, where a standardizing value of 0.07 is chosen for ut. All VARs are run 
with two lags.
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VD leads 1 0 L ’ L
1 0
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&21 VD of &21 V D o f£ VD of effects on Aut
RE AG RE AG RE AG RE AG
1 1 13 87 -10 0 100 83 17 6 94
15 7 93 2 98 60 40 6 94
30 7 93 1 99 59 41 5 95
1 30 52 48 -30 47 53 17 83 45 55
15 42 58 43 57 4 96 40 60
30 42 58 41 59 3 97 38 62
1 60 53 47 -60 84 16 0 100 78 22
15 43 57 79 21 6 94 74 26
30 43 57 78 22 6 94 73 27
Table 2.8: C ountry: France. VD  stands for forecasting variance decompo­
sition of the (approximated) unemployment rate. For the specification with 
outflow and inflow rates, we also consider, as a measure of the forecasting 
variance decomposition for the unemployment rate, the average between the 
ones of inflow and outflow rate with weight equal to (1 — ut) and ut , respec­
tively, where a standardizing value of 0.07 is chosen for ut. All VARs are run 
with two lags.
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VD leads " l "u - ~ -----L ’ L
1 u 
V’ u
b2\ V D o f £ ^ ^ b2i VD of V D of % effects on Aut
RE AG RE AG RE AG RE AG
1 1 11 89 -40 1 99 65 35 5 95
15 0 100 2 98 41 59 5 95
30 0 100 2 98 39 61 5 95
1 30 47 53 -50 7 93 49 51 10 90
15 18 82 9 91 26 74 10 90
30 18 82 9 91 24 76 10 90
1 60 49 51 -60 17 83 35 65 18 82
15 19 81 19 81 15 85 19 81
30 19 81 19 81 13 87 19 81
Table 2.9: C ountry: Germany. VD  stands for forecasting variance de­
composition of the (approximated) unemployment rate. For the specification 
with outflow and inflow rates, we also consider, as a measure of the forecast­
ing variance decomposition for the unemployment rate, the average between 
the ones of inflow and outflow rate with weight equal to (1 — ut) and ut , 
respectively, where a standardizing value of 0.07 is chosen for ut. All VARs 
are run with two lags.
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Country C.I. Aggregate Shock Reall. Shock
Leads: Leads:
2 5 15 30 2 5 15 30
UK resp 0.19 0.04 -0.43 -0.72 0.00 -0.03 -0.17 -0.26
band(^) 0.08 0.24 0.75 1.51 0.07 0.17 0.37 0.59
Spain resp 0.03 0.37 0.49 0.49 -0.26 -0.32 -0.32 -0.31
band(^) 0.12 0.30 0.56 0.66 0.13 0.24 0.33 0.34
France resp 0.25 0.35 0.40 0.41 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01
band(^) 0.10 0.32 0.60 0.70 0.01 0.17 0.24 0.27
Germany resp 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.13
band(^) 0.10 0.34 0.69 0.82 0.09 0.184 0.25 0.27
Table 2.10: US vs E urope, Com parison of Im pulse Responses: This 
table is for the specification over the labour force, with 621 =  1. The first 
number, in each box, represents the difference of the impulse response, of 
the unemployment rate of the country, minus that of the US, calculated 
at different leads. The second, labelled band(^), is one half of the size of 
the corresponding 95% confidence interval, band(^) is calculated using a 
bootstrapping technique with 1000 replications.
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Country C.I. Aggregate Shock Reallocative Shock
Leads: Leads:
2 5 15 30 2 5 15 30
UK resp 0.21 0.11 -0.23 -0.44 0.03 -0.09 -0.44 -0.64
band(*) 0.07 0.24 0.60 1.09 0.07 0.19 0.57 1.11
Spain resp 0.22 0.57 0.69 0.70 -0.32 -0.24 -0.20 -0.20
band(^) 0.12 0.28 0.53 0.65 0.12 0.28 0.46 0.54
France resp 0.26 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
band(*) 0.09 0.30 0.55 0.65 0.09 0.21 0.37 0.43
Germany resp 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.10
band(^) 0.10 0.33 0.71 1.26 0.10 0.23 0.41 0.60
Table 2.11: US vs E urope, C om parison of Im pulse Responses: The
table is for the specification over the labour force, with 621 =  30. The first 
number, in each box, represents the difference of the impulse response, of 
the unemployment rate of the country, minus that of the US, calculated 
at different leads. The second, labelled band(^), is one half of the size of 
the corresponding 95% confidence interval, band(^) is calculated using a 
bootstrapping technique with 1000 replications.
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Country C.I Aggregate Shock Reallocative Shock
Leads: Leads:
2 5 15 30 2 5 15 30
UK resp 0.22 0.11 -0.22 -0.45 0.03 -0.09 -0.45 -0.67
band(+) 0.07 0.23 0.62 1.35 0.07 0.19 0.61 1.31
Spain resp 0.23 0.57 0.69 0.69 -0.31 -0.24 -0.20 -0.20
band(*) 0.13 0.27 0.47 0.51 0.12 0.27 0.41 0.43
France resp 0.26 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06
band(+) 0.10 0.29 0.51 0.57 0.09 0.21 0.36 0.39
Germany resp 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.10
band(*) 0.10 0.32 0.64 0.76 0.09 0.22 0.38 0.43
Table 2.12: US vs Europe, Com parison of Im pulse Responses: The
table is for the specification over the labour force, with 621 =  60. The first 
number, in each box, represents the difference of the impulse response, of 
the unemployment rate of the country, minus that of the US, calculated 
at different leads. The second, labelled band(^), is one half of the size of 
the corresponding 95% confidence interval, band(^) is calculated using a 
bootstrapping technique with 1000 replications.
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U.S. 3 Vars. 1 0.90 0.10 - 0.00
15 0.97 0.03 - 0.00
30 0.97 0.03 - 0.00
U.S. 4Vars. 1 0.71 0.24 0.01 0.04
15 0.71 0.25 0.04 0.00
30 0.71 0.25 0.04 0.00
U.K. 3 Vars. 1 0.65 0.34 - 0.01
15 0.81 0.19 - 0.00
30 0.81 0.19 - 0.00
U.K. 4 Vars. 1 0.93 0.02 0.05 0.00
15 0.96 0.01 0.03 0.00
30 0.96 0.01 0.03 0.00
Spain 3 Vars. 1 0.77 0.22 - 0.01
15 0.65 0.34 - 0.01
30 0.65 0.35 - 0.00
Spain 4 Vars. 1 0.34 0.25 0.39 0.02
15 0.41 0.21 0.37 0.01
30 0.42 0.21 0.37 0.00
France 3 Vars. 1 0.64 0.31 - 0.05
15 0.63 0.36 - 0.01
30 0.63 0.37 - 0.00
France 4 Vars. 1 0.65 0.01 0.30 0.04
15 0.64 0.13 0.23 0.00
30 0.64 0.13 0.23 0.00
Germany 3 Vars. 1 0.56 0.42 - 0.02
15 0.80 0.19 - 0.01
30 0.80 0.19 - 0.01
Germany 4 Vars 1 0.59 0.21 0.18 0.02
15 0.71 0.22 0.06 0.01
30 0.71 0.22 0.06 0.01
Table 2.13: Forecast Variance D ecom position of th e  U nem ploym ent 
ra te  (three and four variables VAR). The coefficient 621 is chosen to be equal 
to 30. All VARs are run with two lags.
70







































































Table 2.14: Speed of ad justm en t ranking  for th e  unem ploym ent ra te  
(ranked eigenvalues): th ree  and  four variables VAR. The entries 
have the same meaning as the ones in the two variable case (table 6). All 
VARs are run with two lags.
VD leads 1 uL > L
1 0
N ’ U
&21 VDof Tl Lhr M &21 VD of ^ V D of % effects on A
RE AG RE AG RE AG RE AG
1 30 11 89 -15 4 96 13 87 5 95
15 48 52 7 93 20 80 8 92
30 57 43 7 93 20 80 8 92














1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19971996 1998
Figure 2.1: {UK} recursive chow test for the inflow equation (normalized
by the labour force)
Ndn CHOWs
Figure 2.2: {UK} recursive chow test for the netflow equation
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Figure 2.3: {US} recursive chow test for the inflow equation (normalized by
the labour force)
i r






Figure 2.4: {US} recursive chow test for the netflow equation
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Figure 2.5: {UK} recursive chow test for the inflow rate equation
i










1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Figure 2.6: {UK} recursive chow test for the outflow rate equation
- Ndn CHOWs




Figure 2.8: {US} recursive chow test for the outflow rate equation
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Figure 2.9: The graphs show the dynamics for the level of the inflows into, 
2^ , and the outflows from the unemployment pool, standardized by the 
labour force. The data are quartely and refer to the period 1972:3 -1989:4 
except for the US and UK, for which the period is 1972:3 to 1997:4
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Range for Parameter Values (b12 vs. b21)






























Figure 2.10: The graphs show the relation between 612 and 621, as given by 
equation (2.7) in the main text, for the two variables specification with 
and ^  as independent variables. The end point for the sample is 
89:4, except for the US and UK for which it is 97:4.
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Figure 2.11: (baseline economy) impulse response to an aggregate shock of
the simulated inflow rate
im pulse R esponse Function for outflows
Figure 2.12: (baseline economy) impulse response to an aggregate shock of




Figure 2.13: (baseline economy) impulse response to an aggregate shock of
the simulated unemployment rate
impulse Response function for outflows
Figure 2.14: (baseline economy) impulse response to an aggregate shock of
simulated outlflows
Baseline Economy:lmpulse Responses
Aggregate shock in flow  rate
Reallocative shock-lnflow rate
Quarters
A ggregate shock-O utflow  rate
Reallocative shock-O utflow  rate
Quart ars
Figure 2.15: (baseline economy) impulse responses for the normalization in








Figure 2.16: (baseline economy) impulse responses for the normalization by
the labour force, 621 =  30.
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Chapter 3 
Growth and Unemployment: A  
Re-exam ination of The Facts
3.1 Introduction
The aim of the following chapter is to document the facts about growth and 
unemployment and their bivariate relationship.
In the past, the received wisdom has been that interactions between out­
put, or productivity, and unemployment were only significant at frequencies 
associated with the business cycle. The relationship between output and 
growth at these frequencies were generally associated with Okun’s Law. The 
correlation of productivity and unemployment was also expected to be neg­
ative over the business cycle. This is due to two reasons: labour hoarding 
by firms during recessions and the importance of technological shocks in 
generating economic fluctuations. At lower frequencies, for example interac­
tions between equilibrium output or equilibrium growth and unemployment, 
there was often believed to be no relationship. According to neoclassical 
growth theory, equilibrium productivity growth is purely determined by the 
exogenous rate of labour-augmenting technical progress. Further, a well doc­
umented stylized fact is that the unemployment rate is untrended in the long 
run (LNJ 1991). This was seen as evidence that output cannot have a great 
effect on the equilibrium unemployment rate. Institutional factors, for ex­
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ample: the benefit regime; the wage bargaining system and minimum wages, 
were viewed as far more important.
However, over the last decade, vast progress has been made in understand­
ing the mechanisms of growth. Endogenous growth theory as pioneered by 
Romer (1986) and Lucas(1988), has helped explain the non convergence in 
growth rates which often shows up in the data. This is achieved by endoge- 
nizing the source of growth of per capita income in the steady state, namely 
technical progress or the accumulation of knowledge. The accumulation of 
knowledge is now seen as not simply exogenously given, but depending on 
many factors which are endogenous up to a point, for example : formal 
education, on the job training, basic scientific research, learning by doing, 
process innovations and product innovations. This has led to many policy 
implications as to what factors can increase average growth rates of many 
economies.
There has also been a growing theoretical literature detailing interactions 
between steady state growth and equilibrium unemployment. Search the­
oretic models illustrate how changes in steady state growth can affect the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. Two main effects are uncovered: a capital­
ization effect and a creative destruction effect Endogenous growth models, 
with some kind of labour market friction, show how changes in equilibrium 
unemployment can affect the steady state growth rate. There axe various 
mechanisms via which this can happen: loss of skills; learning by doing; the 
cleansing effect and savings. An evaluation of the various models which link 
growth and unemployment will be carried out in the next chapter. The pur­
pose of this chapter is to accumulate evidence on the direct link between 
growth and unemployment which will allow such an evaluation.
As Bean and Pissarides (1993) rightly comment, a simple graph looking 
at the cross sectional relationship between growth and unemployment does 
not reveal much of a relationship (see section 3.2). This could be due to not 
controlling for important differences in institutional features across countries, 
which I will address in another chapter, or that a simple cross sectional graph
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does not provide enough detail to uncover any relationship. In this chapter 
I use frequency domain analysis, as well as standard time domain analysis, 
to try to uncover a more complete set of ‘stylized facts’ about growth and 
unemployment. Frequency domain analysis allows one to look at the rela­
tionship between growth and unemployment at all frequencies. This allows 
much more comprehensive analysis of where a possible relationship between 
growth and unemployment may lie, than is possible by using time domain 
analysis alone.
A very arbitrary split, for macroeconomic variables, might be that: low 
frequency movements are equivalent to movements in the equilibrium of the 
process; medium frequency movements equivalent to business cycle induced 
fluctuations and high frequency movements highlight seasonal trends.
The first step in the experiment, is to collect information about individ­
ual growth and unemployment series. This will be done by looking at the 
univariate spectra of the two economic variables and seeing if robust pat­
terns show up, such as Granger’s ‘typical spectral shape'. It will also involve 
relating the frequency domain evidence documented, to previous work done 
in the time domain.
Next, cross spectral analysis will be performed. The cross spectrum gives 
us two important summary statistics:
• the phase spectrum: this gives us the average value of the phase shift 
between the two series, growth and unemployment, at every frequency.
• the coherency spectrum: this gives us the correlation coefficient between 
growth and unemployment at every frequency.
These are very useful, as it allows us to compare the relationship between 
growth and unemployment at different horizons: equilibrium movements and 
business cycle movements.
This allows one to document how the correlations at various frequencies 
may compare with predictions of the growth and unemployment literature. 
This can be done for most of the G-7 countries over a very long time horizon.
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Further, spectral analysis allows one to implement a different concept for 
the notion of equilibrium movements: equilibrium movements mainly show 
up as low frequency oscillations of a variable. The frequency domain can be 
used to apply a ‘low pass filter’ to growth and unemployment, to filter out 
seasonal and business cycle movements. An alternative would be to simply 
average the growth and unemployment rates over a particular sub-period and 
consider these as equilibrium rates. This is the approach taken in much of 
the literature, for example the Barro style growth regressions or the LNJ 
unemployment regressions. This paper also discusses the merits of these 
different methodologies.
Of course, a lot of these movements will be explained by important eco­
nomic events that if not taken into account, could bias our judgement about 
the relationship. The main event I referring to is of course wars, which often 
see a reduction in growth and unemployment as labour is diverted to the 
war effort. There are other major events though, for example: the advent 
of North Sea Oil; the overthrow of political regimes like in Spain and the 
birth and destruction of nations. Such events will be taken into account 
when trying to discern the nature of the relationship between growth and 
unemployment.
The chapter will be structured as follows: section II summarizes the cur­
rent wisdom on the relationship between growth and unemployment, in the 
time domain, while section III briefly summarizes the theory of frequency do­
main analysis and the methods used in this paper. Section IV describes the 
data. Section V carries out univariate spectral analysis of growth and unem­
ployment, for the countries considered and compares the results to wisdom 
prevailing from the time domain. Section VI details cross-spectral analysis 
across the various countries. Section VII returns to the time domain by ap­
plying a low pass filter to growth and unemployment, to split the variables 
into equilibrium and business cycle movements, and discuss their equilibrium 
links across the countries in a historical perspective. Section VIII makes fur­
ther use of the split into business cycle and equilibrium movements, by per-
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forming cross-correlation analysis and granger causality tests at the different 
frequencies. Section VTIII will conclude.
3.2 The bivariate relationship betw een growth  
and unem ploym ent in the tim e dom ain
As mentioned earlier, we can think of the relationship between growth and 
unemployment can be roughly split into three components: low frequency 
movements are equivalent to movements in the equilibrium of the process; 
medium frequency movements equivalent to business cycle induced fluctua­
tions and high frequency movements highlight seasonal trends. In the discus­
sion below, I will focus on the equilibrium and business cycle relationships.
Over the business cycle, the relationship between output or productivity 
and unemployment is clear: we expect an inverse relationship. Two main 
reasons exist for this in relation to productivity: labour hoarding by firms in 
recessions and the importance of technological shocks in generating economic 
fluctuations, both of which deliver the procyclical behaviour of output per 
man-hour.. In relation to output, it is summarized by Okun’s Law.
There has also been a growing theoretical literature detailing interactions 
between steady state growth and equilibrium unemployment. Search the­
oretic models illustrate how changes in steady state growth can affect the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. Two main effects are uncovered: a capital­
ization effect and a creative destruction effect. Endogenous growth models, 
with some kind of labour market friction, show how changes in equilibrium 
unemployment can affect the steady state growth rate. There are various 
mechanisms via which this can happen: loss of skills; learning by doing; the 
cleansing effect and savings.
A more detailed evaluation of the various models which link growth and 
unemployment will be carried out in the next chapter. The purpose of this 
chapter is to take an agnostic look at growth and unemployment and any 
linkages between them. For this purpose it is sufficient just to be aware that
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we should expect a relationship between growth and unemployment and that 
it may be very different at business cycle and long run frequencies.
One way of looking at the relationship between equilibrium growth and 
unemployment, is to plot a scatter of time averaged growth against unem­
ployment. Beau and Pissarides perform such an exercise. A similar exercise 
is shown in figure 3.1. The figure plots the average growth rate of productiv­
ity against unemployment, for the OECD countries over the periods 1955-64, 
1965-74 and 1975-84. There is mild evidence of a negative relationship be­
tween growth and unemployment, over the full sample, but this is primarily 
a consequence of the fact that the 1975-84 period was almost universally one 
of both lower productivity growth and higher unemployment than the two 
earlier periods. Individually, not one of the sub-periods shows a significant 
relationship1.
^ h e  results presented here axe quantitatively slightly different to Bean and Pissarides 
(1993) as the sample differs slightly. The sample used here omits Greece, Iceland, Lux­
embourg and Portugal due to lack of data. The results are still qualitatively the same 
though.
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Scatter diagram s illustrating bivariate relationship betw een growth and unemployment: 
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Figure 3.1: scatter of growth versus unemployment
Phelps and Zoega (1998) uncover results consistent with the negative re­
lationship found in Bean and Pissarides. They look at a scatter of the change 
in equilibrium unemployment against the growth slowdown for OECD coun-
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tries2. They find a positive relationship across a section of OECD countries, 
with the exception of Portugal, which has endured a severe growth slowdown 
but has mostly escaped the unemployment problem.
In figure 3.2 , we have performed a similar exercise to that of Bean- 
Pissarides, but for fewer countries with a longer time series for growth and 
unemployment. This avoids a problem common in much analysis of unem­
ployment and growth post WWII: the importance of a trend due to the rise 
in unemployment from the 1970s onwards in Europe and the productivity 
slowdown in the 1970s, reducing the stationarity of the unemployment and 
growth series. Further it allows us to make more use of within country vari­
ation and less use of cross country variation. The figure plots the average 
growth rate of productivity for various countries over sub-periods: 1891-1910, 
1911-1930, 1931-1950, 1951-1970, 1971-1990. For a pooled sample pre 1951 
there is a positive and significant correlation between growth and unemploy­
ment, but a negative, and not significant one, post 1951. For the combined 
sample, little if any relationship can be discerned. Again for the post 1951 
sample, the negative line is probably due to growth being higher and un­
employment lower in the period 1971-1990 than in the period 1951-1970 for 
most of the countries considered.
The above scatter analysis is not suggestive of any robust relationship 
between equilibrium growth and unemployment.
There could be four reasons for this:
• There is no robust relationship between growth and unemployment.
• If there is a relationship, it maybe that cross-sectional analysis in the 
time domain is not detailed enough. More resolution may be needed 
if the relationship differs at different frequencies, as we have suggested 
earlier.
2 The change in unemployment is and the growth slowdown is evaluated over
the same two periods as the change in unemployment.
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•  There maybe an identification problem. As illustrated in the next chap­
ter, when considering an efficiency wage model, depending on where the 
differences in unemployment come from, one can generate positive as 
well as negative correlation between g and u. If differences in unem­
ployment come from differences in labour demand then it may gener­
ate a positive correlation between growth and unemployment. If they 
come from shifts in the shirking condition, i.e. differences in shirking 
behaviour and /or monitoring technologies, then this will generate a 
negative correlation between growth and unemployment.
• A relationship may show up if we control for the heterogeneity in in­
stitutional structures across countries.
The next chapter will look at the issue of different institutional struc­
tures. This chapter will focus on trying to get a more detailed picture 
of the bivariate relationship between growth and unemployment. To 
do this frequency domain analysis will be used. This will allow us 
to evaluate the relationship between growth and unemployment at all 
frequencies. Below, I briefly outline the frequency domain approach.
3.3 The Theory of Spectral A nalysis
In this section I will highlight the main intuition of spectral analysis and 
some of the tools relevant for this paper. For a more complete treatment, 
the reader is referred to Appendix A.
3.3.1 The equivalence o f the frequency and tim e do­
mains
Typical empirical work in macroeconomics is conducted in the time domain. 
For example, the value of a variable Yt at date t, has often been described in 




The focus of the time domain approach, is the implications of such a 
representation for the covariance between Yt and YT at distinct dates t and 
r.
In this chapter, I will be also be using the analogue of this: the frequency 
domain. Typically, this approach describes the value of Yt as a weighted sum 
of cosine and sine waves of varying frequencies,
/*7T /*7T
Yt = p + a(u) cos (cot) du+  6(u) sin (ut) du
Jo Jo
the goal being to determine how important cycles of different frequencies 
are in accounting for the behaviour of Y.  The frequency domain and the 
time domain are really two sides of the same coin: any covariance stationary 
process has both a time domain representation and a frequency domain rep­
resentation3. The time series representation is the autocovariance function, 
and the frequency domain representation is the power spectral density func­
tion, or simply the spectrum. Any feature of the data that can described by 
one representation can equally well be described by the other representation.
3.3.2 The Spectrum
In the time domain, we evaluate the properties of an economic variable by 
looking at its autoregressive and moving average components. In some in­
stances, the frequency domain representation, often the spectrum, can bring 
out facets of a data series which are not obvious from solely looking at the 
time domain. Below I briefly motivate the concept of the spectrum, before 
describing the important features of the unemployment and growth spectra 
plotted.
3It should be noted that the frequency domain representation can be extended to non 
stationary processes: see Priestley (1981).
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A covariance stationary variable Yt can be decomposed into an integral 
of periodic components:
riv r 7r
Yt =  / i+  / a(uj)cos(ut) du +  6(cj)sm(ut) duj Jo Jo
where a(w) and (5{uj) are uncorrelated random variables with mean zero and 
common variance 2 f(uj). f (u)  is the power spectrum. Appendix A shows 
how to derive the power spectrum as:
1 oo
/(«) = -  £  7(k ) e -^ k
7T ,k = —oo
so that the spectrum is the Fourier transform of the autocovariance func­
tion, 7  (k).
Thus the variance can be decomposed as:
var{Yt) =  2 [  f{u)dw 
Jo
So the power spectrum can be interpreted as the contribution to the vari­
ance of Yt at frequency u.  This is important to remember when interpreting 
the spectra in section V.
Let us next consider some important examples of spectral shapes:
• If Yt is white noise, then the spectrum is flat. This means that all cycles 
axe equally important, which implies that the process is unforecast able.
• Now suppose Yt is an AR(1) process with coefficient p, where 0<p<l, 
i.e. it is stationary. The spectrum for this random variable has a 
peak in the neighbourhood u = 0 and is monotonically decreasing with 
|w|. Since the periodicity of a cycle with zero frequency is infinite, this 
stochastic process does not have an observable cycle.
• It Yt has a unit root, then the spectrum would be unbounded at fre­
quency zero. This is intuitive as a non stationary series has infinite 
variance.
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3.3.3 Partitioning the Frequency Dom ain
As mentioned before, spectral analysis has one great advantage in studying 
the relationship between economic variables: it allows one to study their 
movements at all frequencies. One recent application of this advantage, has 
been in studying the relationship between prices and output. Conventional 
wisdom for decades has been that prices and output exhibit a positive corre­
lation. Recently this has been called into question, with Cooley and Ohanian
(1991) finding that this correlation is negative for the post-WWII period, in 
the US. Haan(1996) has used the spectral analysis to shed some fight on this 
issue. He argues that the source of confusion is the focus on only one corre­
lation coefficient and by doing this, losing out on the dynamic aspects of the 
comovement of variables. Haan uses spectral methods and finds that, for the 
post-WWII period, the comovement between GNP and prices is positive in 
the ‘short rim’ and negative in the ‘long run’. ‘Short run’ here, refers to cycles 
of period less than five years. Thus, by partitioning the frequency domain, 
one can sometimes uncover different comovements at different frequencies.
In studying growth and unemployment, a reasonable partitioning of the 
frequency domain may be into: equilibrium movements; business cycle move­
ments and seasonal trends. In practice, there is strong evidence that such 
a partitioning could be made to work. NBER researchers, using the non 
spectral methods of Burns and Mitchell (1946), have isolated business cycle 
movements as lasting between 1.5-8 years. Englund, Persson and Svensson
(1992) found that for Sweden, the business cycle was represented well in the 
frequency domain between 3-8 years. There seems to be convincing evidence 
that business cycles do not last longer than eight years and thus I take this 
as my demarcation frequency between business cycle movements and equilib­
rium movements. I will follow the NBER definition and argue that seasonal 
movements consist of cycles of less than 1.5 years. Given that the highest 
frequency that can be monitored with annual data is a cycle of two years, 
the data I utilize will only differentiate between equilibrium and business 
cycle movements. In practical terms, a cycle of eight years corresponds to a
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frequency of 0.25 in the spectral plots. This is because the nyquist frequency, 
or a period of 2 years, corresponds to a frequency of one and thus an eight 
year cycle will have a frequency a quarter of this.
3.3.4 Cross spectral analysis
Granger (1966) stated the opinion that cross spectral methods were likely 
to prove one of the most important tools of spectral analysis. It is premise 
which we utilize in this chapter, in using cross spectral methods to get an idea 
of the relationship between growth and unemployment, at all frequencies.
Cross spectrum analysis gives us two important summary statistics:
• the phase spectrum: this gives us the average value of the phase shift 
between the two series, growth and unemployment, at every frequency.
• the coherency spectrum: this gives us correlation coefficient between 
growth and unemployment at every frequency.
Both these statistics are recovered from the cross spectrum. For further 
details of this, see appendix A. The above statistics are very useful as they 
allow one to compare the relationship between growth and unemployment at 
different horizons: equilibrium and business cycle, given yearly data.
Below, I outline a few important types of relationship and their implica­
tions for the coherence and phase spectra:
• Uncorrelated processes: in this case, the coherence and phase will be 
zero for all frequencies.
• Linear regression: if Yt = aXt 4- £t, then the coherence will be one and 
the phase zero for all frequencies.
• Linear regression with delay: if Yt = aXt~d +  £t, then the coherence 
spectrum is the same as for a normal linear regression, but the phase 
spectrum is different. The phase shift at frequency u  is $(lj) =  —ud.
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In other words, when there is a time delay, the phase spectrum is a 
linear function of frequency, with the slope representing the magnitude 
of the delay.
•  Fixed Angle Lag: this is the case, when the phase shift is the same non 
zero value at all frequencies. Granger and Hatanka (1964) considered 
this to be a very important case, the reason being that the smaller 
the frequency the larger the time lag between corresponding compo­
nents. They speculated that a lot of economic processes would have 
this feature.
3.3.5 Filtering
One of the aims of this chapter was to look at the relationship between 
equilibrium unemployment and growth. Previous attempts at this exercise 
have usually taken a simple average of growth and unemployment rates over 
a period of time and considered these equilibrium rates. One important issue 
to decide when using this technique, is the time period over which the average 
is taken.
A more sophisticated approach, is to put unemployment and growth 
through a Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter. A HP filter optimally extracts a 
trend which is stochastic but moves smoothly over time and is uncorrelated 
with the cyclical component. The assumption that the trend is smooth is 
imposed by assuming that the sum of squares of the second differences of yt 
is small. An estimate of the secular component is obtained by minimizing:
E  c t + A EUVh-i - V t ) - ( y t -  2/f-i))]2 A > 0
m\ t=1 t=l t=2
where T  is the sample size and A is a parameter that penalizes the vari­
ability of the trend. As A increases, the penalty imposed for large fluctuations 
in the secular component increases and the path for yt becomes smoother. 
In fact, users of the HP filter can select A a priori to isolate those cyclical 
fluctuations which belong to a specific frequency band.
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The use of the frequency domain provides one with other possibilities. 
This paper proposes a different measure of equilibrium rates by making a 
note of the fact that most equilibrium movements of a variable are likely 
to be of low frequency. Higher frequency movements are likely to be due 
to business cycle or seasonal effects. This chapter proposes to put growth 
and unemployment through a ‘low pass’ filter and consider these equilibrium 
components.
A ‘low pass’ filter is considered a function g(u) such that |T(o;)|2 has the
T(u) is called the transfer function or the Fourier transform of the filter,
In other words, a ‘low pass’ filter completely surpresses sill components 
with frequencies higher than uo- Thus a critical factor in designing an eco­
nomically meaningful ‘low pass’ filter is the cut off frequency u>o- As men­
tioned in the section on partitioning the frequency domain, there is strong 
evidence that business cycles do not last more than eight years. Therefore, 
we choose uo equivalent to a cycle of eight years, i.e. u>o =  0.25, for the low 
pass filter used in this paper.
The filtering process is as follows: (a) transform the time series to the fre­
quency domain by the Fourier transformation, (b) filter out all the unwanted 
components according to the transfer function of the filter, and (3) transform 
the remaining components back to the time domain by the inverse Fourier 
transform.. The result of these three operations is a the filtered process.
The sample of countries considered includes: Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Sweden, the UK and the US. The limited size of this sample is purely data 
driven. Spectral analysis is a very data hungry progress. Various sources, 
for example Granger and Hatanka (1964) and Koopmans (1974), recommend
form
s ( “ )
3.4 D ata
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upwards of 70 observations before reasonable estimates can be obtained. We 
would have liked to have carried out the analysis for the whole of the OECD, 
but for many of these countries only about 40 yearly post WWII observations 
are available. This is clearly insufficient to form reliable spectral represen­
tations. Four other countries we would have really liked to include were 
France, Italy, Spain and Portugal.. These countries would allow interesting 
comparisons to be made. Many argue that Italy and France share many 
similarities. Spain and Portugal form an even more striking combination. 
They have shared very similar recent histories in terms of the formation and 
break down of fascist regimes. They also share many similar institutional 
facets, yet there unemployment experiences have been vastly different, with 
the problem in Spain being much more acute. Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) 
make a comparative study of the two countries but only reach some very ten­
tative conclusions. Maybe there is something in the growth-unemployment 
dynamic that may explain the countries different experiences.
For a detailed discussion of the data sources, please refer to appendix B. 
Some of the series are very long indeed. For all six countries growth figures 
were available from 1870 courtesy of Maddison (1994). In fact from the same 
source, equally long growth series were available for many other countries. 
Growth figures were not the constraint, unemployment figures were.
A problem with such long series, particularly with unemployment figures 
which go back to 1855 for the UK, is that the definitions have changed 
frequently. Further the measurement is likely to be much more reliable 
presently, than say 100 years ago. This may make the data very difficult 
to compare across time.
We believe this to be less of a problem than it potentially seems, due 
to the kind of econometric procedure used. The highest frequency spec­
tral analysis allows us to observe is the Nyquist frequency, lj =  7r. Given 
yearly data, this corresponds to a cycle every two years, i.e. not a very 
high frequency. Seasonal relationships between growth and unemployment 
will certainly not be observable with the given data set: yearly observations
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are just too infrequent for this. More importantly though, exact figures for 
growth and unemployment are probably not required to observe cycles of two 
years or longer. Approximate measures should suffice to recover movements 
of such periodicity. It is for this reason that we believe measurement error 
and changes in definition, though they undoubtedly exist, should not be such 
a big problem for the present analysis.
3.5 U nivariate Spectral A nalysis
3.5.1 Unem ploym ent Spectra
Referring to figure 3.3, which plots estimates of the power spectrum for the 
unemployment rate in the countries considered, with 95% confidence bands4. 
Some of the underlying series are very long indeed. For example, data for the 
UK go back to 1855 and for the US they go back to 1890. Given the length 
of some of the unemployment series, we can be confident that the results are 
not the artifact of a particular period. Here I am particularly thinking of 
a lot of so called ‘stylized facts’, based on analysis that is just done for the 
post WWII period. For unemployment and growth this can be potentially 
misleading, due to the productivity slowdown and a marked upward trend in 
unemployment coinciding in this period.
The unemployment spectra are similar across the countries concerned, 
and show features consistent with the well known empirical regularity: Granger’s 
‘typical spectral shape’. Granger(1966) observed that most detrended macroe­
conomic variables exhibited a typical spectral shape. Estimated spectra look 
like a monotone decreasing function from low to high frequencies, with a 
pronounced peak in the neighbourhood of the zero frequency. The unem­
ployment spectra, for all the countries, seem to follow this description very 
closely.
One feature to pick out, is the seeming lack of business cycle peak in the
4The spectra are estimated via the periodogram, smoothed using Daniel’s flat window.
For more details, refer to Appendix A.
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unemployment spectra. We can define an economic cycle in the frequency 
domain as the occurrence of a peak in the spectral density of a series. In 
fact, if we look at the log spectrum of unemployment (see figure 3.4 which 
plots the log spectrum with 95% confidence intervals), to get more resolu­
tion at the high frequencies where the power is low, we can detect a small 
peak in all countries apart from Sweden around a frequency of 0.6, or a cycle 
of period around 3.5 years. Sargent (1979) in fact notices this phenomenon 
amongst most economic aggregates. They seem to have spectral densities 
resembling the typical spectral shape and do not display pronounced peaks 
at the range of frequencies associated with the business cycle. As Sargent 
rightly comments though, this does not mean that the series do not expe­
rience business cycles. One has to just take a quick look at the raw data 
plots of most economic aggregates to see this. In fact this suggests that the 
definition of business cycles in the frequency domain, based on cyclical peaks 
given earlier, is not very workable. Maybe using time domain definitions of 
business cycles may be more instructive.
The typical spectral shape, identified by Granger, implies that the weight 
of the components with very long periods are disproportionately large, i.e. 
that detrended aggregate times series display a very high degree of persis­
tence. This is born out in Table 3.1, which documents the amount of the 
variance of unemployment and growth that is captured at lower than busi­
ness cycle frequencies, i.e. cycles of over 8 years periodicity by our previous 
definition. In fact one could maybe consider a crude measure of persistence 
in the frequency domain to be just this statistic: persistence is the amount of 
unemployment explained by equilibrium movements. Between 83-95% of the 
variance of unemployment is explained at these frequencies, i.e. persistence 
is very high for all countries considered.
It may be instructive to compare this measure of persistence to those 
in the time domain. In the time domain, persistence has a different mean­
ing. It is usually interpreted as how dependent current unemployment is on 
past unemployment. It is usually measured by the sum of coefficients on
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Table 3.1: Variance: contribution of below business cycle frequencies ( 
greater than 8 years periodicity), to the explained variance of unemployment 
and growth, for the countries considered.
the autogressive components in an unemployment equation. But the closer 
this measure is to one, then the more of the variance of unemployment that 
will be explained by low frequency movements. Thus at some level, this 
time domain measure of persistence and the frequency domain measure are 
equivalent. Blanchard and Summers (1986) estimate unemployment, since 
1900, in the UK and US as AR(1) processes and find coefficients of p, very 
close to but, less than one. They argue though, that an ARMA(1 ,1) fits the 
unemployment series for these countries better. Alogoskoufis and Manning 
(1988) estimate AR(2) processes for unemployment in a sample of sixteen 
OECD countries, since 1952. They find a root near the unit circle for Euro­
pean Community countries, with the US and the Nordic countries displaying 
much lower persistence. Phelps and Zoega (1998), use a Markov Switching 
Model to look at the level of persistence in the UK, over the period 1921-96. 
They find a raw persistence measure of 0.9, but a value of 0.65 once shifts in 
the mean of unemployment have been taken into account.
It seems that the raw measures of persistence, for the US and UK from 
Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Phelps and Zoega (1998), are consistent 
with the high degrees of persistence we see in the frequency domain. The 
evidence from Alogoskoufis and Manning (1998) for the US and Sweden is 
not consistent with our frequency domain measure of persistence. They argue 
the lower persistence in the US and Sweden is expected. This is due to less
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persistence in wage aspirations and less sluggishness in labour demand. In 
the US, it is argued that this is due to higher flexibility and in Sweden due 
to centralized wage bargaining. The difference, we believe, is due to the time 
horizons used. Alogoskoufis and Manning only look at unemployment post 
WWII. Our frequency domain measures are based on much longer series, as 
is the evidence of Blanchard and Summers and Phelps and Zoega. It may 
be the case that the persistence of unemployment reduced in the post WWII 
period, in both the US and Sweden.
A more sophisticated measure of persistence can be generated in the 
frequency domain, by considering a wider class of processes than is usually 
considered. By this, I mean allowing for the possibility of long memory.
A class of spectral density functions able to match Granger’s typical spec­
tral shape is given by
f(8) = dF(8) ~  g(8) 6~2d, as 9 -* 0+ (3.1)
where indicates that the ratio of the left- and right-hand side
tends to a bounded quantity, d is a non negative constant and g(9) is a 
bounded function bounded away from zero in a neighbourhood of the origin. 
The parameter d represents the order of integration of the time series. If it is 
greater than zero, the time series exhibits long memory while it exhibits weak 
memory if the parameter is equal to 0. The parameter d measures the rate 
of divergence of the spectrum around zero frequency and thus it measures 
“how typical the spectral shape is”, d is our measure of persistence: the 
higher the value of d, the higher is the weight of the components with very 
long periods and thus the higher is the persistence of the process.
A time domain representation of the time series X t, t > 0, corresponding 
to equation 3.1 is given by the Wold representation
t
X t  =  X q  +  7 1 +  (fin e t - n j ( 3 - 2 )
T l= 0
with Wold coefficients <f>n = <j)n -1- dnd~l+o(0n) , where is a function
converging to zero at a rate at least as quick as the exponential one ( (j)n < pn,
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0 < / ? < l a s n j  oo), d is the order of integration of the time series, while
o(tfn) indicates a quantity of lower order than </>n, that is limn >OQ °^>n^ =  0.
The Wold coefficient <pn gauges the fraction of the shock et- n, n periods 
ahead, which has not yet been absorbed. Therefore, the rate of decaying of 
the Wold coefficients measures the persistence of the process.
A standard trend stationary process with A R M  A  disturbance exhibits 
Wold coefficients </>n’s decaying at most at an exponential rate, that is a pa­
rameter of fractional integration d equal to zero. This weak memory property 
of A R M  A  processes shows up, in frequency domain, under the form of a flat 
log spectral shape, around the zero frequency. A process with a unit root, ex­
hibits Wold coefficients asymptotically approaching a constant that is d = 1. 
Thus its spectral shape is typical, yet particular as it exhibits a very specific 
rate of divergence around zero frequency. This set of considerations shows 
how standard A R I M A  processes cannot generate arbitrary spectral shapes, 
because they generate shapes with rates of divergence equal to either that of 
a unit root or a flat one.
Let us map the introduction of long memory into time domain concepts. 
If 0 < d < then X t has finite variance and still exhibits mean reversion. 
When the process has infinite variance, but still exhibits mean
reversion. The process is not covariance stationary, but less ‘non stationary’ 
than a unit root process. Further, the process now has mean reversion at 
a hyperbolic rate, i.e. lower than the exponential rate of trend stationary 
A R M  A  processes. Finally when d > 1, the process has infinite variance and 
stops exhibiting mean reversion.
While formally testing for long memory in unemployment is beyond the 
scope of this paper, we can nevertheless informally discuss whether the re­
sults above and other time domain evidence is consistent with long memory5. 
Above, we showed that unemployment was very persistent. This could be
5 A formal way of testing for long memory, or the value of d, is to perform semi para­
metric estimation of the OLS regression of the log of the estimated spectrum over the 
log-frequency, at around the zero frequency. Interested readers are referred to Michelacci 
and Zaffaroni (1997).
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consistent with weak memory trend stationary A R M  A  processes but with 
autoregressive coefficients summing close to one. But, they could also be 
consistent with long memory aswell. Phelps and Zoega (1998) use a Markov 
Switching Model on post WWII OECD unemployment, to show that for 
most countries, the data is consistent with infrequent mean shifts in unem­
ployment, and not very high estimates of autoregressive persistence. They 
test that unemployment is stationary around a shifting mean against the 
alternative of a unit root process with a constant mean. The unit root hy­
pothesis is resoundingly rejected. In light of the discussion above, this test 
could be misspecified.. It could be the case that unemployment exhibits long 
memory with A < d  < 1. Thus unemployment would exhibit mean rever­
sion at a hyperbolic rate, but would not be stationary. Standard unit root 
tests, like that employed by Phelps and Zoega, would exhibit low power with 
respect to this alternative (Diebold and Rudebusch 1991).
This alternative may not be so unreasonable. As Nickell (1998) argues, it 
is very unlikely that unemployment could display a unit root6. If this was the 
case, then unemployment would have no influence on wages. This would im­
ply that there is nothing to anchor the unemployment rate. However, there 
is a lot of evidence that suggests unemployment does affect wages, see Bean 
(1994) for a survey. Bean indicates that the effect does vary widely across 
countries. The effect of unemployment on wages may be weak, but it does 
exist. Therefore, unemployment does have an anchor and it must display 
some mean reversion. This is evidenced by the fact that if we look at unem­
ployment over a long enough time horizon, it is untrended (see LNJ 1991). 
This is not inconsistent with unemployment displaying long memory, in some 
cases, with \  < d < 1. In this situation, unemployment would display mean 
reversion, but at a very slow hyperbolic rate, and would be non stationary. 
The tests performed in Phelps and Zoega could be confusing infrequent mean 
shifts, with just very slow mean reversion. This could maybe also explain
6 Of course unemployment could never truly display a unit root, as it is bounded between 
zero and one. But it may, over certain periods of time, mimic the behaviour of a random 
walk.
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the experience of Europe from the 1970s. Rather than illustrating hysteresis 
effects, or changes in the long run equilibrium unemployment rate, the expe­
rience may just be illustrating long memory effects, or extremely slow mean 
reversion. The above discussion suggests that it is an important next step to 
test formally for long memory in unemployment.
Does the typical spectral shape nature of unemployment imply that busi­
ness cycle movements are not important in explaining unemployment? The 
below analysis suggests that if we only looked at the frequency domain, this 
would be the case. I will argue that this just highlights one of the limitations 
of spectral analysis and illustrates the need to look at the time domain as 
well, to understand fully the processes underlying economic variables.
One can think of unemployment as follows:
e i be i 8u t =  u t + u t  +  u t
where u ^ ,u ^ c , and u at  are the: equilibrium; business cycle and seasonal 
elements of unemployment respectively. Focusing on the equilibrium and 
business cycle elements for the purpose of this exposition, we can deduce 
that the variance at frequency u  of u t  can be determined from the spectral 
decomposition
=  v a r [ u t ( u ) \  +  v a r [ u ^ c ( u ) ]  +  2  c o v [u ^(u ) , u ^ ( lj )]
By definition, the direct contribution of u \ c to the variance of u t  for cycles 
of periodicity greater than eight years must be zero due to the our definition 
of business cycles. This implies that:
v a r [ u ^ c (uj)]  =  0 ,  
c o v [u ^(lj) ,  u bt c ( u ) \  =  0 for u  = u e
where u e is the frequency equivalent of a periodicity of eight years or more.
Given that most of the power of the unemployment spectra is at frequen­
cies below the business cycle, this would seem to imply that business cycle 
variations in unemployment really are not that important.
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This would be an invalid conclusion: it fails to take into account the 
effect of business cycle variations in unemployment on the equilibrium level 
of unemployment. The frequency domain is not the best vehicle to study 
this correlation though. This is because the spectral representation theorem 
effectively decomposes a variable Yt into a linear combination of sinusoidal 
terms, of varying frequency and mutually orthogonal (see appendix A). But 
one can think of periods where short run changes in the unemployment level 
have had an impact on the medium rim NAIRU. An example of this is Europe 
over the 1970s and 1980s, where there was a strong correlation between 
the upward movement in the level of unemployment and estimates of the 
NAIRU. Various explanations for this were the effects of so called ‘insiders’ 
and long term unemployment. Bean (JEL 1994) provides a good survey 
of this literature. To analyze this particular economic mechanism, requires 
analysis in the time domain as well.
3.5.2 Growth Spectra
Figure 3.5 plots the growth spectra with 95% confidence bands for the coun­
tries considered. Once again the sample size is very long, with the data 
going back to 1871. The data is also very comparable across countries, as 
they are sourced from Maddison(1994) which uses Geary-Khamis Dollars to 
get growth data which can be compared across countries.
An interesting exercise is to compare the results here to those of King 
and Watson(1996). They find a pattern namely, ‘the typical spectral shape of 
growth rates\ This is naturally different to Granger’s typical spectral shape, 
as it represents processes which are, in effect, first differences of the 1(1) 
processes Granger was studying. ‘The typical spectral shape of growth rates’ 
broadly describes spectra which rise to a peak at a cycle length of about 5-10 
years and then decline at very high frequencies. They find that for the US, 
post-WWII, growth spectrum, the peak occurs just inside the business cycle 
interval and this interval contains the bulk of the variance of output growth, 
in fact 58% exactly.
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Table 3.2: Peaks: the figures represent the period of the cycle, in years, for 
which the corresponding spectra has a global peak
Referring to Table 3.1 it can be seen that growth spectra considered here 
illustrate the property that the bulk of the variance of output growth is 
contained in the business cycle interval. Only between 28-41% is contained 
in the low frequency interval. The US, the UK, Germany and Canada also 
illustrate a shape similar to that described by King and Watson. Table 
3.2 documents the period for which the global peak of the spectra for each 
country occurs at. For the US, the UK and Germany this falls within the 
limits described by King and Watson, with Canada having a peak just outside 
these limits, at a cycle of 11.8 years. The spectra for Sweden and Australia 
do not follow ‘the typical growth spectral shape’ pattern. Sweden does have 
a large peak around the 10 year cycle, but has its global peak at the 3.6 year 
cycle. The spectrum for Australia is even more perverse. In this case, by far 
the biggest peak occurs at the higher end of the frequency range, namely 2.2 
years.
The Australian spectrum provides an interesting case study as if one 
refers to the raw growth series plot in figure 3.6, it is noticeable how volatile 
growth was in Australia pre-1900, compared to other countries over the same 
period. This could maybe explain the importance of high frequencies in the 
Australian growth spectra. The growth spectrum for post- 1900 Australia 
illustrates this point. High frequencies are no longer important and the global 
peak occurs around the 10 year cycle. There is also a second important peak 
around the 4 year cycle though.
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Thus, the evidence on ‘the typical growth spectral shape’ identified by 
King and Watson is mixed. Some countries bear out the expected shape 
but Sweden and Australia do not. Australia reverts to a shape close to ‘the 
typical shape’ if we exclude pre-1900 data. We could possibly justify omitting 
pre-1900 data on measurement error grounds. Early data is based on very 
incomplete sources and may not be that reliable. The reason why maybe 
King and Watson’s result do not always hold in the spectra considered here, 
is that they only consider growth variables for the post-WWII period and 
for the US only. The data set here is much longer and considers a range of 
countries that may explain the idiosyncrasies registered.
Let us once more use the value of the variance of growth, explained by 
equilibrium movements, as a frequency domain measure of persistence. Un­
surprisingly, it can easily be seen, by referring to Table 3.1, that the persis­
tence of growth is much less than that of unemployment. In fact the values of 
persistence that we find in the frequency domain are remarkably consistent 
with those estimated in the time domain. Jones (1995a) performs various 
stationarity tests on the growth series of OECD countries. He finds that 
ADF tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in growth rates, 
over the period 1900-87, and imply a first order autoregressive root that is 
typically less than 0.3. More specifically it is: 0.29 for Australia; 0.37 for 
Canada; 0.02 for Germany; 0.22 for Sweden; 0.24 for the UK and 0.25 for 
the US. Taking into account that these are only point estimates, and with 
the exception of Germany, they are very similar to the frequency domain 
persistence values of between 0.28-0.41. The rankings across countries may 
not be the same, but both measures are of similar orders of magnitude.
The estimated growth spectra merely confirm the intuition about growth 
rates from time domain experiments: growth is stationary and has very little 
persistence.
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3.6 Cross Spectral A nalysis
As mentioned earlier, many economists believe this to be the most important 
use of the frequency domain, as it allows one to document the relationship 
between two variables across the frequency distribution.
Cross spectral analysis gives us two important summary statistics:
• the phase spectrum: this gives us the average value of the phase shift 
between the two series, growth and unemployment, at every frequency.
• the coherency spectrum: this gives us the correlation coefficient between 
growth and unemployment at every frequency.
An example of the use of these concepts, has been at the NBER to try to 
isolate ‘leading indicators’ of business cycle movements, as an aid in the early 
recognition and prediction of cyclical movements. Essentially a good leading 
indicator displays a sizable phase lead at low business cycle frequencies over 
some important ‘coincident’ measures of the cycle, such as unemployment 
or GNP. Further, the indicator must also display a large coherence with 
those coincident measures. It should be noted though, that a good leading 
indicator does not necessarily help in predicting yt any better than can be 
done by using past y's alone. This is an important point to bear in mind 
when considering the analysis of unemployment and growth below.
Firstly, I will speculate as to what kind of features one may look for in 
the relationship between unemployment and growth. As mentioned in section 
3.2, one may expect a different relationship at business cycle frequencies than 
at equilibrium frequencies. One possible line of thought, is that we should ex­
pect higher correlations at business cycle frequencies, due to common shocks 
to both growth and unemployment. Whereas at lower frequencies, growth 
will be led by technology but unemployment by demography. This is a con­
tentious line of thought. We need to consider the feedback effects between 
growth and unemployment, namely: the capitalization effect; the creative de­
struction effect; loss of skill and learning by doing. The relative importance
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of these effects will determine the nature of relationship, at low frequencies, 
between unemployment and growth.
Referring to figures 3.7-3.9, which illustrate the coherence and phase plots 
for the countries considered. In the coherence plot, the dashed lines repre­
sent 95% confidence intervals, which are reasonably narrow7. The relative 
narrowness of the confidence intervals across countries is determined by two 
main factors: the number of observations and the size of the coherence esti­
mate. The higher both are, the narrower the confidence intervals are. This 
explains why the US confidence interval seems very narrow, when compared 
to the Australian or Swedish bands. The first obvious point to make is that 
coherence spectra imply that there is significant non-zero correlation between 
growth and unemployment, for virtually all frequencies. Secondly Germany 
is the only country for which the coherence is higher at business cycle fre­
quencies than at equilibrium frequencies. All the other countries have high 
coherences for cycles of 10-20 years periodicity. Further, all countries apart 
from Canada have high coherences at high frequencies, especially around 
the 2.5 year cycle. The US has a fairly stable coherence across all frequen­
cies of around 0.8. Looking at its phase spectrum plot (figure 3.8) suggests 
that the relationship may of similar to a linear regression with delay: with 
unemployment leading growth.
Looking at both sets of phase plots suggests that, in general, unemploy­
ment leads growth. Further as Granger and Hatanka speculated, the phase 
plots in years show very clearly that the smaller the frequency, the longer the 
time lag. A note of caution should be mentioned when interpreting phase 
plots in terms of leads and lags. The phase plot is drawn on the — n to n 
simplex to uniquely determine the phase shift at each frequency. But this 
leaves open to interpretation whether a lead could be a lag as well.. For 
example, a lead of |  could equally be interpreted as a lag of Thus, I do
7 The confidence intervals are computed using a procedure described in the appendix. It 
should be noted that the bands are probably more accurate for coherences above 0.4. This 
is because the distribution they are derived from is less of an approximation for higher 
coherences. See Enochson and Goodman (1965) for details.
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not put too much emphasis on the results from the phase diagrams.
There does not seem to be strict demarcation in the relationship between 
equilibrium frequencies and business cycle frequencies. The high coherences 
mentioned earlier at low frequencies, apart from for Germany, extend to the 
low end of the business cycle frequency spectrum: namely, cycles of period 5-8 
years. Given this and the problems outlined earlier, of using spectral peaks to 
identify business cycles, maybe we can follow Sargent (1979) and consider the 
following definition of business cycles: the business cycle is the phenomenon 
of a number of important economic aggregates being characterized by high 
pairwise coherences at low business cycle frequencies.
So, overall, the coherence plots Eire very suggestive that there is a relation­
ship between growth and unemployment at equilibrium frequencies and at 
low business cycle frequencies. There does not seem to be a noticeable shift in 
the relationship, as we progress from equilibrium frequencies to business cycle 
frequencies as the theoretical considerations earlier may have suggested. The 
phase diagrams suggest that unemployment leads growth. This may imply 
that the feedback effects from unemployment to growth, i.e. loss of skills and 
learning by doing, are more important than the feedback effects from growth 
to unemployment, namely creative destruction and the capitalization effect. 
I would caution against this presumption, as the phase plots are difficult to 
interpret for the reasons mentioned earlier.
3.7 Back to  the tim e domain: a low pass filter
In this section the growth and unemployment series, for the various countries 
considered, are passed through a ’low pass’ filter, i.e. high frequency move­
ments are filtered out. These filtered series are then considered equilibrium 
values. The logic runs as follows: filter out all frequencies due to the business 
cycle or above and one should be left with fluctuations due to changes in the 
equilibrium value of a variable. This paper follows: the NBER and Englund, 
Persson and Svensson (1992); and considers cycles of periodicity greater than
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eight years to be lower than any business cycle frequency on average.
An alternative would be to simply average the growth and unemployment 
rates over a particular sub-period and consider these as equilibrium rates. 
This is the approach taken in much of the literature, for example the Barro 
style growth regressions or the LNJ unemployment regressions. Of course 
the perfect method would be to produce measures of equilibrium growth and 
unemployment based on some economic model, for example the NAIRU as an 
estimate of equilibrium unemployment. It is a well documented fact though, 
that these measures are not very robust, being very sensitive to the models 
used.
Thus, as a second best solution, I consider spectral analysis as a good 
option. It is more sophisticated than a simple averaging procedure. This can 
be used to plot the same graph as Bean-Pissarides, but instead of merely 
having the averages of growth and unemployment, I will use filtered growth 
and unemployment rates to see if any relationship consequently shows up.
This has a major advantage over the simple averaging procedure used in 
much of the literature. The filtered series retains all the observations for indi­
vidual countries. This is not the case if one uses the averaging procedure. For 
example, if you have a 100 observations and take 10 year averages, you are 
left with only 10 equilibrium observations, whereas the filtering method will 
retain the 100 observations. This allows one to plot the same scatter graphs 
as in section 3.2 but for individual countries, not across countries. This is 
a very important difference, as cross sectional variations in unemployment 
and growth, particularly across OECD countries, tend to be dominated by 
country specific fixed effects. If the relationship between growth and unem­
ployment is very country specific, a simple look across a section of countries 
could be highly misleading. To really capture the relationship between un­
employment and growth, we need to make use of within country variation 
as well as cross country variation. Utilizing a long panel within countries 
is the best way to achieve this. This allows one to get a truer picture of 
the relationship between growth and unemployment, as any variation in the
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relationship caused by different institutions in different countries is not in­
cluded. Only changes in the institutional framework, within a country, over 
time, can distort the picture.
Referring to figures 3.10-3.15, we plot scatter diagrams for the filtered 
growth and unemployment series of the six countries considered and discuss 
their implications for the relationship between growth and unemployment.8
For Australia there is a slight negative relationship between filtered growth 
and unemployment across the pooled sample and the sub-periods. It is only 
significant for the pooled and post-WWII samples. A linear relationship does 
not fit very well and there is a much higher variance for both filtered growth 
and unemployment in the pre-WWII period.
Canada provides similar results to Australia, though only the pooled sam­
ple shows a significant relationship.
Germany shows little relationship for the pooled or pre-WWII sample. 
The post WWII sample shows a positive and significant relationship, though 
this is due to three outlying observations in the early 50s when most economies 
were seriously booming after recovering from WWII. If we ignore these out­
liers, then the relationship is more or less neutral. This raises a slight problem 
with the methodology used that needs to be highlighted.. The filter still in­
cludes cycles of approximately eight years or above9. The cycle caused by 
WWII for example, could fall into this category. In Germany there was a 
huge fall in output towards the end WWII and immediately afterwards. This 
was due to two reasons: the loss of the war and the wartime economy switch­
ing back to normal economic activities. This was followed by a huge boom 
in the early 1950s, which was also seen in many other countries. These two 
parts together could come across as a cycle of periodicity greater than eight 
years but of huge amplitude. I believe this to be the case with Germany, and 
so any outliers caused by this, must be treated with caution. Again there is
8The sample is split into pre WWII and post WWII periods. The pre WWII sample 
is from 1855-1950 where available and the post WWII period is from 1951-1992
9 the reason why the filter can only approximate an ideal low pass filter of eight years 
or below is due to the problem of ‘leakage’.
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country s.d. for filtered series
growth unemployment
pre-WWII post-WWII pre-WWII post-WWII
US 4.06 1.90 5.81 1.38
UK 2.37 0.75 2.97 2.57
Germany 4.69 3.38 5.94 2.64
Sweden 1.98 1.10 5.72 0.56
Australia 2.75 0.98 4.31 1.85
Canada 4.13 1.05 4.98 1.66
Table 3.3: S tandard  Deviations: S.Ds for filtered unemployment and 
growth.
a higher variance for both variables in the pre-WWII sample, particularly so 
for unemployment.
Sweden shows little relationship for the pooled or pre-WWII sample, like 
Germany. It shows a strong negative and significant relationship for the post 
WWII sample. Again the variance of filtered unemployment is much higher 
in the pre-WWI sample.
The UK shows little relationship in the pooled sample, a slightly positive 
but insignificant relationship in the pre-WWII sample and a strongly negative 
and significant relationship in the post-WWII sample. As noted before, the 
range of observations is much higher in the pre-WWII period.
The US has very similar results to the UK, but the fit is slightly worse 
for all periods
What general lessons can be drawn from the above observations? One 
expected finding is that the range and variance of both equilibrium growth 
and unemployment is higher in the pre than post-WWII period. This is rein­
forced by table 3.3, which documents the standard deviations of the filtered 
series in the pre-WWII and post-WWII periods.
This is unsurprising as some countries were quite early on in there indus­
trial revolution. This period is often associated with more volatile growth 
and unemployment rates than when a country has matured. Secondly, there 
were major events in this period that would have effected even equilibrium
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growth and unemployment. These were events such as: WWI and WWII; the 
Great Depression, which was particularly severe in the US and the hyper- 
inflationary episodes in Germany. Measurement error could also possibly 
play a part. Early data is based on very incomplete sources and may not 
be that reliable. For example, in the UK, pre-1914 unemployment data is 
almost certainly excessively cyclical as it is based on union counts, whilst 
post-1918 is based on a registered unemployment benefit claimant count.
Only Canada and Australia show any kind of significant relationship in 
the pooled sample and in both cases it is negative. With the exception of 
Germany, all countries show a negative relationship in the post WWII period. 
It is particularly strong for the UK and Sweden. The positive relationship in 
the German case is probably due to outliers during the early 1950s. Further as 
mentioned in section 3.2, the negative relationship in the post WWII period 
may be due to the fact that the 1975-84 period was almost universally one 
of both lower productivity growth and higher unemployment than earlier in 
the post WWII period.
The above results suggest is difficult to have any strong sense of the 
relationship, between growth and unemployment, from the filtered growth 
and unemployment series scatter diagrams. There is some suggestion of a 
negative relationship, though for reasons mentioned above, this is not a strong 
conviction.
To a large degree these findings confirm the results reported in section 3.2. 
This is that the scatter diagrams show a negative relationship post WWII 
and little relationship across all sub-periods. The only difference occurs in 
the pre WWII sample, where the averaging method produces a positive and 
significant relationship between growth and unemployment. This is not repli­
cated in the results from the filtering method. For reasons outlined at the 
beginning of this section though, the filtering method probably produces 
more reliable results. It may be the case that we need to take account of the 
differing institutions across countries more explicitly to get a better sense of 
this relationship. This exercise is carried out in the following chapters.
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3.8 Tim e Domain Statistics
Splitting the frequency range into different components, by using a low pass 
filter, allows other interesting statistics to be developed in the time domain. 
In this section, I look at the cross correlations and granger causality tests, 
between the filtered growth and unemployment series.
3.8.1 Granger causality tests
An often remarked on phenomenon in economics, is that correlation does not 
necessarily imply causation. An example would be the positive correlation 
found between the death rate in the UK and the proportion of marriages 
solemnized in the Church of England. The Granger approach to the question 
whether X  causes Y, is to see how much of the current Y  can be explained 
by past values of Y  and then to see whether adding lagged values of X  can 
improve the explanation. Y  is said to be Granger-caused by X, if X  helps in 
the prediction of Y, or equivalently if the coefficients on the lagged X s  are 
statistically significant. It is important to note though, that the statement 
lX  Granger causes Y 1 does not imply that Y  is the effect or the result of X .  
Granger causality measures precedence and information content, but does 
not by itself indicate causality in the more common use of the term.
We have performed Granger causality tests between our measures of equi­
librium growth and unemployment: the filtered growth series (#/) and the 
filtered unemployment series (uf). The overwhelming finding is that the null 
hypothesis of non granger causality is rejected, in both directions10. In other 
words, we cannot reject the hypothesis that Qf granger causes Uf and that Uf 
granger causes #/. I will comment more on these results in the next chapter, 
but even given the notoriously low power of granger causality tests, they sug­
gest that growth and unemployment feedback into each other, at equilibrium
10The results of the tests are available on request. The tests were performed for a 
variety of lags to check for robustness, and at a significance level of 5%. In general, the 





The granger causality tests above suggest that we cannot rule out causality 
in both directions. Given this, looking at the cross correlation lag structure 
should provide us with important insights. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 document the 
cross correlations between filtered growth and filtered unemployment, for the 
various countries considered. With the exception of Sweden, the results axe 
striking. Looking at the lag structure of corr(u^+T, for r  > 0, we find 
that the cross correlations are nearly always negative for all the countries 
considered. For corr(ity,^+T) with r  > 0, we find at low lags that the 
correlation is positive and at higher lags it switches to being negative. The 
switching point occurs at lag lengths of 8-12 depending on the country. Again 
I will comment more on these results in the next chapter, when I relate them 
closely to the predictions of various models. They are very suggestive of the 
following mechanisms at work though:
• in the effect of growth on unemployment, capitalization dominates cre­
ative destruction ( a negative corr(utf 'T, <?/) ;
• in the effect of unemployment on growth, the cleansing effect is preva­
lent at lower lags of 0-8 years (a positive corr(utf ,g tf ' T)) , after which
loss of skills and learning by doing effects dominate (a negative corr(u^, gf+T))-
The exception of Sweden, maybe due to the emphasis that country has 
placed on using active labour market policies to sustain full employment, 
throughout its history. This may have counteracted the natural forces finking 
growth and unemployment. It should be noted, though, that ‘the Swedish 
model’ was perceived to have failed in the 1990s, when the combination of low 
growth and joining the ERM illustrated how active labour market policies 
were not effective as anti-cyclical devices. Active labour market spending 
ballooned and yet unemployment continued to increase.
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The above insights will become clearer when we discuss the various models 
linking growth and unemployment, in the next chapter.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter has used a combination of frequency domain and time domain 
methods to try and get a more detailed picture of the relationship between 
unemployment and growth. It has been argued that the time domain does not 
provide enough resolution about the relationship, especially if the relation­
ship is different at equilibrium frequencies than at business cycle frequencies.
A variety of instruments are used, in the frequency domain, to recover 
some stylized facts about the relationship between unemployment and growth:
• Univariate analysis suggests that unemployment is a highly persistent 
process that may well show signs of long memory. They also confirm 
our prior belief that growth is highly stationary with little persistence.
• Cross spectral methods show a high degree of correlation between un­
employment and growth at equilibrium and low business cycle frequen­
cies, with no noticeable shift in the relationship as one progresses from 
equilibrium frequencies to business cycle frequencies.
• The relationship between filtered growth and unemployment gives a 
suggestion of a negative relationship, though this is not a strong con­
viction.
Mapping back into time domain, we find that granger causality tests 
cannot rule out steady state growth and equilibrium unemployment feeding 
back into each other. Further, cross correlation analysis is very suggestive 
that certain mechanisms are more important than others. This will become 
clear, when we review the various mechanisms linking growth and unem­
ployment, in the following chapter. One finding will be that capitalization 
dominates creative destruction, in the effect of growth and unemployment.
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It also seems that, in the impact of unemployment on growth: the cleansing 
effect is prevalent at medium run frequencies; with loss of skills and learning 
by doing dominating at long run frequencies.
Thus, the conclusion of this chapter is that bivariate analysis of growth 
and unemployment provides us with some highly pertinent stylized facts 
about: growth, unemployment and their mutual relationship. In isolation 
though, it is not enough to discriminate between the various mechanisms 
leading to a relationship between unemployment and growth. Only by more 
explicitly taking into account the differing institutions across countries, will 
that goal be achievable. An attempt at such is carried out in the following 
chapters.
3.10 Appendix A  - The Theory of Spectral 
Analysis
This section reviews some of the important elements of spectral analysis 
utilized in this paper. Firstly I will describe the foundation of the frequency 
domain approach and it’s relation to the time domain. This will be followed 
by a discussion of filtering procedures and cross spectral analysis, focusing 
on the coherence and phase concepts.
3.10.1 The Frequency Dom ain Approach to  Tim e Se­
ries Analysis
Typical empirical work in macroeconomics is conducted in the time domain. 
For example, the value of a variable Yt at date t, has often been described in 
terms of a sequence of innovations {£t}£-oo in models of the form
oo
Yt = V + t-j
j =0
The focus of the time domain approach, will be the implications of such 
a representation for the covariance between Yt and Yr at distinct dates t and 
r.
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In this chapter, I will be using the analogue of this: the frequency domain. 
Typically, this approach will describe the value of Yt as a weighted sum of 
cosine and sine waves of varying frequencies,
pir rir
yt =  / i+  / a(u) cos(ut) d u +  8{u) sin (ut) duJo Jo
the goal being to determine how important cycles of different frequencies 
are in accounting for the behaviour of Y . The frequency domain and the 
time domain are really two sides of the same coin: any covariance stationary 
process has both a time domain representation and a frequency domain rep­
resentation. Any feature of the data that can described by one representation 
can equally well be described by the other representation. In this chapter, 
it is argued that the frequency domain is convenient for analyzing the link 
between growth and unemployment, as it allows one to look at the relation­
ship at different frequencies: low, medium and high. It is further argued 
that these different frequencies each have an economic interpretation: low 
frequency readings as equilibrium movements; medium frequency as business 
cycle movements and high frequency as seasonal trends.
Representation
The Spectral Representation Theorem11 says that any covariance-stationary 
process Yt can be expressed as:
Yt =  p +  [  [a(u) cos(ut) +  8(u) sm(ut)]du (3.3)
Jo
The random processes represented by a(u) and 8(u) have zero mean and 
the further property that for any frequencies 0 < uq < UJ2 < < 7r,
the variable J^2 a{uj)duj is uncorrelated with a(u)du  and the variable 
J^2 8{oj)doj is uncorrelated with 8(u)du while for any 0 < uq < U2 < 
7r and 0 < < ^4 < 7r, the variable J^a a(tu)du is uncorrelated with
Q  S ( u ) d u .
11 In fact Priestley(1981) shows how this representation can be extended to non station­
ary linear processes.
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The above representation, allows one intuitively to think of Yt as a linear 
combination of sinusoidal terms, of varying frequency. The upper limit in 
the integral is 7r rather than oo as one cannot distinguish between variation 
at a corresponding frequency in the range (0, n) and higher frequencies due 
to the periodicities of the cosine and sine functions. The frequency u  = ir is 
called the Nyquist frequency.
The next important concept to introduce is the (power) spectral distri­
bution Junction or F(u). This arises from the Wiener-Khintchine Theo­
rem, which as applied to real-valued processes says that, for any stationary 
stochastic process with autocovariance function 'y(k), there exists a mono- 
tonically increasing function F(u) such that
7(^) =  [  cos u k  dF(u) (3-4)Jo
Equation 3.4 is called the spectral representation of the autocovariance 
function. The great use of this is that it can be shown that F(u) has a direct 
statistical interpretation: it is the contribution to the variance of the series 
which is accounted for by frequencies in the range (0, u).
For a purely indeterministic discrete stationary process, the spectral dis­
tribution function is a continuous (monotone bounded) function in (0,7r), 
and thus we can derive the (power) spectral density function, f (u )  =
This is often referred to as the spectrum.
When f (u )  exists, equation 3.4 can be expressed in the form
7 (k) = f  cos uk  f(u )  du (3.5)
Jo
Putting k = 0, we have
7(0) =<72x = f  /M du = F(tt) (3.6)
Jo
The physical meaning of the spectrum is that f(u )du  represents the con­
tribution to variance of components in the range (a;,a; 4- du). If a band
contributes a large proportion of the total variance it may be considered
important compared to a band which contributes a smaller amount to the
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variance. Equation 3.5 illustrates the point made at the beginning of this 
section, that the autocovariance function and the power spectral density 
function are equivalent ways of describing a stationary stochastic process: 
the time domain and frequency domain approaches are complementary.
Inverting equation 3.5 we get
•I oo
/(« )  =  -  £  l { k ) e - ^ k (3.7)
7T ,K——00
so that the spectrum is the Fourier transform of the autocovariance func­
tion.
Estimation
Given a set of observations {yt}?=i> the spectrum , /(cj), is usually estimated 





This is because it can be shown that equation 3.8 reduces to
N - 1
7ri  c^ iwk (3-9)jfc=-(7V-l)
where Ck = ~V){yt+k — y)/N , i.e. represents the sample estimate
of j k, and it is assumed that Ck = 0 for \k\ > N. Thus the periodogram is 
the sample analogue of the theoretical spectrum.
It can be shown that the periodogram is an asymptotically unbiased es­
timator of the spectrum, but not a consistent one, as the variance of I (u ) 
does not tend to zero as N  increases. This is not surprising given that the 
Fourier series representation 3.9 requires one to evaluate N  parameters from 
N  observations no matter how long the series. Thus to get a reasonable 
estimate of the spectrum, ways of smoothing the periodogram are used. By 
smoothing the spectrum one means that for each frequency, a weighted aver­
age of sample spectrum values for frequencies on either side of the frequency
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concerned are utilized. For a detailed discussion of various smoothing tech­
niques the reader is referred to Koopmans (1974) and Priestley (1981). The 
window used for smoothing is Daniel’s flat window. The results are robust 
to changes in the bandwidth of the window and the window itself.
3.10.2 Cross spectral analysis
Below I will discuss the concept of the cross-spectrum, in particular looking 
at the phase and coherence concepts.
By analogy with the univariate case (see equation 3.7), we will define 
the cross-spectrum of a discrete bivariate stationary process as the Fourier 
transform of the cross-covariance function, namely
fxy(w) 7r 2  7xv(*)ek ——oo
—i w k
over the range 0 < u  < n where ~fxy(k) =  Cov(Xt, Yt+k)- 
Note that cross-spectrum is a complex function unlike the auto-spectrum 
as 7xy(k) is not an even function. Thus we can write f xy{uj) in one of two 
ways
f xy{w) = c(u) — iq(uj) 
or
fxy(w) =  axy{u)e^xyi:w)
where
a xy{uj) = +
is the cross-amplitude spectrum,
=  tan-1
is the phase spectrum, and
C(w) =
c(w)
\ /*(<*>) /y M
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is know as the coherency spectrum, where f x(uj) and f y(oj) are the power 
spectra for the individual processes.
Further, it can be shown that
0 < C(u) < 1
The phase spectrum measures the phase difference between corresponding 
frequencies of the processes. When on variable is leading the other, 
measures the extent of the time lag. The coherency spectrum is equivalent 
to the square of the correlation coefficient between corresponding frequencies 
of the processes.
Thus the coherence can be used to measure the degree to which the two 
series are related and the phase may be interpreted in terms of time lags.
E stim ation
Estimation is analogous to the univariate case. A smoothed version of the 
cross periodogram is estimated, from which it is easy to recover estimates of 
the phase and coherency spectrum.
3.10.3 Filtering
Let Y(t) be the unfiltered series and X(t)  the filtered series. The filtering 
process can be represented as





where r(u;) is called the transfer function of the system and is simply the 
Fourier transformation of the filter g{u).
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The spectral representation for Y(t) is12
r oo
Y(t) = /  e™1 dzy(v)
J  — OO
where z v ( u j )  is a complex random process with uncorrelated increments 
so that
E[dzy(u) dzy(u)\ =  0, u  7^  A 
=  dFy(u), uj = X
So, the spectral representation of X(t)  is
In other words, a ‘low pass’ filter completely surpresses all components 
with frequencies higher than luq. Thus a critical factor in designing an eco­
nomically meaningful ‘low pass’ filter is the cut off frequency luq.
3.10.4 Confidence Intervals
The above estimation procedures derive point estimates of: the spectrum, 
cross-spectrum, phase spectrum and the coherency spectrum respectively. 
Below I state various results which can be used to derive appropriate confi­
dence intervals. The discussion below is based on Koopmans (1974), which 
the reader is referred to for a more comprehensive treatment of the issue.
12In this sub-section I have written the spectral representations in complex number form, 
for ease of exposition. They are simply generalisations of equation 3.3 to the complex 
numbers space.
where dzx(u) = Y{uj)dzy{u})








where /(a;) is a smoothed periodogram estimator and r  is the equivalent 
degrees of freedom, which for the Daniel window used in the paper is twice 
the number of observations.
This result can be used to calculate 100(1 — a )% confidence intervals for 
the spectrum.
Let
P{xl <  a )  =  a / 2 ,  P(x2r <  b) =  1 -  ( | ) 
then the 100(1 — a)% confidence interval for the spectrum, f(uu) is
i M  < /H  < z M .
b a
The 100(1 — a)% confidence interval for the log spectrum, log(f(w) is
log(-)a
i.e. is of constant width over the frequency range.
The Coherence Spectrum
For the coherence spectrum, Enochson and Goodman (1965) have shown that 
for n > 20, the random variable
ip =  tanh-1 ((5(u;))
is approximately normally distributed with mean and variance
E((p) = tanh-1 ((^(a/)) + 2(n — 1)
V a r M  = ( 2( ^ 1))
13 these conditions are that M and N are large, where these represent the truncation 
point in the smoothed periodogram estimator and the sample size respectively.
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In these expressions, 2n denotes the equivalent degrees of freedom of the 
estimator f(uj) and C(uj) is the sample coherence. If u* is the upper ^ cutoff 
point for the standard normal distribution, then after some manipulation, it 
can be shown that the 100(1 — a)% confidence interval is
C(lj) < C(u) < C H
where
C(u) =  tanh {tanh-1 (C(cj)) — (2(n — l) -  ^— 2(n — l ) -1)} ,
C(u) =  tanh {tanh-1 {(5(o;)) +  u<z (2(n — l ) -  ^ — 2(n — I)-1)} ,
Easier to implement is a test of the hypothesis C(lj) =  0 vs C(u) > 0. 
As if C(u) = 0, then
(n -  1) ( C H ) 2 /[I -  (C(o;))2] =  F2i2(n_i)
T he P hase  S pectrum
For the phase spectrum, Hannan (1970) has shown that a 100(1 — a)% con­
fidence interval for $(cj) is the set of all values of the parameter satisfying 
the inequality
^ i
|sin ($ (w) -  * (W))| < { g ^ ~ ^ 22 )} ^ - 2( f ), u, ft 0,w, (3.10)
where t2n-2( f ) is the upper ^ cutoff point of the t distribution with 2n — 2 
degrees of freedom.
One can solve for the angle for which equation 3.10 holds with equality. 
Then, the confidence interval is
$(cj) -  < <E>(u;) < $(w) +  3>*
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3.11 Appendix B - D ata
The growth figures are from Maddison (1994). He uses the Geary-Khamis 
approach to ensure comparisons are transitive across countries. It is based on 
the twin concepts of purchasing power parity of currencies and international 
average prices of commodities.
The unemployment figures come from a variety of sources, which are fisted 
below for each country.
• UK - Until 1971, the figures refer to registered unemployed at local un­
employment offices or careers offices on one day in each month, capable 
of and available for work. After 1971, the series is based on records of 
claimants at unemployment benefit offices. It therefore excludes unem­
ployed people not claiming benefit, but includes the severely disabled 
unemployed not included in previous figures. For 1921-1938 includes 
persons temporarily stopped. 1855-1899: C.H. Feinstein (1976), Table 
57. 1900-1983: T. Liesner (1989), Table UK.10.
• US - 1890-1987. It includes those not working during the survey week 
but who are available and currently looking for work. The sample 
consists of about 60,000 households selected to represent the total pop­
ulation aged 16 years and over. From January 1967 the lower age was 
raised from 14 to 16 years and the figures were revised back to 1947. 
Source T. Liesner (1989).
• Sweden - 1920-1987. OECD data used from 1950. Earlier data are 
taken from League of Nations and United Nations sources. Agricultural 
workers are excluded up to 1939. For 1920-28 the figures refer to trade 
unionists only.
• Germany (T867-1938 and 1948-1987); Australia (1900-1987); Canada 
(1921-1987). Source: T. Liesner (1989).
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scatter diagrams illustrating the bivariate relationship 
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Figure 3.2: scatter of growth versus unemployment (version 2)
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Figure 3.3: unemployment spectra
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Figure 3.4: log spectra of unemployment
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growth spectra for various countries
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Figure 3.1: Figure 3.5: growth spectra
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Figure 3.2: Figure 3.6: historical growth series
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Figure 3.7: coherency spectra
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Figure 3.8: phase(radians) spectra
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Figure 3.9: phase(years) spectra
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US UK Germany Sweden Australia Canada
lags
0 -0.0084 -0.0504 0.0348 0.0344 -0.1976 -0.2402
1 -0.2548 -0.2386 -0.0589 -0.0510 -0.3678 -0.4484
2 -0.4233 -0.3534 -0.1284 -0.0834 -0.4907 -0.5677
3 -0.4850 -0.3703 -0.1608 -0.0650 -0.5434 -0.5795
4 -0.4497 -0.3013 -0.1574 -0.0154 -0.5270 -0.4975
5 -0.3568 -0.1875 -0.1327 0.0386 -0.4624 -0.3606
6 -0.2550 -0.0810 -0.1076 0.0748 -0.3781 -0.2167
7 -0.1804 -0.0231 -0.0991 0.0827 -0.2975 -0.1036
8 -0.1434 -0.0301 -0.1134 0.0650 -0.2310 -0.0379
9 -0.1307 -0.0908 -0.1450 0.0338 -0.1770 -0.0134
10 -0.1177 -0.1727 -0.1816 0.0029 -0.1292 -0.0103
11 -0.0858 -0.2436 -0.2112 -0.0181 -0.0852 -0.0084
12 -0.0327 -0.2806 -0.2285 -0.0262 -0.0513 0.0028
13 0.0266 -0.2783 -0.2362 -0.0248 -0.0394 0.0221
14 0.0698 -0.2467 -0.2442 -0.0197 -0.0596 0.0409
15 0.0796 -0.2026 -0.2541 -0.0159 -0.1117 0.0516
Table 3.4: Cross Correlations: Correlations are for growth leading unem­
ployment.
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US UK Germany Sweden Australia Canada
lags
0 -0.0084 -0.0504 0.0348 0.0344 -0.1976 -0.2402
1 0.2581 0.1655 0.1307 0.1545 -0.0181 0.0130
2 0.4741 0.3322 0.2109 0.2517 0.1272 0.2569
3 0.5914 0.4038 0.2656 0.3033 0.2101 0.4470
4 0.6002 0.3743 0.2947 0.2901 0.2276 0.5587
5 0.5276 0.2717 0.3024 0.2095 0.1992 0.5892
6 0.4212 0.1418 0.2885 0.0832 0.1540 0.5509
7 0.3236 0.0287 0.2441 -0.0467 0.1148 0.4624
8 0.2541 -0.0439 0.1564 -0.1316 0.0871 0.3412
9 0.2040 -0.0773 0.0197 -0.1372 0.0601 0.2014
10 0.1480 -0.0912 -0.1522 -0.0592 0.0160 0.0556
11 0.0638 -0.1096 -0.3226 0.0736 -0.0550 -0.0819
12 -0.0510 -0.1452 -0.4405 0.2100 -0.1454 -0.1945
13 -0.1741 -0.1897 -0.4610 0.2990 -0.2305 -0.2662
14 -0.2681 -0.2188 -0.3670 0.3104 -0.2787 -0.2874
15 -0.2997 -0.2080 -0.1807 0.2472 -0.2676 -0.2594




An Evaluation of the 
Theoretical Links between  
Steady State Growth and 
Equilibrium Unemployment
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to document the theoretical links between steady 
state growth and equilibrium unemployment and evaluate them given the bi- 
variate evidence accumulated in the previous chapter. The previous chapter 
analyzed the general bivariate link between growth and unemployment and 
argued that one needed to take into account the various institutional differ­
ences across countries, to get a complete picture. The task of the present 
chapter is to provide the theoretical framework to perform such analysis.
How does technological progress affect the equilibrium unemployment 
rate? This question has preoccupied policy makers and workers since at least 
the industrial revolution. Workers often worry that the kind innovation we 
see, for example when Ford car plants became automated in the 1920s, will 
destroy their jobs. Schumpeter (1942) came up with the notion of ‘creative 
destruction’ which he described as follows (page 83):
144
‘ The fundamental impulse that keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes 
from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transporta­
tion, the new markets....[the process] incessantly revolutionizes from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This pro­
cess of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism’
Policy makers have since struggled to articulate the meaning of this for 
the real economy. New technology destroys jobs but also creates new ones. 
The key question for the policy maker is which force dominates: destruction 
or creation? If destruction dominates, then it implies that there is a trade 
off between steady state growth and unemployment. Many economists, for 
example Gordon (1995), have argued that we need to appeal to a growth- 
unemployment trade off to explain the contrasting performances of the USA 
and Europe, since the early 1970s. The USA has had a more marked pro­
ductivity slowdown than Europe, but it has had a much lower mean unem­
ployment rate.
Formal economic models have only recently been able to generate relation­
ships between unemployment and growth. Previously, according to neoclas­
sical growth theory, equilibrium productivity growth was purely determined 
by the exogenous rate of labour-augmenting technical progress. Further, a 
well documented stylized fact is that the unemployment rate is untrended 
in the long run (LNJ 1991). This was seen as evidence that growth cannot 
have a great effect on the equilibrium unemployment rate. This lack of rela­
tionship between growth and unemployment no longer holds if we allow the 
growth rate to be endogenous, as recent models do (see Romer 1986, 1990 
and Lucas 1988), and consider unemployment in a search theoretic frame­
work (see Pissarides 1990 and Mortensen and Pissarides 1998). Endogenous 
growth models suggest that factors which affect the rate of innovation or 
human capital accumulation will affect the equilibrium growth rate. Search 
theoretic models suggest that any factor that affects the rate of job destruc­
tion, or the discounted future returns from posting a vacancy and hence job 
creation, will affect the unemployment rate.
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These linkages suggest how growth can influence unemployment and vice 
versa. If unemployment is associated with loss of skills (see Pissarides 1992), 
then an increase in the unemployment rate can reduce the accumulation of 
human capital and thus lead to a reduction of the equilibrium growth rate. 
Also, an increase in unemployment ceteris paribus will lead to a fall in em­
ployment. This could reduce the amount of learning by doing, if this is 
prevalent, and provide another mechanism for lower human capital accumu­
lation and thus lower equilibrium growth. Further, if there are strong com­
plementarities between the skills of the workforce and the returns to technical 
innovation, lower learning by doing could indirectly reduce the rents available 
to an innovator and thus reduce equilibrium growth, via a fall in technical 
progress. One final mechanism, though certainly not the least important, 
is saving. High unemployment may have a negative effect on future growth 
by reducing the pool of savings available for investment, be it in physical or 
human capital, or in knowledge-creating activities.
The Economist ( February 11, 1995) summarized the conventional view of 
how steady state growth impacts on unemployment. When new technology 
arrives, old jobs are destroyed with beneficial effects on labour productiv­
ity and new ones are created, because of increased aggregate demand due 
to higher incomes that an increase in the growth rate brings. Search the­
oretic models can illustrate both effects ( see Aghion and Howitt 1994 and 
Mortensen and Pissarides 1998). The creative destruction effect is when pro­
ductivity growth occurs through the destruction of low productivity jobs and 
their replacement by new high productivity ones elsewhere in the economy, 
thus increasing the inflow rate into unemployment. The capitalization ef­
fect is where an increase in the growth rate increases the present discounted 
value of the profits from creating a new job slot, leading firms to open more 
vacancies increasing the rate of job creation and thus ultimately reduce un­
employment.
The overall effect on unemployment will depend on the balance of these 
two effects. Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) conjecture as to what may de­
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termine the importance of these two effects. There are two main factors to 
consider here: the extent to which technical progress is embodied and the size 
of renovation costs. The intuition is simple, if technical progress is disembod­
ied, so that labour productivity in existing jobs grows at the exogenous rate 
of technical progress, then there is no creative destruction effect, as there is 
no need to destroy jobs to take advantage of the technical progress. If techni­
cal progress is embodied in new capital, productivity in existing jobs does not 
grow. Growth can come about either through job destruction and creation 
of a new more productive job or through ‘restructuring’ without job destruc­
tion. Now if renovation costs are too high, then restructuring an existing 
job will not be an option. This will imply that the capitalization effect will 
disappear, as an increase in growth will not increase the discounted returns 
of opening a job slot because the job cannot adapt to technical progress.
For ease of exposition, I split the analysis into two sections a) exogenous 
growth and b) endogenous growth. In the first section, we use the Aghion & 
Howitt (1994) model to illustrate the various linkages between unemployment 
and growth, namely: the capitalization effect and the creative destruction ef­
fect. We discuss in detail how robust these effects axe and also review other 
models in this class. We could have also used the more general stochastic 
search theoretic model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) to show the capi­
talization and creative destruction effects. We chose the Aghion and Howitt 
model as it allows a more transparent treatment of the linkages from unem­
ployment to growth, which come into play when we go on to the endogenous 
growth influences. This does not mean it is any more realistic. The purpose 
of the chapter is not to provide the most realistic model, but one that can 
allow a useful discussion of the important effects.
When we move on to the endogenous growth influences, the set of linkages 
becomes jpuch richer as a) unemployment can now feedback into growth 
and b) institutions have a more pervasive effect. We review the important 
predictions, that models in this class have, for the link between growth and 
unemployment.
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The chapter will be structured as follows: section II documents the inter­
relationships between growth and unemployment in a model of exogenous 
growth, namely the capitalization and creative destruction effects. Section 
III considers the richer set of interactions once we allow growth to be en­
dogenous and Section IV summarizes the main findings of the various models 
and evaluates them given the bivariate evidence documented in the previous 
chapter. Section V concludes.
4.2 Exogenous Growth
In this section, we firstly outline the important elements of the Aghion and 
Howitt model (1994). Next, we discuss extensions to the model, in particu­
lar: an endogenous interest rate and intersectoral complementarity. Finally 
we review the more general search theoretic model of Mortensen and Pis- 
sarides(1998).
4.2.1 The Aghion and H owitt m odel
The economy comprises of a continuum of agents, infinitely-lived, and in­
dexed from 0 to 1. Each individual is endowed with a flow of one unit of 
labour services and a stock of X units of human capital. All individuals share 
the same linear preferences over lifetime consumption:
roo
U(c) = E0 ct ’ e~rtdt,
Jo
where r > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference, and ct is the indi­
vidual’s consumption of a final good at time t. There is no disutility of work 
and human capital has no consumption use.
There is a continuum of firms in the economy, whose total mass is en­
dogenously determined in a steady-state equilibrium. Firms axe also infinitely 
lived. Each firm is really a research facility for producing new knowledge. 
Let Dt be the sunk cost of setting-up a research facility at date t.
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Once its research cost Dt has been sunk, each firm generates a stream of 
innovations, or new technological vintages, according to a Poisson process 
with parameter A.
New ideas need to be embodied into new machines in order to be imple­
mented. Let Ct be the fixed cost that must be paid by a firm implementing 
a new innovation at date t or the implementation cost.
The output flow of any production unit at any time s is:
yt = At - ip(xs -  a)
where a (> 0) is the minimum human capital input representing overhead 
costs. is a regular neoclassical production function and At = Aq • egt is the 
unit’s productivity parameter. In order to keep present values finite, assume 
9 < r.
An innovation that occurs in any given firm at time t will open access 
to the leading technology At as of that date. Thus, provided the firm incurs 
the implementation cost Ct , it will be able to establish a production unit of 
vintage t.
The source of unemployment in the model is labour reallocation across 
firms. Any production unit has to incur a fixed overhead cost in human cap­
ital whose price in terms of final consumption rises at the economy-wide rate 
of growth. A production unit whose technology is fixed eventually becomes 
unable to produce enough to cover its fixed cost, at which point the job is 
destroyed, forcing the worker into unemployment until matched with a new 
machine.
The labour market is modelled via a matching function (see Pissarides 
1990):
m  =  m (l, v)
where m is the aggregate flow of new workers and is a function of the 
total labour force, as we allow for on the job search, and the total mass of 
vacancies in the economy, v. For simplicity we assume that the matching 
function is deterministic, though Aghion and Howitt (1998) show that the 
results easily extend to the case of stochastic matching.
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Let ^ be the amount of time a firm needs to spend searching for an 
appropriate worker-machine match after it has experienced an innovation. 
Let  ^ be the time spent searching by a worker before being successfully 
matched with a machine. Then:
1 v
q(v) m (l, v)
and
1 _  1 
p(v) m (l,v )
Let p and q have the usual interpretation as in Pissarides (1990) and
follow the standard search theoretic assumptions. Let S  be the duration of a
match, then equilibrium unemployment is determined by the condition that 
the flow into unemployment is equal to the flow from it, i.e.
( i - « ) ^  =  p(y )
u = 1 — S  • p(v) (4.1)
This is the unemployment equation, which holding S  constant, can also 
be regarded as a Beveridge Curve showing unemployment as a decreasing 
function of vacancies.
Now we need to determine S  in equilibrium. Suppose at time t, a firm is 
hit by a technological innovation that opens up access to the leading vintage, 
namely At. The firm then searches for a suitably skilled worker. Hence at 
date t0 = t +  i ,  a match is made to form a new production unit. The surplus 
flow generated by this production unit at any date r  > t0 is:
max{A t • ^ (x  -  a) -  PT • x} = At • n (^ -) ,  (4.2)x>a
where n  is decreasing in its price argument.
Since A t remains constant while PT grows at the same rate as the economy 
in the steady- state: PT = PQ • egT, the unit will produce less and less as PT
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grows, until it becomes unprofitable at date to +  S. At that date the ratio of 




: S  = -  where T =  In(Pmax) -  ln ( -^ )  > 0 
9 A
Intuitively, the faster the price of human capital grows, the sooner will 
production units hit the zero-profit bound p max. Hence the inverse relation­
ship between the growth rate g and the duration of the match S. This is the 
cause of the direct creative destruction effect of growth on unemployment. 
Rewriting equation 4.1 illustrates this:
U =  l - M  (4.3)
9
Thus, holding T and v constant, an increased growth rate g directly raises 
the job-destruction rate, thereby increasing the unemployment rate. There 
could be further indirect effects through the vacancy channel. To illustrate 
this, we need to consider a free entry condition for firms.
The fixed cost of entry at date t is Dt =  d • At. The expected net benefit 
of entry, which also grows at the steady rate g, can be expressed as:
w t = W  ■ At = Ee>o[(Vt+e +  W(+«)e-r9],
where t +  6 is the arrival date of the first innovation experienced by the 
firm that enters at date t and Vt+e = V  • At+e is the present values of the 
profit stream accruing from that innovation. With some manipulation, we 
can arrive at:
r - g
where A is the poisson arrival rate of innovations at a firm and hence A • Vt 
is the instantaneous expected income from having created a firm. So we have
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a free entry condition:
d = ™ -  (4.4)r - g
Next we need to derive an expression for V.  An innovation at t will not 
begin to produce output until to = t + ^ y  when the appropriate worker has 
been found. At that time, the implementation cost Ct — c -A t must be paid 
by the firm to initiate the new match. From that time until t +  ^ y  +  S  
the match will generate a flow of surplus given by equation 4.2, of which we 
assume the firm can bargain for the constant fraction 0 1. Hence using the 
fact that:
P to+s — — -<>_r . rp m a x  . e g s - T  fo r  a ft  5  <  _  =  £
9
we have:
V = e ^ { 0  [ 9 e-rsn(Pmax . e9S~r )ds -  c} (4.5)
Jo
From (4.4) and (4.5) we have a final expression of our free entry condition: 
A rL
d =  e ~ ^ { /3  /  9 e -r5n (P max • e9a~r )ds -  c} (4.6)r — g Jo
The free entry condition illustrates the capitalization effect and the indi­
rect creative destruction effect1.
The capitalization effect occurs as if g increases and the rate of interest is 
exogenous, then the net discount rate (r — g) at which firms capitalize their 
expected income falls, and this in turn increases the present benefit of entry. 
This will increase the equilibrium level of vacancies v and hence decrease 
equilibrium unemployment, as shown by equation 4.3.
This effect is present partly because the interest rate is exogenous. Sup­
pose we endogenize the interest rate by choosing an iso-elastic utility function 
instead:
poo cl~s
u(c) = Eo e~pt- dt\ s > 0Jo 1 — s
Standard nash bargaining intuition is used here, see Pissarides(1990).
2 To fully specify the model, we need an equilibirum condition on the market for human
capital. See Aghion and Howitt (1994) for further details.
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Then it can be easily shown that (r — g) increases as g increases if s > 1, 
as in steady state equilibrium with consumption growing at rate g,
r =  p -f- sg
In other words, the capitalization effect is reversed if the elasticity of marginal 
utility is greater than unity. The intuition for this is the following: theci-a
instantaneous utility function has a constant elasticity of marginal utility 
equal to —s. It is a standard result that the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution is the reciprocal of this. Thus if s is high, we have a low elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution. A change in the growth rate will change the 
optimal consumption path. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 
low, this will require a large change in the interest rate to bring the consumer 
back onto its optimal consumption path. Eriksson (1995) generalizes this 
result in an optimizing ramsey model. If £ is the capital tax rate, then the 
condition for the capitalization effect to be reversed is: s > 1 — £, which 
Eriksson argues is not unreasonable, see Blundell(1988), Hall (1988) and 
Paterson and Pesaran (1992).
The free entry condition also implies an indirect creative destruction ef­
fect. An increase in the growth rate also reduces the life-time of production 
units, and induces a faster decline of profits during this lifetime, since the 
price of the human capital input also grows at a faster rate. This will re­
duce V  and therefore tends to reduce the firm’s incentive to enter and create 
a stream of vacancies. This effect reinforces the direct creative destruction 
effect and will thus increase unemployment.
Even the indirect creative destruction effect is not robust though. So far 
we have assumed that the goods produced by the various sectors of the econ­
omy were perfect substitutes, so that the price of each good would equal unity. 
What happens if we reduce the degree of substitutability between goods of 
different vintages? Aghion and Howitt (1998) analyze this question in detail, 
I merely summarize the intuition below. Without perfect substitutability, an 
increase in the growth rate will generate a continual increase in demand for 
existing plants output as well as a continual increase in the cost of operating
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a plant. This will raise the output price of any intermediate plant. Thus, 
because the costs and revenues of an intermediate plant increase in response 
to an increase in the growth rate, the overall effect on V  is not obvious. If 
the degree of intersectoral complementarity is high enough, then regardless of 
the capitalization effect, revenues could increase enough so that V  increases 
and the indirect creative destruction effect is overturned.
4.2.2 The M ortensen and Pissarides m odel
The more general search theoretic model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) 
provides a more complete explanation of which is more important: capitaliza­
tion or creative destruction. Let us abstract from the issues of an endogenous 
interest rate and the possibility of intersectoral complementarity. The key 
insight of this paper is in its treatment of technical progress. Once a job 
is created, the employer has three choices at any future date: continue to 
produce with the technology embodied in the job when it was created; pay a 
fixed renovation cost to update its technology and continue producing with 
the same worker; or close the job down and exit production. In the model 
of Aghion and Howitt, described above, employers never update by assump­
tion, so the useful life of a job is always shorter when the rate technological 
progress is higher. In the model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) the cost 
of renovating the technology or the renovation cost determines which of the 
capitalization and creative destruction effect is more important.
If renovation costs are too high, then restructuring an existing job will not 
be an option. This will imply that the capitalization effect will disappear, as 
an increase in growth will not increase the discounted returns of opening a job 
slot, because the job cannot adapt to technical progress. In contrast, at the 
other extreme of zero renovation costs, or continuous updating of technology, 
there is no required destruction of jobs to implement new technology and 
hence no creative destruction effect. Job creation is thus positively affected 
by technological progress because of the capitalization effect of growth on 
expected profits.
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It should be noted that the capitalization effect in this model is subtly 
different to that of Aghion and Howitt (1994). In the Aghion and Howitt 
model above, the capitalization effect is due to the set-up costs Dt. This can 
be seen by looking at equation 4.4. If there are no set-up costs, then the free 
entry condition becomes:
V = 0 (4.7)
In other words there is no capitalization effect. It should be fairly clear 
that some cost is required, in any search based model, to generate a capital­
ization effect as otherwise the free entry condition will just revert to equation 
4.7. Or in other words, to when the value of posting a vacancy reaches zero. 
This effect returns in the model of Mortensen and Pissarides, in the form of a 
cost of posting vacancies. It may be argued that this is easier to justify than a 
general research facility set up cost. The intuition for the effect in Mortensen 
and Pissarides is simple: consider again the case of exogenous interest rates 
where an increase in g reduces (r — g). In other words, at a faster rate of 
technological progress all future income flows are discounted at a lower rate. 
Because the cost of creating a vacancy is borne now, whereas profits from it 
accrue in the future, the lower discount rate increases job creation.
Mortensen and Pissarides show that there is a critical renovation cost such 
that faster growth decreases unemployment, when the actual cost of updating 
a job’s technology is below the critical value and increases unemployment 
when the actual cost is above the critical value.
The above discussion shows that there is no consensus about the size 
of the capitalization and creative destruction effects. All we can say is that 
theory is capable of delivering an effect of steady state growth on equilibrium 




In the previous section, we considered growth in the standard neoclassical 
sense, i.e. equilibrium productivity growth is purely determined by the ex­
ogenous rate of labour-augmenting technical progress. Now, we allow for 
this process to be endogenous. This allows for a lot of indirect interactions 
between growth and unemployment and for unemployment to feedback into 
growth.
It seems rather obvious that changes in unemployment can affect equi­
librium growth. Economic theory though, has only recently been able to 
model this. Endogenous growth models suggest that factors which affect the 
rate of innovation, or human capital accumulation, will affect the equilibrium 
growth rate (see Barro and Salai-Martin 1995 for survey). If unemployment 
is associated with loss of skills (see Pissarides 1992), then an increase in the 
unemployment rate can reduce the accumulation of human capital and thus 
lead to a reduction of the equilibrium growth rate. Also, an increase in un­
employment, ceteris paribus, will lead to a fall in employment. This could 
reduce the amount of learning by doing, if this is prevalent, and provide 
another mechanism for lower human capital accumulation and thus lower 
equilibrium growth. Of course, these effects could be ameliorated if human 
capital accumulation also occurs formally through schooling or formal train­
ing. Employment today could reduce the amount of time potentially devoted 
to human capital accumulation.
A further route which has the opposite effect, is the ‘cleansing effect’ 
of recessions. It has been recently suggested that recessions may be periods 
when there is a great deal of unrecorded investment-like activity taking place. 
Aghion and Saint-Paul (1991) argue that recessions allow quicker ‘organiza­
tional change’ than booms and that deeper recessions will encourage further 
restructuring. This would imply an increase in unemployment leading to an 
increase in growth.
One final mechanism, though certainly not the least important, is saving. 
High unemployment may have a negative effect on future growth by reduc­
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ing the pool of savings available for investment, be it in physical or human 
capital, or in knowledge-creating activities.
Below, I briefly outline a model illustrating the negative impact unem­
ployment can have on growth, due to loss of skills, before considering the 
implications of this in the model of Aghion and Howitt above. Next, I will 
discuss the implications of the savings nexus for the interactions between 
growth and unemployment. This discussion will be framed around the over­
lapping generations models of Bean and Pissarides (1993) and Daveri and 
Tabellini (1997). Finally I will review other classes of models that may gen­
erate a relationship between growth and unemployment.
4.3.1 Skills
Consider the following model: workers may be in two states, employed (E) 
or unemployed (U). The flow transition probability from U to E is e\ the flow 
transition probability from E to U is 7 . A worker’s human capital evolves 
according to:
dh—7- =  — 6h if he is unemployed, and: at
~  =  <(>h if he is employed
Total production is proportional to the employed’s aggregate human cap­
ital. Defining He and Hu as the employed’s and unemployed’s human capital 




= {<l>-1)He + 1Hu 
=  — (<5> -f- e)Hu +  sHe
dt
In the long run steady state, both He and Hu will grow at the same rate, 
which will be the highest eigenvalue of the system. Hence the growth rate of 
the economy is determined by:
- ( 7  +  e) +  J { 7  -I- s)2 + 4(</>s -  <57) -1- 6(j)
a = --------------- ------------------------------------
y 2
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It can be seen that g increases in e and decreases in 7 . At the same time, 
equilibrium unemployment will be:
7u = ------
7  +  £
Thus it can be seen that the flow that increases unemployment, will also 
cause a fall in the rate of human capital accumulation and hence a fall in 
the steady state growth rate. A similar kind of logic can be applied to the 
problem of learning by doing.
Next, let us look at the impact of these feedback effects, in the model of 
Aghion and Howitt. Consider the following specification for growth:
9 =  go +  &(1 -  u)i where g0, 6, b' > 0
Here the term 6(1 — it) can be interpreted as a learning by doing term 
that is external to the firm. Or we can think of —bu as a loss of skill effect. If 
we reverse the sign of b then —bu can be perceived as a cleansing type effect. 
Let us stick with the case of b > 0 for the moment.
This feedback effect, changes the free-entry condition in the basic Aghion 
and Howitt model. This condition now becomes:
\  p  qTtJT /• “ •
d  =  --------------------     - f / 5  /  50 e - r « + t ( l - » ) . n ( p m «  . e 9 0 S - T \ ^ s  _  C1 ( 4 .8 )
r -  go -  6(1 -  u) Jo
The replacement of g by go in the integrand comes from the fact that 
a production units productivity-adjusted price for land now grows at rate 
go not g. The new factor eb^ ~u 3^ in the integrand appears because learning 
by doing causes the productivity of each match to rise by a rate 6(1 — it) 
thereby enhancing the value of each innovation. The unemployment equation 
becomes:
Tp(u)
u =  1 —
9o
because the length of each match is now — instead of - .
0  90  9
What is the impact of this change. Perhaps the easiest way to think 
about it is that the feedback effect from unemployment to growth creates
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a macroeconomic complementarity. Cooper and John (1988) analyzed the 
impact of introducing such effects. It can lead to a multiplier effect and if 
strong enough, multiple equilibria. An increase in the exogenous part go will 
have the same capitalization and creative destruction effects without learning 
by doing, but they will be quantitatively larger due to the feedback from 
unemployment to growth. This is the multiplier effect. Multiple equilibria 
can be constructed as follows. Consider the case where the capitalization 
effect dominates the creative destruction effect. In a low-level equilibrium, 
high unemployment inhibits growth by slowing down learning by doing, and 
slow learning keeps unemployment high by making it unprofitable to create 
a lot of vacancies. In a high-level equilibrium, low unemployment stimulates 
growth through learning by doing, and the prospect of fast learning provides 
the incentive for firms to create enough vacancies to keep unemployment low. 
The same logic can be applied to the loss of skills mechanism.
If we have a cleansing effect, then we can still get multiple equilibria, 
but there properties will be very different. With cleansing predominant, we 
could generate a low growth-low unemployment and a high-growth-high un­
employment set of equilibria, when the creative destruction effect dominates 
the capitalization effect.
4.3.2 Saving
This mechanism is the focus of overlapping generations models, such as Bean 
and Pissarides (1993) and Daveri and Tabellini (1997). Once we endognize 
growth, then savings should be an important determinant of not only the 
level of GDP/capita, but of the steady state rate of growth. The endogenous 
growth theory literature (see Barro and Salai-Martin 1995) suggests various 
ways of affecting steady state growth, such as: human capital accumula­
tion and research and development to increase the chances of innovating and 
implementing those innovations. This requires some kind of financial invest­
ment, which in turn necessitates savings.
Overlapping Generations Models (OLGs) are a good vehicle for generating
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a savings mechanism. This is due to the life-cycle motivated savings of the 
young. In these models, only the young work and they must save for when 
they are old and retired. I will briefly motivate and discuss some of the 
main results coming out of this liter at me. For further details of the models, 
interested readers are referred to Bean and Pissarides (1993) and Daveri and 
Tabellini (1997).
The Bean and Pissarides model
Bean and Pissarides (1993) use an overlapping generations model with two 
additional features. First, firm’s technology exhibits decreasing returns with 
respect to their own capital but the aggregate technology is linear in aggre­
gate capital. This is a fairly standard way of generating endogenous growth, 
via a physical capital externality. Second, there are labour market frictions, 
modelled by a matching function, which generate a positive natural rate of 
unemployment. These features generate interactions between growth and 
unemployment. The key equation in this model is:
g = -  1 =  ^  -  1 (4.9)
y K t K t K ’
Here the steady state growth rate, which equals the rate of capital growth 
is simply function of the level of savings3. Bean and Pissarides presume the 
level of savings is positively related to the employment level, an assumption 
we will discuss in detail a bit later. This key relationship is the cause of 
the interactions between unemployment and growth, in this model. This 
mechanism can lead to some indirect interactions between unemployment 
and growth, or in other words, changes in institutional variables that lead to 
changes in both growth and unemployment.
Consider a reduction in hiring costs, it will increase employment as firms
3 Implicitly in this formulation is the assumption of complete depreciation after a single 
period. This assumption is not important and non depreciating capital can be easily 
introduced into the model, without changing anything of substance.
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have higher profits from a job match4. According to equation 4.9 this will 
increase savings and thus increase growth. An increase in income taxes, on 
the other hand, will have the opposite effect. A balanced budget condition 
is assumed, i.e. that an increase in taxes is used to finance an increase in 
government spending. An increase in the tax rate, increases the opportunity 
cost of working and thus wages in a Nash bargain in this model. This leads 
to lower employment which will reduce savings and thus growth.
One of the more interesting results of Bean and Pissarides is of the effects 
of a change in the savings rate, s. The basic model has a very classical 
feature that a reduction in the savings rate, or an increase in the propensity 
to consume, will lower savings and thus growth, but leave unemployment 
untouched. Bean and Pissarides augment this model by introducing some 
Keynesian features, namely an imperfectly competitive consumption goods 
sector. In this augmented model, an increase in the propensity to consume 
not only raises consumption, but also raises employment and output because 
of the effect the deeper market has on competition and the price mark-up. If 
this effect is strong enough then total savings and investment will also rise. 
The only problem with this later Keynesian result is that it is driven by the 
assumption that setup costs are denominated in terms of consumption goods, 
so a fall in the mark-up due to increased competition also lowers set-up costs.
Finally, let us consider the effect of an increase in the relative bargain­
ing strength of workers5. Unemployment will rise as wages will increase, 
due to the increased bargaining strength of workers. This will reduce sav­
ings. On the other hand, increased bargaining strength shifts income from 
entrepreneurs to workers. Since workers do all the saving in this model, sav­
ings will increase because of this. Thus, the effect on savings is ambiguous
4 Of course, in a more general search model, the effect on employment would be am­
biguous. Job creation would increase as it will become more profitable for firms to post a 
vacancy. But job destruction could increase as it is now cheaper to find a new job-worker 
match. In this model, the latter effect does not exist. Employment is purely determined 
by job creation in this two period OLG model, as all matches end automatically after one 
period.
5This increases the amount of surplus workers receive in the nash bargaining solution.
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and so the effect on growth is also ambiguous.
This last effect probably highlights better the importance of the life cycle 
savings of workers in generating most of the important results of this model. 
If work was uniformly spread over one’s lifetime, then most of the effects dis­
cussed above would disappear, as they rely on a life-cycle savings mechanism. 
A life cycle savings mechanism may not be unreasonable as most individuals 
are required to save for retirement. It can be argued that an OLG model is 
simply capturing this phenomenon in a simple way. Further, most saving in 
the industrialized world occurs through the medium of pension funds. Still, it 
is not comfortable to have a model in which all the main effects rely on a life 
cycle savings mechanism. Below, we discuss the Daveri and Tabellini OLG 
model, which provides another channel by which growth and unemployment 
can interact.
The Daveri and Tabellini model
Daveri and Tabellini present an OLG model where equilibrium unemploy­
ment is caused by monopolistic trade unions. Assume competitive firms hire 
labour and capital up to the point where the respective perceived marginal 
product equals the relevant input price. Further assume a balanced budget 
condition holds. Under a union bargaining solution, equilibrium employment 
is given by:
r  =  r( l - q ) 2( l - r i) '
a
where r l is the labour income tax rate, -a is the replacement ratio and 
a is the technology coefficient from a production function of the following 
kind:
y = m i 1'"  (4-10)
where y is the level of output normalized by the labour force, I is the em­
ployment rate and k is the capital at the beginning of the period normalized 
by the labour force.
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The key growth equation is given below:
1 +  g*(fc) =  1  =  F[<f>k(k)l,1~a(l -  t *)]{1 +  (4.11)
A C  1  —  a  AC
Where F  [] is the savings rate and is a function of underlying preferences6 
and r k is a tax on capital.
As expected in this class of models, for any given capital stock, equilib­
rium growth is higher the greater is the employment rate. Here though, the 
effect of employment on growth occurs though two distinct channels. First, 
by observation of the production function, equation 4.10, it can be seen that 
higher employment increases the marginal product of capital, as captured by 
the term (j)k(k)l*l~a in equation 4.11, and this in turn induces more savings 
by the young. Second, higher employment increases the average income of 
young individuals, which in a life-cycle model leads to more savings. This 
is captured by the term l*l~a$Q± in equation 4.11. Only the second effect is 
captured in the Bean-Pissarides model. This is because they choose to model 
preferences as Cobb-Douglas:
U =  C\~sC32
where C\ and C2 represent consumption in the first and second periods 
respectively.
With Cobb-Douglas preferences, as above, this implies a constant savings 
rate,s. Thus the first effect is abstracted out of consideration from the Bean- 
Pissarides model. Daveri and Tabellini argue that the first channel is very 
robust and intuitive. Higher employment implies a lower capital-labour ratio, 
and hence a more productive capital stock. This in turn fosters investment 
and stimulates growth. Even this mechanism can be challenged on empirical 
grounds though. Essentially this result requires that the interest rate has 
a positive impact on savings. Liebfritz et al (1997) presents a summary of 
14 recent single country studies of this relationship. There are four with a
6Daveri and Tabellini assume that the sustitution effect outweighs the income effect 
and thus the savings rate is an increasing function of the interest rate.
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positive effect, four with a negative effect, two with some positive and some 
negative effects and four with no effect. So it is not clear how strong this 
mechanism is in practice.
Let us take a more explicit form of the production function, equation 
4.10. Let <f>(k) = Ak, so that we have an endogenous growth model and 
4>k{k) = A = The corresponding growth rate is:
1c
1 +  g*(k) = — = F U r l- " ( l  -  r k)]{l +  (4.12)k 1 — a
Here growth is permanently affected by employment. As employment is 
reduced, the marginal product of capita falls. Firms scale down investment, 
but the marginal product of capital is not affected by this lower investment 
rate. Hence the growth affect is permanent. Obviously if we have a standard 
neoclassical, diminishing returns to each input, production technology, this 
would not be the case. Because as firms scaled down investment, the marginal 
product of capital would rise as <p () would be concave. This would continue 
until the growth effect had vanished and the economy is back to lower steady 
state level of output.
Thus the model of Daveri and Tabellini can generate effects of employ­
ment of growth even if growth is exogenously determined. But for these 
effects to be permanent, growth needs to be endogenously determined. This 
model shows how the replacement rate, cr, and labour taxes, r l, can have 
important effects on growth by changing employment.
4.3.3 Other Channels and M odels
So far we have looked at a very narrow range of models for generating linkages 
between growth and unemployment. Once we endogenize growth there are 
many other classes of models which can also generate interactions between 
growth and unemployment. We review these other models in this section.




Eriksson (1997) uses a classical Ramsey optimizing growth model with a 
search theoretic labour market to see if there is a trade-off between employ­
ment and growth. We discussed earlier how, in this model, the capitalization 
effect can be overturned if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution was 
low enough8. Eriksson also endogenizes the growth rate in his model to al­
low unemployment to feedback into growth. The growth rate is endogenized 
by assuming that perpetual growth is made possible by a positive techno­
logical externality, working through the presence of the average capital stock 
(K) in the individual firm’s production function:
F  =  A TT K?N}~a
where a  +  v = l 9.
Let us look at some of the effects in this model. An increase in the capital 
tax rate will reduce the incentive to save. This will cause the growth rate 
to fall. For a firm considering how many vacancies to put out, this means 
that the cost of vacancies will grow slower. Thus some of the recruiting 
activities are pushed into the future i.e. jj or 6, labour market tightness, 
falls. Thus employment will fall, through the matching function. This will 
further reduce growth, due to the same effect as in Daveri and Tabellini, 
namely the marginal product of investment falls as N  falls.
An increase in the bargaining strength of workers, or an increase in un­
employment benefit, increases the amount of surplus workers can extract in 
a nash bargain. This makes the revenue accruing to a firm for a successful 
match fall. This makes the firm less prone to put out vacancies. Thus 6 and 
N  decrease. This leads to a fall in growth for reasons mentioned above. The 
effect on growth of a change in the bargaining strength of workers is different 
to that of Bean and Pissarides, who find an ambiguous effect. This is be­
8This would imply (r-g) rises as g increases.
9This is the same production function as in Daveri and Tabellini (1997) and Bean and 
Pissarides (1993), based on Romer (1986)..
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cause the life cycle saving mechanism of workers is not present in Eriksson’s 
optimizing Ramsey model.
An increase in the cost of posting vacancies or hiring costs will lead to 
similar effects in this model. This effect is not robust though, as was men­
tioned when discussing a similar effect in the Bean-Pissarides model. This 
is because in Eriksson’s model, the job separation rate is exogenous. An in­
crease in the cost of vacancies will lead to less vacancies being created and 
hence less job creation. But if we allow for an endogenous job separation 
rate, this could fall in response to this effect. This is because if it is more ex­
pensive to match new jobs with workers, firms may be less willing to destroy 
old jobs. Thus the total effect on unemployment and hence growth will be 
ambiguous.
Frictions caused by Education Costs
Falkinger and Zweimuller (1997) present an endogenous growth model in 
which workers have to be educated to get employed. Unemployment is not 
caused by matching frictions, or real wage rigidity, but by the fact that only 
workers who satisfy a certain skill requirement can find employment. Getting 
the necessary education requires resources which axe provided via perfect 
capital markets. They find that increased innovation costs, or decreasing 
profits, lead to a decrease in the growth rate but an ambiguous effect on 
employment. On the one side, less growth and less innovation lead to lower 
life-time income of workers, so that less people can afford education. On 
the other side, less growth and innovation imply a lower interest rate, which 
makes it easier to finance education.
The effects of profits on unemployment is different from most models, 
due to the interactions of the interest rate and education and thus onto em­
ployment in this model. Let us take the example of the Bean and Pissarides 
model. As Caballero (1993) noted while commenting on the Bean-Pissarides 
model, one of the implications of its Keynesian extension is that sectors with 
higher degrees of imperfect competition should show a greater negative cor-
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relation between growth and unemployment in response to an increase in 
the propensity to consume. But higher degrees of imperfect competition are 
generally associated with higher profits. Thus lower profits, when interacted 
with the marginal propensity to consume should be associated with lower 
growth and higher unemployment.
Efficiency Wage Considerations
Finally, another class of models that can generate correlations between growth 
and unemployment are endogenous growth models, with the labour mar­
ket modelled according to efficiency wage considerations. In fact Saint-Paul 
(1991) shows how, when we consider the general equilibrium of an efficiency 
wage model, the correlation between growth and unemployment may be pos­
itive or negative. Following Saint-Paul, consider the following endogenous 
growth model:
Y  =  A K a(He)l~a 
K =  PY
H=  7 Y
e =  e(— ,it), e\ > 0, e2 > 0, e(l,*) =  0, e(-,0) =  0 up
Where H  is human capital, K  is physical capital, e effort, j  the real 
wage, u  the alternative wage (which grows at the same rate as the economy) 
and u unemployment.
Consider the balanced growth path of the economy with a constant effort. 
Let g be the growth rate. This implies:
Y = g  =  +  C1 -  “b  (4-i3)
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Along a balanced growth path, all variables grow at the same rate, im­
plying:
h  = h  = i
K ~  k ~ e  
I  = A lT Z -V -*K
|  = A ^ - a 
Substituting into (4.13), this yields a growth rate increasing in e:
g = A(5a(ne)l~a
Further assume e(x,u) — (x — 1 )6up. Then the Solow condition10 can be 
written as:
w LJ— = xu> —
p  1 — 5
This determines a constant, exogenous real wage premium. This gener­
ates an upward sloping SC  locus in the (u, e) plane. The equation for SC  
is:
e =  (——t) 6up 
1 — 5
Now, if N  is total employment, and L the total labour force, labour 
demand will be determined by the equalization of the marginal product of 
labour and the wage:
N  ” H e' 1 - 5
Assuming u  = i.e. that the alternative wage is proportional to human
capital per capita, and noting that in equilibrium ft =  4- =  this defines a
h  7
downward sloping locus LD  in the (u, e) plane, with the following equation:
A a el - Q =  ( l - « )
7 ( l - a ) ( l - 5 )
10 e\  (x ,u )  * x  =  e ( x , u )
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It is clear that depending on where the differences in unemployment come 
from, the model can generate positive as well as negative correlation between 
g , i.e. e, and u. If differences in unemployment come from differences in 
labour demand, it may generate a positive correlation between growth and 
unemployment. If they come from shifts in S C , i.e. differences in shirking 
behaviour and /or monitoring technologies, t this will generate a negative 
correlation between growth and unemployment.
4.4 A  sum m ary and evaluation o f the m odels
So far we have documented the theoretical links between steady state growth 
and equilibrium unemployment. Since we can identify many channels linking 
growth and unemployment, it is difficult to gauge the theoretical robustness 
of the effect of growth on unemployment or vice versa.
When we consider the case of exogenous growth, we discover two effects of 
growth on unemployment: the capitalization effect and the creative destruc­
tion effect. Neither is particularly robust, as is evidenced by the introduction 
of an endogenous interest rate and of complementarities amongst goods.
We follow by allowing growth to be endogenous and this introduces a feed­
back effect from unemployment to growth. Loss of skill, learning by doing 
and the saving mechanism would predict that this effect should be negative. 
But if we allow for the possible cleansing effect of recessions, the sign of this 
effect could be reversed. This feedback effect leads to a macroeconomic com­
plementarity, and the possibility of multiplier effects and multiple equilibria.
Introducing endogenous growth also allows institutions to indirectly ef­
fect growth and unemployment. Most of models discussed allow institutional 
changes, such as changes to: taxes, hiring costs, the replacement rate and 
the bargaining power of workers to affect growth by first impacting on un­
employment. But Eriksson (1995) shows how by considering the importance 
of labour market tightness, these indirect effects can impact firstly on growth 
and thus onto unemployment.
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The next step is to try to discriminate between the various models, on 
the basis of empirical evidence. We do this below by using the evidence of 
Jones (1995a) and the bivariate evidence documented in the previous chapter. 
According to endogenous growth theory, permanent changes in certain policy 
variables have permanent effects on the rate of economic growth. As Jones 
(1995a) noted, growth rates of GDP per capita show little or no persistent 
increase, in the post WWII era, for OECD countries. In fact, for some of 
the countries, there is a significant negative trend for the post WWII period. 
Thus, the determinants of long-run growth in these countries either must not 
exhibit persistent increases, or must exhibit offsetting movements.
Jones (1995a) uses these facts to develop a sharp criticism of AK-style 
growth models. It is important to outline this criticism, as AK-style mod­
els are at the core of the OLG models and the optimizing Ramsey models 
outlined in section 4.3. The mechanism underlying the AK models, is that 
increased savings leads to increased investment and more capital accumula­
tion. Due to a physical capital externality, this leads to increased growth. 
It can easily be shown that a simple AK-style model will have the following 
relationship between steady state growth and investment:
Q y  —  $  - f “  ■A.%
where S is the rate of depreciation and i the investment rate in physical 
capital11.
So, steady state growth is a positive affine transformation of the invest­
ment rate for physical capital. In this class of models then, the dynamics 
of growth rates should be similar to the dynamics of investment rates. An 
increase in the investment rate, perhaps due to an increase in the capital 
subsidy, will be matched by an increase in the steady state growth rate. In­
vestment rates for many of the advanced OECD countries exhibit a strong 
positive trend in the postwar period. Moreover, this trend is strengthened 
if one follows De Long and Summers (1991) and Jones (1994), and focuses
11 For example, the growth equation (equation 9) in the model of Bean and Pissarides is 
exactly this, but with a rate of depreciation equal to one.
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on producer durables investment. These have increased by about 3%, from 
just over 4% of GDP to 7% for: France, Germany, the UK and the US. In 
Japan, the rise is even larger, from about 3.5% to 9%. Despite these large 
movements in investment rates, growth rates have fallen, if anything, in the 
postwar period.
Could there be variables which could counter balance this effect? It is 
difficult to think of any. Two possibilities are human capital investment and 
openness. Yet, both of these are also trended upwards in the postwar period. 
This suggests that the AK models do not provide a good description of the 
driving forces behind growth in developed countries. It also suggests that 
models based on a savings mechanism axe probably not the right vehicles 
to evaluate the growth-unemployment dynamic. This rules out the OLG 
models and optimizing Ramsey models for generating a permanent growth- 
unemployment dynamic. As the analysis of the Daveri and Tabellini model 
showed earlier, we can still generate a temporary growth-unemployment dy­
namic with a standard neo-classical production function, once we drop the 
AK-style production function. In fact Jones (1995a) estimates that a perma­
nent increase in the investment rate affects growth only over the relative short 
horizon of 8-10 years. This could be consistent with a temporary growth- 
unemployment dynamic caused by a savings mechanism, as suggested by 
Daveri and Tabellini (1997).
We can draw some even stronger conclusions by using the bivariate evi­
dence documented in the previous chapter. The granger causality tests could 
not rule out causality running in both directions. Yet we have also docu­
mented that unemployment is: highly persistent, shows mean reversion, but 
may or may not be stationary. Whereas growth is highly stationary and has 
very little persistence. Further, the coherence diagrams suggested a relation­
ship between growth and unemployment at equilibrium frequencies and at 
low business cycle frequencies. Given the above evidence that growth illus­
trates little persistence but unemployment a lot, it may be the case that at 
low business cycle frequencies the relationship is due to unemployment effects
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impacting on growth. This could be due to: the effect of savings; cleansing 
type effects; loss of skills and learning by doing. At lower equilibrium fre­
quencies, the relationship maybe due to growth impacting on unemployment, 
through capitalization and creative destruction effects.
The cross correlations analyzed in the previous chapter allow us to ex­
plore this hypothesis further. Looking at the lag structure of the correlation 
for growth leading unemployment, we found that the cross correlations were 
nearly always negative for all the countries considered. This would be consis­
tent with capitalization dominating creative destruction, as increased growth 
leads to lower unemployment in this scenario.
For the correlation of unemployment leading growth, we found at low lags 
that the correlation was positive and at higher lags it switched to being neg­
ative. The switching point occurred at lag lengths of 8-12 depending on the 
country. The only mechanism, which we discussed in section 4.3, that can 
generate a positive correlation of unemployment leading growth, that we see 
at shorter lag lengths, is a cleansing type effect. This is because an increase 
in unemployment will allow quicker organizational change and this would in­
crease future growth, i.e. lead to positive correlation between unemployment 
and growth. Now the prevailing literature generally associates this effect with 
recessions, i.e. it is the business cycle component of unemployment leading 
to a change in the structural growth rate. Here we have a link between the 
filtered unemployment and filtered growth, i.e. our measures of structural 
unemployment and structural growth. Thus the cleansing type effect we 
have identified here, is slightly different to that in the prevailing literature. 
But there is no reason why a cleansing effect cannot occur in response to 
an increase in structural unemployment. In fact many authors argue that 
the deeper the recession, the stronger the effect is (Aghion and Saint-Paul 
(1991)) and it is very likely given the persistence we see in unemployment, 
that a deep recession will have structural effects aswell.
What can explain the negative correlation between unemployment and 
growth we see at longer lags? Section 4.3 suggests three suspects: loss of
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skills, learning by doing and savings, each of which can deliver a negative 
correlation between unemployment and growth. The savings mechanism 
works as follows: an increase in unemployment reduces savings, which in 
turn reduces investment and thus causes growth to fall. An increase in un­
employment can also cause an increase in the atrophy of skill; and, ceteris 
paribus, lead to a fall in the employment rate, which in turn could reduce 
learning by doing. Both effects will reduce the skills base of the labour force 
and thus reduce growth. We can probably rule out the effects of savings, 
as Jones’s evidence suggests that the effects of savings, working through in­
vestment, do not last longer than 8-10 years. Yet, the negative correlation 
only kicks in at lags higher than 8 years. That suggests that loss of skills or 
learning by doing maybe the dominant effects, of unemployment on growth, 
at longer horizons.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has documented numerous mechanisms that link growth and 
unemployment. Some of the effects uncovered were more theoretically ro­
bust than others. The bivariate evidence linking growth and unemployment, 
discussed in the previous chapter, has been useful in helping discriminate 
between the various models. In particular, when combined with the Jones 
(1995) critique of AK models, we derive some pertinent results. It seems that 
at longer horizons, the relationship between growth and unemployment is be 
dominated by growth affecting unemployment, rather than vice versa. This 
is because growth is highly stationary with low levels of persistence, whereas 
unemployment is a highly persistent process. Further, cross correlations sug­
gest that capitalization effects are more important than creative destruction 
effects. At medium run horizons, a cleansing type effect seems to be very 
pervasive.
To sharpen our judgements further, we must extend our empirical evi­
dence beyond looking only at the evolutions of growth and unemployment.
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In the next chapter, we introduce other variables, capturing the effect of 
institutions. This will allow us to check whether the bivariate correlations 
discussed here, are robust to the introduction of other factors; and test some 




A M ulti-Variate Evaluation of 
the Mechanisms Linking 
Growth and Unemployment
5.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, we have documented empirical evidence on the bivari­
ate link between growth and unemployment and the theoretical mechanisms 
linking the two. But bivariate correlations can sometimes be misleading if 
the correlation is caused by other underlying factors. It could be the case 
that when we allow for the impact of other factors, namely institutions, these 
bivariate correlations could be overturned.
For example, suppose a reduction in labour taxes leads to a reduction 
in the surplus that workers could appropriate from innovators. This could 
lead to an increase in the incentives to innovate, an increase in R&D and 
an increase in growth. At the same time and for the same reasons, it may 
also lead to a reduction in unemployment. If we just looked at the bivariate 
correlation of growth and unemployment, it would be negative and maybe we 
would conclude a capitalization type effect we in operation. This would be 
the wrong conclusion as what is driving the negative correlation are changes 
in labour taxes. This could be perfectly consistent with the direct effect
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of growth on unemployment being positive, i.e. consistent with creative 
destruction dominating capitalization. To solve this problem, we explicitly 
control for the effects of institutional changes in this chapter.
We have noted previously that both theoretical considerations and the 
bivariate evidence suggest that growth and unemployment feedback into each 
other. This implies that both are endogenous variables and thus the standard 
practice of estimating a single growth or unemployment equation, to recover 
the effects of growth on unemployment and vice versa, is liable to suffer from 
the problem of simultaneity bias. To tackle this problem, we will estimate 
a system, including a growth and unemployment equation. This will be 
estimated across a panel of OECD countries to test the various hypotheses 
suggested by the growth-unemployment literature.
We noted, in the previous chapter, the importance of Jones’ (1995a) cri­
tique of AK models of growth. In this chapter we try to discriminate between 
the mechanisms causing a link between growth and unemployment further, 
by testing Schumpeterian R&D growth models directly, and the importance 
they place on creative destruction. The Schumpeterian approach has some 
interesting implications that affect not just unemployment and growth. The 
main propagation mechanism of the Schumpeterian approach is innovation. 
One intuitive prediction is that R&D expenditure should be highly correlated 
with growth, as higher R&D should increase the probability of innovations. 
This can be tested by looking at the correlation between R&D expenditure 
and steady state growth, over a panel of OECD countries. Also, if creative 
destruction is important, then this should show up in a high correlation 
between growth and job destruction. We use Davis and Haltiwanger and 
Schuh’s (1994) data on US job creation and job destruction to test this link.
The chapter is structured as follows: section II analyses the link between 
growth and R&D, while section III lays out the empirical methodology un­
derlying a system including an unemployment and a growth equation and 
discusses the data. Section IV documents the results of estimating the sys­
tem. Section V looks at the correlations of growth, job creation and job
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destruction, and section VI concludes.
5.2 The Link betw een Growth and R&D
The bivariate evidence in the previous chapter suggested that the capitaliza­
tion effect dominates the creative destruction effect. This result could prove 
to be misleading, once we control for movements in other factors, as we try to 
do later. Also, on some level, looking at the relationship between growth and 
unemployment is a rather indirect way of trying to recover Schumpeterian 
forces. The main propagation mechanism of the Schumpeterian approach is 
innovation. Thus, one would expect that R&D should be highly correlated 
with growth, as higher R&D should increase the probability of innovations. 
This can be tested by looking at the correlation between growth and R&D. 
This has been a source of intense debate recently, with the issue really being 
what measure of R&D should be used.( see Jones 1995b and Aghion and 
Howitt 1998). Below I will try to clarify the relevant issues and present some 
new evidence.
5.2.1 Theoretical considerations
Jones (1995b) made a highly influential critique of R&D models of growth 
based on Schumpeterian notions. His argument was as follows. There has 
been a substantial increase in R&D levels in the post WWII period that might 
have been expected to raise growth. Yet, as we have mentioned in Chapter 
4, growth rates have certainly not risen in this period, if anything they have 
fallen. This suggests that Schumpeterian forces cannot be the main driving 
force of growth. The following reduced form of the Romer (1990) model of 
endogenous technical change, illustrates the point. The aggregate flow of 
output is:
Y  =  AT^AZq)1-0,
and the rate of growth of technical knowledge A  is proportional to the
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current flow of research labour L2:
Total labour supply is constant and can be freely allocated between re­
search and manufacturing:
L = L\ +  L2
Thus, in the steady state, the rate of growth of output should be pro­
portional to the steady-state share s* of the total labour force devoted to 
R&D:
9 y  =  9 a  = 8L2 = 8s* L
But as Jones documents, L2 — s*L has increased substantially since the 
1950s in all OECD countries, while growth of output per capita has not. He 
uses this to suggest decreasing returns in the production of new knowledge, 
the argument being as more knowledge is been accumulated, the harder it 
becomes to extend, as the easy innovations are made first. To accommodate 
decreasing returns, Jones proposes a slightly different innovation process:
•
4  =  S L ^ 1 (5.1)
with 7 < 1, and A < 1. It is easy to show in this case that growth is 
no longer endogenous, as it becomes proportional to the rate of population 
growth (n), namely:
An
Aghion and Howitt (1998) argue that there is a way of rescuing Schum­
peterian type endogenous growth models that is consistent with the facts. 
They consider a Schumpeterian model with capital accumulation. The key 
facet is the innovation process, which is:
<t>t =  0 < A, 4> >  0 , 4 ’ < 0, *(0) =  0; (5.2)
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where 4>t is the Poisson arrival rate of innovations in a sector to which 
Rt units of final output have been put into R&D. A™ax is the maximal value 
of the productivity parameters Ait in the economy at date t, and A is a pa­
rameter indicating the productivity of R&D. <j> exhibits decreasing returns to 
scale, which is the result of a research congestion. The A™** parameter cap­
tures the force of increasing complexity; as technology advances the resource 
cost of further advances increases proportionally.
Growth in the leading edge parameter A™** occurs as a result of the 
knowledge spillovers produced by innovations. At any moment of time, the 
leading-edge technology is available to any successful innovator, and this 
publicly available knowledge grows at a rate proportional to the aggregate 
rate of innovations. The factor of proportionality, which is a measure of 
the marginal aggregate impact of each innovation on the stock of public 
knowledge, is assumed to equal ^  > 0. a is the size of the innovation and 
Qt is a measure of how many different intermediate products exist at time t. 
The factor of proportionality is normalized by Qt, to allow for the fact that 
as the economy develops an increasing number of specialized products, an 
innovation of given size will have a smaller impact on the aggregate economy. 
This yields a rate of technical progress of:
•
A m a x  -
gt = —-—  = ——\(J)(nt)
y A*max Qt
where nt = .
Aghion and Howitt show how structural parameters that affect the in­
centives to innovate and accumulate capital can still effect the steady state 
growth rate, i.e. growth is still endogenous. The reason why the result is 
different to that of Jones, is both capital and labour are used in R&D un­
der the Aghion and Howitt innovation process (equation 5.2) , as opposed to 
just labour in the Jones specification1 (equation 5.1). The Aghion and Howitt 
model predicts that we should look at the relationship between steady state
1 Input R t includes capital and labour. For details of the model, see Aghion and Howitt 
(1998) ch.12.
growth and rather than the number of scientists as predicted by a Romer 
type model. This is because of the complexity normalization nt = -j&r and 
the spillover normalization A simple rise in absolute R&D expenditure 
would not cause an increase in growth due to these two effects. In the next 
section, we empirically test the validity of this argument.
5.2.2 Empirical evidence
If we are going to see a relationship between and steady state growth, 
then it should be apparent for the US. This is because the US has been 
the frontier economy when it comes to innovation, for most of the last cen­
tury. Thus we first plot a scatter of moving averaged against a measure 
of steady state growth. is averaged over the five years immediately
preceding the growth observation. For example we would pair the filtered 
growth measure for 1980 with the averaged over 1975-79. This is so any 
relationship documented does not merely reflect correlation, but could po­
tentially reflect causality. It is very easy to imagine growth causing We 
can think of some effect very similar to the capitalization effect of growth on 
unemployment. An increase in growth could increase the present discounted 
value of a future innovation and this will lead to an increase in just 
as the capitalization effect leads to an increase in vacancies2. We filter out 
causality running in this direction, by timing the R&D to happen before 
the growth takes place3. The measure we use is the filtered growth mea­
sure, as described in chapter 3 and based on Maddison’s (1994) historical 
data. In other words, growth once cycles of frequency eight years or less 
have been filtered out. This allows us to use the full set of annual data, 
from 1958 onwards. The limitation is the data on R&D, which come from
2In fact, although Jones (1995) uses a decreasing returns to R&D innovation process to 
generate an exogenous growth rate, he still finds a positive correlation between the share 
of labour employed by the R&D sector and steady state growth. The causality runs from 
growth to the R&D though.
3We also perform granger causality tests, and these do rule out causality in both di­
rections, but the results are sensitive to the number of lags used.
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the NSF(1996). Referring to figure 5.1, we can see a positive and significant 
correlation between filtered growth and , though there seems to a substantial 
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Figure 5.1: scatter of growth vs R&D for the US
Next, we see if this relationship still holds when we allow for some cross 
sectional variation, i.e. include other OECD countries. Here, we use a panel 
of two observations: time averaged for 1970-79 and 1980-89. The is 
from the OECD (1995) and is the limiting factor in the size of the sample. 
The growth data are once again from Maddison(1994). Figure 5.2 plots a 
scatter of against time averaged growth for the pooled OECD sample. 
There is clearly little relationship that can be discerned from it.
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Figure 5.2: scatter of growth vs R&D for a pooled OECD sample
This could be because there is little relationship, or because of the pre­
dominance of country-specific effects. To test whether the latter hypothesis 
is true, we run a simple panel data version of equation 5.3, namely:
9it = oti +  d i ( ^ ^ ) it + d2huit +  d3lgdpit + eit (5.4)gdp
where at is a fixed effect, hu and I gdp are used as state variables to capture 
initial conditions and possible convergence effects, as suggested by Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin4. For a detailed discussion of the data, see section 5.3.2 and 
the data appendix. No other environmental variables are included, as if these 
Schumpeterian models are to believed, such variables are important precisely 
because of their effect on §757?. The results axe reported below5:
di= 0.24 (0.65) d2= 0.17 (1.29) d3= -4.29 (-5.73)
We use a procedure that produces robust statistics to heteroscadasticity. We 
use manit, which is a state variable representing the initial level of manufac­
turing output in any sub-period, as an instrument for gdpit to counter any
4 These axe respectively a measure of the stock of human capital and the level of log 
GDP, both measured during the initial year of the corresponding sub-period.
5 the t-ratios are in brackets
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lagged endogenous variable or measurement error problems6. As can be seen 
from the results, the coefficient on ( ^ ) ,  although having the right sign is 
nowhere near significant. This suggests that for countries not on the techno­
logical frontier, R&D is not an important determinant of steady state growth. 
An immediately obvious problem with the above regression, is that we have 
not dealt at ail with the potential endogeneity of (^ f)-  We mentioned ear­
lier how it is easy to conceptualize growth affecting R&D expenditure. It is 
difficult to solve for the potential endogeneity bias in this equation, as if we 
use as an instrument for ( - ^ ) ,  then we no longer have a panel of
data, but merely a cross section. Thus we would no longer be able to take 
account of the country specific effects, which is the whole point of doing this 
exercise. The endogeneity bias may not be so bad though, if we make the 
reasonable assumption that since tends to be a very smooth and slow 
moving variable, it is a fairly exogenous variable. The problem lies partly in 
trying to estimate the structural relationship, equation 5.3, directly. In the 
next section, when we estimate a system involving growth and unemploy­
ment, we will come back to this problem again and consider a reduced form 
of equation 5.3, by substituting out the ( ^ )  variable.
5.3 Growth and Unem ploym ent R evisited
5.3.1 Empirical M ethodology
The previous chapter suggested that, at least theoretically, steady state 
growth and unemployment feedback into each other. We argued that growth 
impacted on unemployment through capitalization and creative destruction 
effects; and that unemployment affected growth through: loss of skills; learn­
ing by doing; cleansing effects and savings. Further, Granger Causality tests 
could not reject the hypothesis of causality in both directions. This suggests 
that to consistently identify the effects of growth on unemployment and vice
6 See the later section on growth and unemployment for a more detailed discussion of 
this issue.
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versa, we need to take into account the potential for simultaneity bias caused 
by unemployment and growth both being endogenous. We attempt to solve 
this problem by estimating a system of unemployment and growth equations, 
across a panel of OECD countries. The data are discussed in more detail in 
the next section, but a panel is used, as it allows us to utilize variation in time 
and cross section. Cross-sectional variations in unemployment and growth 
are dominated by fixed effects at the country level. This is not surprising, 
as institutions only change slowly over time. For example, as Nickell (1997) 
notes, labour market legislation differs markedly across countries and such 
legislation did not change much after the late 1960s or early 1970s. Using 
a panel of observations allows one to take account explicitly of these fixed 
effects.
U  nem ploym ent
In considering factors affecting equilibrium unemployment, we draw on the 
analysis of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and Layard and Nickell 
(1997). Layard and Nickell (1997) show that from a very general model 
of the labour market, which allows for: insider influences on wages; outsider 
influences on wages, working through the ‘threat points’ in a nash bargain 
and the problems of matching workers to employers and searching behaviour, 
we can derive the following general equation for equilibrium unemployment:
u =  / ( s , c , 6,/?) (5.5)
+  -  +  +
In other words, equilibrium unemployment is a decreasing function in any 
factor which: reduces the exogenous separation rate out of unemployment, 
s; increases search effectiveness of the unemployed, c; lowers the benefit re­
placement ratio, b, or lowers the strength of worker in the wage bargain, (3. 
Most of the subsequent discussion of the effect of labour market institutions 
comes under these four headings, with the exception of taxes. We would 
expect labour taxes to either have no effect or a positive effect on unem­
ployment, depending on whether higher taxes are passed on to higher gross
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wages. Daveri and Tabellini (1997) suggest that this is the case for Europe 
and thus we should expect labour taxes to have a positive and significant 
effect on unemployment for European countries7. We saw in the previous 
chapter how they derive an overlapping generations model, with union bar­
gaining, that leads to unemployment positively depending on labour taxes. 
Phelps(1994) and Pissarides (1996) also argue that taxes have an important 
impact on labour costs in wage bargains because of important non-labour 
income effects. These effects arise because while labour costs axe subject to 
both payroll and income taxes, non-labour income is subject only to income 
taxes.
Taking into account the additional growth effect documented in the previ­
ous chapter, consider the following empirical specification for an equilibrium 
unemployment equation:
u it — Oii + b i g a  + &2^ t +  b$(Jit -f- b ^ n u  + b ^ u a - i  -(- £ u  (5-6)
where: uit is the equilibrium unemployment rate in country i at time t\ g 
is the steady state growth rate of GDP per capita; tl labour taxes; a the 
replacement rate; n the change in inflation and a* represents a fixed effect 
for each country.
Apart from the growth variable, this specification draws on the cross 
country unemployment analysis of Layard Nickell and Jackman (LNJ 1991) 
and Layard and Nickell (1997). The fixed effect and a pick up arguments 
in equation (5.5). An increase in the replacement rate would be expected to 
have a positive effect on equilibrium unemployment for two reasons. First, 
if the real value of benefits are higher, this could lead to reduced search 
amongst the unemployed and thus reduce transition rates into employment. 
Second, by increasing the value of a workers outside option, it could lead 
to higher wages negotiated in any given bargaining process. The LNJ style 
regressions, also include other variables that affect the arguments of equation 
(5.5), such as: benefit duration; employment protection; union and employer
7Daveri and Tabellini’s definition of Europe, refers to Continental Europe and thus 
does not include Scandinavian countries and the UK.
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coordination. To the extent that these labour institutional variables have 
not changed much since the late 1960s (Nickell 1997) a lot of their impact 
will be picked up by the fixed effects.
The main focus is on the sign of 61. If 61 < 0 , it suggests that capital­
ization dominates creative destruction, which would be consistent with the 
bivariate evidence presented in the previous chapter. If the opposite is true, 
it would suggest that creative destruction is the dominant force.
The change in inflation variable is included to allow for a short to medium 
term trade off between unemployment and inflation. A lagged unemployment 
variable is included to take account of the very high persistence in unemploy­
ment, as documented in chapter 3.
The country specific effect is entered as a ‘fixed’ rather than a ‘random’ 
effect. This if for two reasons: first, the sample is of only 18 OECD coun­
tries and thus methodologically, fixed effects specific to each country may be 
a better interpretation of the facts than effects drawn randomly from some 
underlying distribution (Baltagi 1997). Second, and more importantly, for 
the random effects model to be consistent, the random effects must be uncor­
related with the exogenous variables included in the model. This is unlikely 
to be the case in either an unemployment or growth equation. The country 
specific effects partly cover omitted variables correlated with the exogenous 
variables. In the unemployment equation, we may expect omitted variables 
representing difficult to measure, or observe, elements of the wage bargaining 
process to be correlated with labour taxes and/or the replacement rate. Ilsam 
(1995) applies similar logic to argue for fixed effects in growth equations.
Growth
In the previous section, we made an attempt to directly estimate the struc­
tural growth relationship, derived from the model of Aghion and Howitt 
(1998 chl2.). Here, we consider estimating a reduced form of this equa­
tion, by factoring out the variable. The reasoning goes as follows. In 
Schumpeterian models of growth, such as Aghion and Howitt (1998 chl2),
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the incentive to innovate is the monopoly rents induced by implementing a 
vertical product innovation. Any feature that reduces the value of innova­
tion will reduce R&D intensity and hence through equation 5.3 will reduce 
steady state growth. Thus any institutional feature that increases the ability 
of workers to capture the monopoly rents by increasing wages, i.e. reduces 
the surplus available to a potential innovator, will reduce growth in these 
types of models. So, any institution that increases the outside option or 
insider power of workers, could reduce growth. Thus labour market legisla­
tion, for example on employment protection or benefit durations, could effect 
growth directly and through the unemployment variable. Consider an R&D 
function like the following:
-—7— = F (t\ cr, bd, coord, uc, ep, x) gdp
where bd are benefit durations, coord is a measure of union and employer 
co-ordination, ep is a measure of employment protection, uc is union cover­
age8 and x  is a vector of omitted variables. Referring to the unemployment 
equation (5.6), we could consider as an approximation to the above:
.r&d.
( j  Jit =  7 1 +  Uit +  v itgdp
where the effect of these institutional variables is captured by an unem­
ployment term uit and a fixed effect. As we noted earlier, labour market 
legislation has not changed much since the late 1960s (Nickell 1997) and so a 
fixed effect may capture a large part of its effect which does not work through 
the unemployment rate. Although this is a far from perfect specification for 
R&D, it will capture some of its effect and more importantly, it will capture 
a lot of the effects relevant to the Schumpeterian approach.
By substituting out from equation 5.4 we arrive at the following
reduced form equilibrium growth equation:
9u = 7  i +  Ci uit +  c2huit +  C3 lgdpit + u it (5.7)
8 For a more detailed description of the variables see the data appendix and Layard and 
Nickell (1997).
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where: hu is the stock of human capital; I gdp is the initial level of log 
GDP in the sub-period and is a fixed effect.
Apart from the unemployment term and the addition of fixed effects, this 
specification is similar to a simple Barro style growth regression (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1995). The unemployment term, apart from capturing any ef­
fects working through innovation, will also capture effects working through 
loss of skills, learning by doing, savings and cleansing effects, as documented 
in chapter 4. Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin, we use an empirical frame­
work of conditional convergence, that relates real per capita growth to the 
initial level of state variables and environmental variables. In the specifi­
cation above the state variables are hu and I gdp. We augment the above 
specification by adding some environmental variables that might be impor­
tant for the OECD. To test the importance of physical capital externalities, 
we add a term reflecting investment, namely ( ^ ) .  We also introduce a terms 
of trade variable, tot, since OECD economies tend to be fairly open and there 
has been much time series variation in terms of trade measures. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) control for many more environmental variables, such 
as: the black market premium on foreign exchange and measures of politi­
cal instability. Since we are focussing on highly developed OECD countries, 
most of these variables, though they will differ across these sample countries, 
will not show much time series variation. Thus there effects will mainly be 
washed up by the fixed effect. The specification we test, is the following:
9it — l i  + c \U i t -1- C 2 h u it + C s lg d p u  -f c ^ t o t u  -1- Cs(—y-)n +  U it  (5.8)gdp
Once again, the main focus is on ci, the coefficient on the unemployment 
variable. If it is positive, it suggests that cleansing type effects are prevalent. 
If, on the other hand, it is negative, this would be consistent with: loss of 
skills, learning by doing or savings effects. We would expect C3 to be negative 
as it represents the standard absolute convergence coefficient. The sign of C2 
is a bit more complex. Standard neo-classical Ramsey models would predict 
C2 < 0 due to diminishing returns to reproducible factors. But if we allow
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for endogenous growth and externalities to human capital, an increase in hu 
could increase growth, tot is a variable measuring the change in the price 
of exports relative to imports and thus we should expect C4 > 0. Finally we 
would expect C5 > 0. If physical capital externalities are prominent, then 
this term will be significantly positive. Though as Jones (1995a) argued, the 
evidence for physical capital externalities is not strong (see the discussion 
in chapter 4). It will be interesting to see if his critique is born out in an 
insignificant c5.
5.3.2 D ata
The data is for a panel of 18 OECD countries during the period 1960-1989. 
The reason why the sample is restricted to only 18 OECD countries is data 
availability. In particular, certain variables were unavailable for: Greece, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand and Portugal. We will discuss a few pertinent 
points below, but all the data sources are listed in the Data Appendix.
Since we are interested in equilibrium movements in growth and unem­
ployment, we remove the effect of the cycle by averaging each variable over 
a five-year period. In previous chapters, we have argued that there is com­
pelling evidence that business cycles do not last beyond eight years. Given 
this why have we used a five year averaging procedure? We use it for two 
reasons. Firstly it is standard in the literature to use periods averaging 5-6 
years ( see: Barro and Sala-i- Martin 1995, Islam 1995, Layard and Nickell 
1997, and Daveri and Tabellini 1997 to name a few) and thus it makes the 
results easier to compare if we use the same averaging procedure. Secondly, 
if we increase the sub periods to averages over eight years then we lose two 
observations. Given that at least one observation is lost to create lags, this 
would result in only three usable observations. We believed it was more im­
portant to keep a higher number of time series observations that were easier 
to compare to the previous literature in this area.
The growth rates are recovered from Maddison (1994) which uses Geary- 
Khamis dollars to normalize GDP across countries. The unemployment vari­
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able is the standardized unemployment rate according to OECD definitions. 
For labour taxes, we use the tax wedge. Following LNJ (1991) this includes 
payroll taxes, income taxes and consumption taxes. Taxation on labour typi­
cally operates via the wedge between the real cost of a worker to an employer 
and the real consumption wage of the worker9. For the replacement rate, we 
use an aggregate gross measure as produced by the OECD, following Daveri 
and Tabellini (1997), since we want to separate out the effect of labour taxes 
from unemployment benefits. Many would argue that changes in labour taxes 
mainly work through the replacement ratio. This is because in most OECD 
countries benefits are exempt from income taxes. Thus if we increase income 
taxes, ceteris paribus, labour taxes increase and the net replacement ratio 
rises. We want to separate out this effect from the direct effect of an increase 
in labour taxes on gross wages and hence on unemployment. Thus we include 
both labour taxes and the gross replacement rate.
The human capital variable deserves special mention, as measures of hu­
man capital have often been a weak spot in growth regressions. Previous 
work (for example Daveri and Tabellini 1997) has often used a secondary 
enrollment ratio measure. This really is not a particularly useful measure, as 
it is not related to the stock of human capital amongst the current working 
age population. Barro and Lee (1993) have made important progress in this 
respect. Based on census data and other information, they have constructed 
a human capital variable which gives the average schooling years in the total 
population over age 25. This is a stock measure and is what we use as our 
human capital variable in the growth equation. The terms to trade variable 
measures the growth rate of export prices minus those of import prices.
9 Of course this measure is far from perfect, for example some income taxes fall on 
capital income and some consumption taxes are paid by individuals who are out of the 
labour force (see LNJ for more details).
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5.4 Estim ation and R esults
There are various methods available to estimate regressions with panel data. 
Since we axe applying the fixed effects model, we consider two options: the 
least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimator with instruments; and the 
first difference estimator with instruments. Both methods are designed to 
solve the problem of country specific effects. The LSDV estimator is biased 
when lagged dependent variables are present (Nickell 1981), which is a prob­
lem in both the unemployment and growth equation, more so in the former 
case, as will be discussed below 10.
5.4.1 The Unem ploym ent Equation
Consider the unemployment specification, equation 5.6. Even if growth was 
exogenous in this equation, the regression coefficients would be biased due 
to the presence of the lagged dependent variable (Nickell 1981). Further this 
bias is likely to be large as it depends on the size of T, or the number of time 
series observations and not N  the number of cross sectional observations. In 
our sample, there are 4-5 time series observations depending on the number 
of lags used. This is very small and thus the biases from the LSDV estimator 
are likely to be large.
One solution is to first difference equation 5.6, so we have:
A u #  =  b \ A g n  +  -f  6 3  Act# +  6 4 A 71#  -I- b ^ A u a - i  +  A s #  (5-9)
The fixed effect has disappeared and we can now use instrumental vari­
ables to solve for the problem of the lagged dependent variable and the 
endogeneity of Ap#.
1 0  A seemingly more sophisticated method to solve the problem of lagged endogenous 
variables, than first differencing and using instruments, is to first difference and use the 
General Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator. This essentially chooses the optimal 
instrument matrix utilising all possible lags. This technique is not reported in this section 
as the GMM estimator suffers large biases when the cross section is small (Arellano and 
Bond 1991 and 1998). In our sample the cross section is small, being only 18 countries. 
We did try using GMM estimators, but found the results were not consistent with other 
techniques, suggesting large small sample biases.
191
The results from using a variety of instrument sets are reported in Table 
5.1. In all specifications we include a set of time dummies. All equations 
are estimated using a one step IV estimator which has test statistics robust 
to heteroscadasticity11. In the basic specification we use uit- 2 to instrument 
Auit-i, as suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981). Based on a differenced 
version of the equilibrium growth equation (5.8) we instrument out Agu with 
Ahuit, A totu , and A lgdpit. We further use Amanit and manit- 1
as instruments for A lgdpit to avoid a potential lagged dependent variable 
problem in the growth specification (see equation 5.7) and to reduce potential 
measurement error problems. We discuss these issues in more detail later, 
when we estimate the growth equation.
For this basic specification, we find that the effect of growth on unem­
ployment is negative and not significant. The effects of labour taxes and the 
replacement ratio are found to be positive, as expected, but not significant.. 
Daveri and Tabellini find that labour taxes have a positive and significant 
effect for continental Europe in their analysis. This maybe because they 
allow for a different effect of taxes in continental Europe, Scandinavia and 
the Anglo-Saxon economies; or because they use different taxation data, fo­
cussing on effective as opposed to statutory rates. We do not pursue that line 
of thought in this paper. A change in inflation has a negative and significant 
effect on unemployment, suggesting a short/medium run trade off between 
unemployment and inflation. The lagged unemployment variable has a pos­
itive and significant effect, supporting the notion that unemployment is a 
highly persistent process. Unfortunately the hypothesis of no second order 
serial correlation is rejected at the 5% level, suggesting that the estimates
11 The estimations were carried out using Dynamic Panel Data (DPD), by Arellano and
Bond. Tests for serial correlation are reported. These are for first order serial correlation 
in levels equations and second order serial correlation in first differences equations. In 
first differences equations, the one step estimator is consistent up to first order serial 
correlation, but is inconsistent if second order serial correlation is detected and lagged 
dependent variables are present. A Sargan statistic is presented to test the overidentifying
IV restrictions. This is based on the two step estimator in DPD, and is only reported 
when the two step procedure has been possible. Arellano and Bond (1991) discuss in more 
detail the above testing procedures.
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from the basic specification could be inconsistent.
Next, we take into account the possible endogeneity of changes in infla­
tion. If unemployment changes, this could lead to a change in wage pressure 
and hence a change in inflation. Since the sub-periods are five year aver­
ages and we are looking at the change in inflation, which is not a persistent 
process, the lag of this variable is not necessarily a good instrument, as it is 
not highly correlated with the contemporaneous change in inflation. Thus, 
we instead use the contemporaneous rate of change of the supply of money 
(d2m\) as an instrument for inflation. This is based on a monetarist inter­
pretation of inflation, that is some ways, inflation is linked to narrow money 
via the ‘Quantity Theory of Money’. Although Ml will be endogenous to 
some degree, it should be more exogenous than 7r, to the extent that the 
central bank controls the stock of narrow money. To the extent that narrow 
money is an important factor in inflation and the central bank has control 
over it, this should be a good instrument. Thus to estimate equation 5.9, we 
use all the instruments in the basic specification plus dSml.
For this specification, we find that b\ is negative and significant at the 10% 
level, but just under significance at the 5% level. Taxes and the replacement 
rate are still not significant, but now lagged unemployment is no longer 
significant, though it has the expected sign. The size of the inflation effect is 
very large though and just significant at the 10% level. The size of the effect 
is surprising, Layard and Nickell (1997), also find a negative and significant 
inflation effect, though at -0.21, it is about a sixth of the effect discovered 
here. Though they do not instrument inflation, and as we can see from 
the results in the first specification, when inflation is not instrumented, the 
effect is more significant, but of significantly lower absolute value. The serial 
correlation test suggests no problems and the Sargan overidentifying statistic 
suggests that the instruments are valid.
Next we take account of spurious results due to the possible endogeneity 
of tax rates and unemployment benefits. For example suppose that there is 
a large, negative aggregate demand shock that raises unemployment. This
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could cause an increase in labour taxes to pay for increased unemployment 
benefits. These variables are unlikely to be as endogenous as the change in 
inflation variable as they are statutory rates. They are set by government 
and do not react naturally to a change in unemployment as say inflation, 
which is determined as a natural economic outcome.
In the third specification, following Andersen and Hsiao (1981) and Daveri 
and Tabellini (1997) we augment the instrument set by using rrit- 2 and tlu- 2  
as further instruments. We use the second lag of these variables only as 
instruments rather than A rrit- i  and AtZit_ias well, as Daveri and Tabellini 
do, to avoid potential correlation with the error term, Ae^-icaused by the 
presence of the A uu-i term as a right hand side regressor. We find that 61 is 
still negative, but no longer significant. This is due to a substantial increase in 
the standard error of the coefficient, as the absolute value of the coefficient 
increases. The increase in the size of the standard error is not surprising, 
given that we are using more instruments. A couple of surprising results are 
the negative, though not significant sign on the replacement rate. Daveri 
and Tabellini (1997) find a similar problem when they instrument out the 
replacement rate. Also the inflation effect is even larger now, approximately 
ten times the size of the effect in Layard and Nickell (1997). This is slightly 
worrying as the inflation effect is now the most important impact by far. 
Layard and Nickell also find it to be one of the most important variables, 
but not to the extent we find it here. Further, the magnitude and significance 
of the lagged unemployment effect completely collapses. This maybe be due 
to two things: a) the choice of instruments for the replacement rate and 
the tax rate may be capturing the effect of lagged unemployment as they 
are second lags of their respective variables; b) by using five year averages 
of the unemployment rate in the estimations, we may also be reducing the 
persistence in unemployment when compared to looking at annual rates, by 
removing a large portion of the cyclical effect.
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5.4.2 The Growth Equation
Consider the growth relationship, equation 5.7. Aside from the endogeneity 
of unemployment and potential endogeneity of the investment share, there is 
a potential lagged dependent variable problem with the I gdp variable. This 
is not as serious a problem as in the unemployment equation, as I gdp is not 
strictly a lagged dependent variable. It as an initial levels term, whereas, 
the dependent variable is a differenced term. One solution to this potential 
problem, rather than first differencing, is to try to find a suitable instrument 
for I gdp. One potential candidate is the initial level of manufacturing output 
in each sub-period (man). This should be highly correlated with the level of 
gdp and is in general measured with less error.
Thus for our first growth specification, we consider estimating equation 
5.8 directly, using the LSDV estimator. Based on the equilibrium unemploy­
ment equation (5.6) we use tl, <r, and n as instruments for u, (~^)t-ias an 
instrument for ( ^ ) t  and man as an instrument for I gdp. We need to instru­
ment the investment share as it is potentially endogenous. The reasoning is 
similar to a capitalization effect. Growth may increase the future returns to 
capital, and thus cause increased investment. As Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) show, ( ^ ) t - i  is a good instrument for ( ^ ) t  as there correlation is 
very high, around 0.80. The results for both growth specifications are re­
ported in Table 5.2. All regressions include time dummies. The main result 
is that unemployment has a negative and not significant effect. Human cap­
ital has a positive but insignificant effect, whereas tot has a positive and 
significant effect, as expected. Igdp has a negative and significant effect, the 
value of convergence implied, is around 10%. This is much higher than the 
estimates reported by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), which are around 2%. 
This is not surprising given the evidence documented by Islam (1995). As he 
notes, the sample used by Barro and Sala-i-Martin, is very large. When one 
focuses on OECD, countries convergence estimates tend to be much higher. 
Also, the Barro and Sala-i-Martin estimates do not take account of fixed ef­
fects in the panel of countries considered. As Islam shows, this downwardly
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biases the convergence estimates and once we take fixed effects into account, 
the estimates rise considerably12. The effect of ( ~ )  is not significant.
An alternative to the LSDV estimator, is to first difference and estimate 
the following equation:
Agit = ciAuit +  c2Ahuit +  csAlgdpa +  c^Atotit +  c5 A(-^—)it +  A ljugdp
Here, we use Atlit, A a it and A 3m lit to instrument Au\ A ( -^ )u - i  and 
2 to instrument A (A ^)it] and finally Amanit and manit_i as instru­
ments for A Igdpu. The results are very similar as for the LSDV estimator, 
with the exception of the magnitude and significance of the human capital ef­
fect. The effect of unemployment is slightly higher in magnitude, but slightly 
lower in significance.. Human capital has a substantially higher effect and 
is now significant. Tot remains positive and significant and the convergence 
term is around 11% and highly significant. The investment share term re­
mains insignificant. The serial correlation and Sargan tests, suggest that the 
equation is well specified.
5.4.3 Fixed Effects
There is another avenue open to us to test the importance of R&D effects. We 
can look at the fixed effects from the growth relationship, equation 5.8. We 
argued before that the fixed effect could capture the direct effects of slowly 
evolving labour market institutions on the monopoly rents of innovators and 
thus on growth, under a Schumpeterian approach. So could estimate the 
following equation, across the OECD, to see if the labour market institutions,
12 Since the initial level of GDP and the equilibrium level are positively correlated, if we 
do not perfectly control for equilibrium GDP, by omitting the fixed effects, we will tend to 
bias upward the coefficient on GDP. But since the convergence term is usually negative, 
this means we would underestimate the rate of convergence. Though as Barro(1996) 
argues, quasi differencing by using the LSDV estimator, or using first differences directly, 
could increase the importance of measurement error over the signal, especially in variables 
with little time series variation. This, as Barro argues, would lead to an overestimate of 
the rate of convergence.
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which we enter as fixed effects in the unemployment regression, matter in 
growth:
7 i = c + e\bdi +  e2coordi +  e$epi +  e^uci +  77* (5.10)
where 7i are the fixed effects from equation 5.8 estimated by LSDV, bdi are 
benefit durations, coordi is a measure of union and employer co-ordination, 
epi is a measure of employment protection and uci is union coverage13. Al­
though there has been some time series variation in the labour market insti­
tutional variables, since the 1960s, variation across countries has been much 
greater, within the OECD. To this extent, estimating the above equation 
should capture the effects of labour market institutions on growth. We would 
expect ei, e3, and e4 to be < 0 due to the positive effects on wage pressure of 
an increase in benefit durations, employment protection or union coverage. 
e4 should be positive, as coordination reduces wage pressure by encouraging 
unions and employers not just to think about there own membership, but 
what effects there actions will have on the aggregate economy. The results 
of estimating equation 5.10 with statistics robust to heteroscadasticity are 
reported below14:
e~i= 0.03 (0.15) e2=  0.05 (0.21) e3=  -0.02 (-0.51) e4=  -1.40 (-2.70)
It can be clearly seen that none of the institutional variables are near 
significance with the exception of uci which is significant and has the expected 
sign.
5.4.4 Summary
The multivariate evidence sheds some light on the various linkages, which I 
summarize below:
13 For a more detailed description of the variables see the data appendix and Layard and 
Nickell (1997). We took the value of these variables for the 1980s.
14 The t-ratios are in brackets
197
The links betw een growth and unem ploym ent
The evidence is weak. The only term which is significant in any of the spec­
ifications used, is the effect of growth on unemployment and even then only 
at the 10% level15. In this case, the effect is negative, suggesting capitaliza­
tion dominates creative destruction, which is consistent with the bivariate 
evidence reported in the previous chapter. For this specification ( the sec­
ond unemployment specification), the long run coefficient of growth is -0.98. 
This suggests that an increase in growth of 1% reduces unemployment by 
1%. This is an important though not very large effect. Given that OECD 
unemployment rates have diverged by as much as 14% and growth rates have 
only diverged by a couple of % in the post WWII period, it seems obvious 
that growth is not the main determinant of equilibrium unemployment, even 
if this specification was the true one. If it is not the true one, then it is 
difficult to find any affect of growth on unemployment at all. Institutional 
factors are probably far more important.
Unemployment is not significant in either of the growth specifications. 
Maybe this is not surprising. Even though we can identify effects of unem­
ployment on growth, for example: loss of skills, learning by doing, cleansing 
effects and savings, should we really expect them to be significant? Consider 
the following example. Let us start with an unemployment rate of 5% and 
hence an employment rate of 95%. Next let unemployment increase by 2% 
so the employment rate falls to 93%. It is probably through the employment 
rate that unemployment effects growth. It is agents who are working who 
contribute to the production of output. Now although an increase in the 
unemployment rate of 2% from a base of 5% is large can we really say a fall 
in the employment rate from 95% to 93% is? The percentage increase in un­
employed numbers is 40% whereas the percentage fall in employed numbers
15 These results are slightly different to Daveri and Tabellini (1997). They also find 
growth has a negative and significant effect in the unemployment equation, when a differ­
ence equation is estimated, but not when a levels equation is estimated. They also find 
unemployment negative and significant in the growth regression, though only for certain 
specifications.
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is only around 2%. It would take a huge increase in unemployment to have 
a significant effect on the number of employed agents. Maybe this explains 
why we do not see a significant effect of unemployment on growth.
The link between growth and R&D
The multivariate evidence suggests that the link between steady state growth 
and R&D is not strong. If there is a creative destruction effect it seems to 
be dominated by a capitalization effect. Further, the evidence from the 
effect of unemployment on growth, and from the fixed effects, suggests that 
effects working through the monopoly rents available to innovators axe not 
significant. This is consistent with the OECD evidence, in the previous 
section, which did not find a link between growth and R&D, except for the 
US.
One possible explanation for the lack of importance of is that in 
the post WWII period, many of the European countries and Japan were 
recovering from WWII. Certainly for a prolonged period, there was lots of 
creation and very little destruction, as reflected in the post WWII boom. The 
US may not just have helped with the Marshall plan, but also with providing 
technological now-how that allowed easy imitation and implementation of its 
own innovations. Although the data for the OECD panel starts from the 
1970s, when the World Economy became less robust in face of the two oil 
price shocks and the global productivity slowdown, the US was still the 
frontier economy. Certainly, many argue that Japan’s success was based on 
imitation and process innovation, rather than vertical product innovation. 
Thus it maybe the case that direct vertical product innovations have not 
been very important in post WWII growth for most OECD countries with 
the possible exception of the US. In most other countries, imitation of existing 
technologies, through technological transfers may have been more important. 
Although it still requires R&D to imitate existing technologies, for example 
by backward engineering a product, it probably does not require as much 
R&D as innovation itself. This suggests that R&D is only one of the main
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driving forces of growth for countries on the technological frontier. We try 
to investigate this hypothesis further by looking at the relationship between 
growth and job flows, in the next section.
The link between growth and physical capital accumulation
The growth regressions suggest that the investment share is not a significant 
determinant of steady state growth. This is consistent with Jones critique of 
AK models of growth, as documented in the previous chapter. It is not con­
sistent though with a large body of cross-sectional studies on growth, which 
usually find a highly significant and positive effect of the investment share 
on growth. Below I try and explain the source of this difference. Levine 
and Renelt (1992) did some sensitivity analysis across a large range of cross 
sectional growth regressions. They found most of the results to be fragile, 
with the exception of a positive correlation between growth and the invest­
ment share. Yet the results here and from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), 
both across a panel of countries, suggest that the effect of changes in the 
investment share on growth are insignificant. There could be two reasons 
for this difference. In cross sectional regressions, country specific effects are 
not controlled for. Yet as we have discussed at length earlier, these are 
undoubtedly important in multi-country analysis. It could that investment 
shares are correlated with these country specific effects, and thus the results 
would suffer from fixed effects bias, in a purely cross country study. Or it 
could be the case that growth causes investment rather than vice versa and 
thus the coefficient on the investment share has endogeneity bias, in a purely 
cross-sectional study. Both these effects can be controlled for by using panel 
data, as one can allow for fixed effects and use instruments to control the 
endogeneity bias. We suspect that the fixed effects bias is more important 
than the endogeneity bias. This is based on Jones’ evidence, which shows 
that investment shares are highly trended upwards in the OECD yet growth 
has been stationary, or if anything shown a slight negative trend, in the 
post WWII period. Given these facts, it seems unlikely that growth and
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investment shares have any strong link in either direction. This maybe what 
is being reflected in the lack of significance of the investment share in this 
study. The positive correlation in cross country studies, could be due to 
the fact that countries with high growth also happen to have been countries 
with high investment shares, without any causality implied. Once we allow 
for some time variation, within countries, it seems pretty clear that the link 
between investment shares and growth is not strong.
5.5 The Link between Growth and Job Flows
It has often been argued that economic growth in a market economy involves 
reallocation. Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ is exactly this process. If 
this is the case, then we should see a strong correlation between growth and 
job flows. Aghion and Howitt (1998) argue that if growth is caused by vertical 
product innovations, we should see a positive correlation between growth and 
job destruction. Vertical product innovation leads to business stealing from, 
and the eventual exit of, firms with outdated technologies. This will cause 
job destruction.
Vintage capital models use a subtly different conceptualization of Schum­
peterian mechanisms but reach the same conclusions. Caballero and Ham- 
mour (1994) and Campbell (1997) emphasize the role of entry and exit. If 
new technology can only be adopted by new establishments, growth occurs 
only via entry and exit, which requires factor reallocation and job turnover. 
The importance of this will depend on the size of the renovation costs, as 
modelled by Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) and discussed in Chapter 4. 
Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1997) emphasize that existing plants can 
adopt new technology by retooling. The retooling process may generate 
within-plant and between-plant job reallocation.
Davis and Haltiwanger (1998) survey recent plant-level and firm-level 
studies which have looked at the role of factor reallocation in productivity 
growth. These studies find that the reallocation of output and inputs from
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less productive to more productive plants plays a major role in industry- 
level multifactor productivity growth. Though a closely related literature 
investigating the connection between employment reallocation and labour 
productivity growth yields a more mixed set of results and a typically smaller 
role for reallocation.
Here, we try to determine the importance of reallocation via creative 
destruction by looking at more aggregate job creation and destruction data, 
for the US. This has been compiled by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1994) 
for the period 1973-1988 in the manufacturing sector. For manufacturing 
output we use data from Mitchell (1993) and construct growth rates, which 
we then pass through a low pass filter, to filter out movements of frequency 
eight years or less16. Figure 5.3 plots a scatter of annual job destruction 
rates against filtered manufacturing growth. It is difficult to discern a clear 
relationship, but when we plot scatter of job reallocation against filtered 
manufacturing growth( see figure 5.4), there seems to be clearly positive and 
significant relat ionship17.
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Figure 5.3: scatter of US job destruction vs. growth
16Data from Mitchell (1993) was used as the series available was very long. This makes 
the spectral estimator more reliable. For more details of these issues, see chapter 2.
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Figure 5.4: scatter of US job reallocation vs. growth
This difference could be due to two things: job reallocation is much less 
cyclical and volatile than job destruction as can be seen in figure 5.5, and 
thus the relationship between job reallocation and steady state growth could 
be less distorted by cyclical factors. Secondly, maybe job reallocation also 
captures the relationship between growth and job creation. As we noted 
from the bivariate evidence in chapter 3 and the systems estimates earlier in 
this chapter, if there is an effect of growth on unemployment, it is negative, 
suggesting capitalization dominates creative destruction. Maybe this is also 
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Figure 5.5: graph of US job realloaction and job destruction
To try to filter out cyclical effects more comprehensively, we look at the 
relationship between filtered manufacturing growth and the minimum of job 
creation and job destruction. The idea behind this is that at the steady state 
level of unemployment, we should have similar levels of job creation and job 
destruction18. Looking at the minimum of these two flows may be getting 
nearer to the steady state flows, with anything above the minimum being 
due to cyclical forces. Figure 5.6 below plots a scatter of the relationship. 
It seems that there is a positive relationship, though it is slightly under 
significance at the 10% level and there are a couple of outliers.
18This is, of course, abstracting from other flows into and out of the unemployment 














2 3 4 5
US filtered manufacturing growth
Figure 5.6: scatter of US steady state flows vs. growth
Evidence on job flows does exist for other countries, but we have refrained 
from trying to pool this data because, as Davis and Halitwanger (1998) note, 
cross country comparisons with job flow data are very dangerous due to 
differences in: sector coverage; data quality and business unit definitions. 
We concentrated on the US because: the data was good quality; the time 
horizon was relatively long and the US is still the frontier economy.
5.6 C on clu sion s
The interactions between growth and unemployment are both complex and 
multi-faceted. We have discovered in this chapter, that once we control for 
the impact of institutions, that the interactions between growth and unem­
ployment are weak. At best we only discover a weakly significant negative 
effect of growth on unemployment, in one of the unemployment specifica­
tions. If this is the true specification, it suggests capitalization dominates 
creative destruction, which is consistent with the bivariate evidence. Even 
if this effect is significant, the magnitude is not very high. A 1% increase
205
in growth will only reduce unemployment by 1%. Given that OECD unem­
ployment has differed by as much as around 15% in the post WWII period, 
whereas growth has only differed by a couple of %, it suggests that growth 
has not been the main cause of the structural movements in unemployment. 
If it is not the true one, then it is difficult to find any affect of growth on 
unemployment at all. Institutional factors are probably far more important.
Further analysis of R&D and job flows evidence, suggests that R&D mod­
els of growth and creative destruction mechanisms may be important in coun­
tries on the technological frontier, such as the US, but not so prevalent in 
other OECD countries. Also, results from estimating a growth and unem­
ployment evidence, suggest that changes in the investment share do not have 
significant effects on growth. This is consistent with Jone’s criticism of AK 
models of growth and suggests that accumulation of physical capital does 
not have major effects on steady state growth.
Overall, the evidence from the last three chapters suggest that the inter­
actions between growth and unemployment are small, with some marginal 
evidence of a capitalization effect. Unemployment can have effects on growth 
through mechanisms like: learning by doing, loss of skills, cleansing effects 
and savings; but they do not seem to be very significant in practice.
5.7 D ata Appendix
u =  standardized unemployment rate. Source: CEP-OECD data set.
g =  growth rate of GDP per capita. Source: Maddison (1994)
tl =  the tax wedge, defined as the sum of the payroll tax rate, the income 
tax rate and the consumption tax rate. The latter are average rates derived 
from national income and aggregate tax data. Source: CEP-OECD data set.
cr =  the gross replacement rate. Source: OECD Database on Unemploy­
ment Benefit Entitlements and Replacement Rates.
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7r =  the change in inflation. This is the average of the annual change in 
inflation, over five years. Source: CEP-OECD data set.
A2m l =  the change in the growth of ml. This is the average of the 
annual change in the growth of m l, over 5 years. Source: CEP-OECD data 
set.
hu = the Barro-Lee measure of the stock of human capital. It represents 
the average schooling years in the total population, over age 25 and is mea­
sured at the beginning of any sub-period. For example, for the sub-period 
1980-84, the measure is for 1980. Source: Barro-Lee data set.
gdp =  the log of GDP. Measured at the beginning of every sub-period, 
like hu. Source: Maddison (1994).
tot =  terms of trade shock: the growth rate of export prices minus the 
growth rate of import prices. Sources: Barro-Lee data set and for the last 
sub-period, various editions of the IMF publication International Financial 
Statistics.
(gfe) =  rati° °f real gross domestic investment (private plus public) to 
real GDP. Source: Barro-Lee data set, though the primary source is the 
Summers and Heston data set.
man = the level of manufacturing output. Measured at the beginning of 
every sub-period, like hu. Sources: CEP-OECD data set for the unemploy­
ment/growth regressions and Mitchell (1993) for the correlations between job 
flows and growth.
^  =  R&D expenditure normalized by GDP. Sources: NSF (1996) and 
OECD (1995).
jd , j r  =  annual job destruction and job reallocation rates for the US 
manufacturing sector. Source: Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996).
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bd =  benefit duration measured in years. 4 years is considered indefinite. 
Source: LNJ (1991), see Annex 1.3 of this for more precise details.
coord = is the sum of employer and union coordination indices produced 
by LNJ (1991). Both are measured on a scale of 1-3 with: 1 =  low; 2 =  
medium and 3 =  high. Source: LNJ (1991), see Annex 1.4 of this for further 
details.
ep = employment protection and is measured on a scale of 1-20 in with the 
degree of protection in ascending order. Source: OECD Jobs Study (1994).
uc=  a union coverage index, on a scale of 1-3. 1 =  under 25% covered; 
2 =  25-70% and 3 =  over 70%. Source: LNJ (1991), see Annex 1.4 of this 
for further details.
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spec. 1 2 3
dep variable Au Au Au
-0.35 (-1.46) -0.40 (-1.76) -0.66 (-1.11)
A t1 0.07 (0.70) 0.03 (0.29) 0.35 (0.60)
A ct 0.028 (1.07) 0.027 (0.59) -0.21 (-0.56)
A n -0.40 (-2.28) -1.27 (-1.65) -2.21 (-1.71)
A ut-i 0.99 (2.20) 0.59 (0.74) 0.04 (0.04)
no obs 70 70 70
serial corr. stat. -2.13 -0.44 0.47
sargan stat. 2.30 (df=3) 0.55 (df=3) 0.24 (df=3)
Table 5.1: U nem ploym ent Regressions
N otes
• We estimate using a one step IV estimator which has test statistics 
robust to heteroscadasticity across 5 time periods ( 1965-69, 1970-74, 
1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89). T ratios axe shown in brackets.
• The serial correlation test is for second order correlation and asymp­
totically converges to 7V(0,1). The estimator is consistent up to first 
order correlation. The Sargan statistic is based on the two step esti­
mator as performed by DPD. The reason we use this statistic is that 
the one step Sargan statistic, when heteroscadasticity is present, does 
not asymptotically converge to a x2- See Arellano and Bond (1991) for 
further details of these test statistics.
• In column 1, we use as instruments: ut- 2, A hu, A tot, A(^A), A man, 
mant_i and the time dummies. In column 2 we also use A3m l. In 
column 3, we augment the instrument set with t\_2 and crt_2-
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spec. 1 2
dep variable 9 &9
u -0.31 (-1.47) -0.47 (-1.40)
hu 0.0012 (0.40) 0.0055 (2.26)
tot 0.082 (2.33) 0.078 (1.73)
Igdp -0.099 (-2.43) -0.11 (-2.66)
i
G DP 0.10 (0.84) -0.07 (-0.40)
no obs 88 70
serial corr. stat. -0.47 -0.281
sargan stat. na 2.77 (df=3)
Table 5.2: G row th Regressions
N otes
• The type of estimator, is the same as for the unemployment equation.
• In column 2 the independent variables are entered in first differences.
• The serial correlation test is for first order correlation in the levels 
equation and second order correlation in the differences equation.
• In column 1, we use as instruments: t l, a , it, m a n , ( ^ ) i - 1 the fixed 
effects and the time dummies. In column 2 we use A t 1, Act, A3m l, 
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